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PREFACE 
The al.lthor chose·to.write a thesis on this particular 
subject with the prime intentiqn of acquainting himself with 
some aspect of the Constructio~ Industry. This was because 
he felt th~t, after ,obtaining a four year undergraduate 
degree in the theory of Civil.Engineering, he was insufficient-. 
ly prepared to enter the field of Construction. 
Furthermore, there are vast areas of application for 
Operations Research methods in Construction work. Apart from, 
the Critical Path Method, and similar scheduling techniques'· 
the,present writer considers that insufficient use has been 
made of Operations Research up to.the present time. 
This has possibly been caused by the absence of a 
comprehensive literature·on the applications of statistical 
methQdS to constructio~. The main reason for this is un-
doubtedly the reluctance of c01;npanies successfully using these 
techniques,to divulge information which might be of use to. 
thei+ competitors. 
The fact that not much work'had previously been done 
on this thesis topic made it a chall-enging one. 
In conclusion, the author wishes to acknowledge his 
debt to several peqple and institutions for their kindness 
to him. 
His year of study was made financially possible through 
the award of the Andrew Roberts Scholarship by the South African 
Federation of Ci~il Engineering Contractors and through a 
\ 
grant by the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, 
The author is indeed grateful to both these institutions, 
for without their help, this thesis could not have been , 
written. 
Next, the author wishes to express his sincere thanks, 
to certain members of a local firm of contractors. Not only 
were they always available to discuss points about which 
the author had little or no experience, but they allowed him 
to observe their tendering methods at first hand. Further-
more, the firm supplied data on past tenders which proved in-
valuable in the latter parts of this thesis. Unfortunately, 
since this data is of_a semi-confidential nature, the firm's 
name cannot be mentioned. 
For typing the manuscript, the author is very grate-
ful to Mrs. Elsie Chapman. Her patience in deciphering a 
nearly illegible handwriting was most commendable. 
· But,most of all, the author is indebted to his thesis 
supervisor, Professor A.D.W. Sparks, both for the refresh-
ing discussions held with him and for his encouragement in 
supporting a thesis on Construction. Without his subtle 
guidance, the author would certainly not.have learned as much 
about the subject as -he did-
PART 1 
FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED WHEN 
TENDERING 
CHAPTER 1, -. CHOOSING THE CONTRACTOR 
Section 1.1 General : 
Before.considering 1n detail that portion of the cost 
of ~ Civil Engineering project associated with the employment 
of a contra~tor, one should take an overall. look at the total 
cost of an average project. 
a) 
b) 
This would usu~lly include the following items 
cost of the land on which the project was to be built; 
. ' 
legal expense incurred 1n drawing up conditions of 
contract, etc., 
c) financial expense including interest on bank loans 
or the cost of issuing bonds; 
d) cost of construction itself; 
e) cost of employing consulting eng1neers to design and 
supervise the project; 
f) loss of inter~st that co.uld be·earned by capital tied 
up during the construction period; 
g) contingencies. 
It is clear that while construction costs do not con-
stitu~e the complete cost of a project, they nevertheless form 
a very large part. Hence, once the consultants have been 
appointed, they theoretically expend.a great deal of time and 
e~ergy in choosing an optimal design in close co-operation 
with the promoter. 
Figure 1.1 gives an indication of a typical pre-
contract programme for a reasonably large project. This 
flow diagram ends with the.tendering phase, and it is upon 
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\I Promotor ,, 
Original idea 
Approve design and give 
additional instructions 
I Consultants 
Receive initial instructions 
Prepare provisional and al-. 
ternative designs with re-
conunendat i'ClnS·· · 
Complete small scale working 
drawings 
t 
Obtain estimates from nominated 
sub-contractors 
~C_h_e_c_k __ c_o __ s_tr•o_f __ p_r_o_J_·e_c _ t~J~.-----------------------~ 
1 ~Prepare specification andl 
Secure approval of local' 
authority and complet~ ~ 
_leases, etc. j 
-----------........ I Accept 
Figure· 1.1 
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detail drawings 
quantities 
this that the .remainder of this thesis will be co:ncentrated. 
Section 1. 2 Types of Tender 
Obviously.there are many ways·~n which the. contractor 
for a project can be chosen. However the best approach 
generally depends upon particular circumstances, such as 
the type of job, size of project, time available for com-
pletion, etc. The various types of tender used at present 
are described in the following sub-sections. 
1.2.1 Open Competition. In this method, the promoter 
or his agent advertises for tenders from any interested 
contractor. Generally these tenders are for the whole con-
tract price. There are two main objections to this type of 
tendering. 
a) The essence of the method is that the lowest bid 
should be accepted. Hence anybody willing ~o chance 
a low bid will get the contract, and so it could 
possibly be awar.ded to an incompetent co:ntr actor. 
b) The better contractors might not bother to tender 
seriously if they feel that their chances of losing 
the award to an incompetent firm was high. 
At first glance at the tender results, one would ob-
viously be attracted by the.lowest price, but only after. 
estimating the additional co.st of delays and in extreme 
cases the cost of bankruptcy of the contractor, would the 
true cost emerge •. Hence promoters should try and. avoid 
open unrestricted tendering wherever possible. 
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1. 2. 2 The Selected List. In this system, the promoter 
or his agent invites certain contractors to tender for th~ 
proposed project. The contractors rna~ be _selected.in two 
I 
ways : 
a) A list of "approved'' contractors. is kept and a short 
list of at most eight contractors is selected from it 
for a particular contract. Good practice is to change 
the short list for each job so that all the contractora 
have equal tendering opportunities, though the present 
writer doubts if this ca,n always occur in practice. 
The approved list is changed periodically by removing 
the names of unsatisfactory contractors and inviting 
others to join. 
b) Should such a list not be kept, the~ contractors might 
be invited by advertisement to have their names con-
sidered for a short tender list for a particular project. 
The promoter then decides.to which cqntractors he will. 
send the tender documents. 
The main objection to selective tendering is its use 
by public bodies where there will always be complaints that 
the list has been unjustly complied. 
A model form of invitation (19a) requires the following 
information to be given in.the letter of invitation to the 
contractor •. 
a) The name and address of the promoter and his profession-
al engineer. 
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b) The name of the quantity surveyor and any other con-
sultants. 
c) Details of the form of.contract to be used. 
d) A description of the extent and nature of the .works, 
e) The proposed starting date and complet~on.time,. 
f) The time allowed for preparing the tenders. 
g) A reminder to the contractor that he is legally bound 
not to disclose his tender price to any other con-
tractors before all the tenders have been received. 
h) The period of time for which the invitation will be 
open for acceptance. 
1. 2.3 Based on Overheads and Profit Only, Such a tender 
is also done from a selected list of contractors, This method 
is usually adopted when there is insufficient time to prepare 
firm bills of quantities, The contractors generally submit 
prices in the form of percentages of the project cost for over-
heads and profit, and their percentages might also be required 
to include design and site supervision charges, The information 
given to the contractors will inc~ude the following 
a) Conditions of co.ntract (especially penalty clauses, 
defects liabilities, etc,); 
b) The project programme as envisaged by the promoter; 
c) The approximate anticipated value of the job; 
d) The way in which the remainder of the contract. 
price is to be paid. 
1. 2. 4 Based on Technica.l and Management Proposals.Only. 
This also is done from a selected list and would be relevant 
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when the construction of the project is likely to be of such 
magnitude and difficulty that the price of the contract would 
hinge on the method of construction. The contractor ~auld be 
required to submit the following information : 
a) The proposed method of construction together with a 
description of the main technical features;. 
b) The proposed system of organisation for the job; 
c) A progranune for the job including the date when work 
would begin; 
d) Budget prices with their degree of accuracy and a list 
of exclusions with reasons; 
e) The proposed extent of sub-contracting; 
f) Any quer~es about the general and special conditions 
of contr.ac t as suggested by the promoter. 
1. 2.5 Negotiations •. , In this case, the promoter selects 
a single-contractor,with whom to negotiate, While it would 
appear that the price offered by a single contractor _would 
be higher that1 the lowest of several tender bids, after com-
pletion and the totalling of the final co.nstruction cost a 
negotiated contract should be cheaper.· Indeed, if at the out-
set the project seems to be of such a nature that there is no 
reason why the tender price should not be the final price 
(i.e. no additional claims are likely to be made by the con-
tractor), then negotiation should not be adopted. On the other 
hand, should there be only one contractor qualified to com-
plete th~ proposed project, then there is no alternative but. 
to negotiate .• , Trying to convince the contractor that he ~s 
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tendering in a competitive environment would probably have 
disastrous results and d~stroy any confidence the contractor 
might have in the promoter. 
At the outset; an agre.ed programme for the contract 
must be drawn up. It should cover the.period from the start· 
of negotiations to the completion of the construction, and 
it would usually include the,following steps : 
a) Agreement on.the general contract conditions; 
b) The preparation of an estimate by the contractor .~n 
the same manner as if it were a contract·for tender; 
c) Agreement between the promoter and the contractor on 
quanti.ties and unit prices; 
d) Agreement on margins for overhead and profit. 
During the negotiation it u important to leave .very little· 
room for future disagreements. Hence a careful note is made 
of whether any variations are to be allowed in material prices, 
whether such prices include transport and hanc;lling costs; and 
whether trade discounts have been deducted •. Also, a reason(lble. 
allowance is made for contingencies. It·is agreed in some. 
quarters that overhead charges should not include expenses 
which are not .connected with the job in some way; for example, 
the cost of motor cars used by engineers working on other 
jobs., However, this would seem to be unreasonable, as the. 
contractor is only.in a position to negotia~e at all on accQunt 
of the experience gained by his organization as a whole. If 
the promoter wishes·to.make use of this experience, then he 
should surely pay for it. 
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1. 2. 6 Two - Stage Tendering. This may be done to ensure 
a measur.e of competition before negotiations proceed with a 
single contractor. Preliminary drawings and specifications, 
probably in note form, are distributed to the potential 
contractors who are asked to submit tentative material 
prices and labour and overhead rates as well as information 
about their plant capacity, site organization and other relevant 
details. From these reports, and possibly after interviews 
with the contractors ~n question, one particu~ar firm is chosen 
and the job proceeds as a normal negotiated contract. This 
procedure would seem to have most application when extensive 
design work ~s to be incorporated ~n the contract. 
1. 2. 7 Package Deals. These are also known as "Turn-
Key" contracts. A contractor may form a consortium with con-
sultants and perhaps with other contractors who are better 
equipped to perform certain specialized work, so that he may 
offer a price .to cover the·whole cost of a project. On the 
one hand it is argued that this will result in savings to the 
promoter because he will avoid the separate cost of consultants, 
and also the design will be executed keeping in mind the plant 
avai1able to the contractor. However, on the other hand it 
is held that the consultants are being paid in any case, and 
also that the contractor's equipment and resources limit the 
feasibility of an otherwise excellent design, which could be 
executed for a considerably reduced price by another contractor. 
Another argument advanced against package deals is that 
they are undesirable from the professional engineer's point of 
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view. It is felt that a loss of professionalism will re-
sult if the engineer shares in the profits of the contract; 
a) His supervision of the work in progress will not be as 
it should. 
b) Indirectly, he might indulge in self-laudatory advertis-
~ng. 
c) He will be offering his combined services with the con-
tractor in a competitive enviornment. 
d) It is possible that he might have to undertake a contract 
without the remotest possibility of making a profit, to 
avoid having the contractor's organization lying idle. 
1.2.8 Serial Tenders. These are applicable where there 
is a number. of ver;y similar projects to be constructed.. The 
first contract is put out to tender in the normal. way and the 
remainder of the contracts are negotiated using the original 
tender as a basis, Obvious advantages are that. speci.al 
equipment which. might have· to be purchased for the first 
contract will be assured of continu~d employment, and also 
that experienced and efficient construction teams will be 
formed on account of the repetitive nature of the work. This 
type of contract is especially applic~ble for industrialized 
building where a large initial outlay has to be made. 
Section 1.3 Types of Contract, 
There are several basic types.of contract that may be 
used for .Civil Engineering construction projects. Individually, 
these broad types of co,ntract may have different conditions 
of contr~ct associated with them. These conditions will be 
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dealt with at .a later stage, though (Chapter 3), 
1.3.1 Lump Sum Contracts. These provide for the contractor 
to be paid an agreed ·sum of money for the.completion of the 
project according to the drawings and specifications. The 
agreed sum may be V?ried only under special circumstances and 
these will be dealt with in the discussion on conditions of 
contract; This type of contract is most popular with pro-
moters for several reasons : 
a) The cost of the project ~s fairly well established at an 
early stage and thus aids financial planning; 
b) The contractor is provided with a good incentive.to keep 
his costs down and to hasten his progress; 
c) The promoter does not need to employ quantity surveyors 
to keep a close eye on the amount of work that has been 
done each pay period. 
1. 3. 2 Unit Price Contracts. These provide for the con-
tractor to be paid an agreed amount for each unit of work he 
completes. Obviously, this is done when there is doubt as to 
the. exact quantity of work in the. project. The tender documents 
include a l:lill of quantities which is priced by the contractor 
to. provide a tentatiye contract sum on a.basis of which the 
contract might be awarded, and more important; it provides the 
unit prices by which the .remeasured quantities are valued to 
pay the contractor. Unit price contracts may have several 
variations : 
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a) The contractor may be asked to price the items without 
being given even an approximate idea of the quantities 
involved; 
b) The promoter may have filled in the pr~ce~ opposite 
respective items and the contractor .is asked to make per-
centage adjustments on which the tender award might be 
based. This method was used in the United Kingdom during 
the Second World War because prices were subject to ex-
treme fluctuat;ion. It was known as "Tendering on Basic 
Rates"• 
1.3.3 Cost Reimbursement Contracts. These are.contracts 
paid for by calculating the actual amount.of money that was 
used to construct the project •. This type of contract·is used 
when speed is all-important and also when aspect.s of the project 
are. open to alter(ltions during the c<;>nstruction stage. In 
such cases the final cost of the contract; is very likely to 
be substantially higher than the original tender price after 
all the contractor's claims for extra payment have been settled. 
The problem with . this type of contract· is that. the co.ntrac tor 
has.to be paid enough money to cover his overhead costs that 
are not associat~d with the job, as well as a management fee, 
or profit margin. This might be done by paying the contractor 
an agreed percentage ~n addition to the total direct cost 
of the project. However, this is quite impracticable as the 
contractor _is provided with no incentive whatsoever to complete 
the job quickly or efficiently. In fact; the·less efficient 
he is, ,the more profit he will make. A slightly better 
method is to agree on a fixed amount to be paid to the. 
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contractor on completion of the project to cover his over-
heads and profit, While being an improvement this still is 
not all that good a method as the contractor is limited in 
the amount of profit he can make. 
1. 3.4 Target Cost Contracts. These are basically cqst 
reimbursement contracts in which an attempt ha~ been made to 
provide some incentive to t~e contractor. This is done by 
agreeing on a "target cost" for the contract befor~ con~truct­
Lon begins and then sharing any savings or excesses (depend-
ing whether.the final cost is under or over the target) between 
the contractor and the promoter. The target cost itself will 
usually include an amount for contractor's overhead and profit 
and it is generally slightly flexible to take into account 
variations in labour rates and some material price~. The 
contractor's percentage share in the difference between the 
actual and target prices will increase, the larger is this 
difference. In other words, the greater the savings he makes, 
the more of these savings are his, and the more inefficient 
he is, the greater quantity of the additional cost does he 
bear. The very.nature of this type of contract implies that 
the final project will ,not differ overmuch from its original 
plan. Hence it is questionable whether this type of contract 
is of much use as an alternative to straight-forward selective 
tendering when the_promoter has a choice of contractors for 
his project. One answer to this is that Ln theory the promoter 
will pay less as tenderers will not have to inflate their prices 
to cover contingencies. This writer envisages this type of 
contract being of real use only when plans for the project have 
been fully prepared and· there is only one. contractor prepared 
or qualified to do the work. These are severe limiations. 
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CHAPTER 2 ELEMENTS OF THE TENDER PRICE 
Section 2.1 General : 
Estimating should not be confused with tendering. In 
the present context, estimating may be defined as the calculation 
of the quantities and cos.ts of all the various separate items 
involved in constructing a project. When a contractor prepares 
an estimate, he does not make an allowance.for his own profit 
margin. After sufficient deliberation, he decides on a suit-
able profit amount and·adds it to his estimated price to make 
up his tender price. Hence, tendering includes. the profit 'margin 
while estimating does not, 
The joo of preparing an estimate is naturally an import-
ant one ~n a construction firm. Only those_men who have had 
fairly extensive experience are generally allowed to prepare 
estimates.. Usually .estimators work together with the men who 
will supervise .the project, should the tender prove success-
ful. Such a link at this stage is invaluable as site manage-
ment w~11 have nobody to blame but themselves-if they build 
the project for a higher price than the estimate; 
Apart from an accurate knowledge.of the output of both 
labour and· plant, .the estimator must have .. a practical mind and 
be able tq plan the construction properly and visualize exact-
ly how it will be carried out. Though the estimator seldom 
actually produces data·such as the cost of labqur and plant 
per unit of production, yet he must have .an extensive knowledge. 
of such costs to be able to select the most economical.methods 
of construGtion. 
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When preparing an estimate of the.cost of a typical 
project, the estimator has first to become thoroughly acquaint-
ed with the drawings and specifications •. Site meetings are 
often held at which the firms competing for the tender are 
represented and any queries relating to the drawings and 
specifications maybe put to the promoter or his represent-
ative (usually the consulting engineers). The site meeting 
is also important as ~he estimator.has to have first hand 
knowledge of the local conditions. He needs to appraise the 
physical site conditions so that he might form an idea of what 
plant is needed and how efficiently ·it will be able to work, 
as well as the. likelihood of sub-surface conditions being 
different from those indicated in the tender documents. He 
must also decide what services such as water and electricity 
must be provided as well as what the loc~l labour situation 
is, It could seriously influence the cost of labour if 
workers have to be imported to the work site and accommodated. 
there. Another factor that ~s to be watched, especially if 
large quantities of concrete are to be cast, is the proximity 
of sources of supply of aggregates. General access to the 
site is also important because double handling of materials 
and supplies is costly. 
Once the estimator ~s fully conve~sant with the requ~re­
ments of the project and the conditions under which it is to 
be constructed, he.has to draw up a detailed plan. Here a 
I>ractical mind and an eye for economy are all important. 
Decisions have to be made on how much plant. is to be used and 
where it is to be placed on the site. These decisions can only 
be made if the estimator has at hand an accurate knowledge of 
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the various types of equipment available at the time and 
their working capacities. For instance, he will build up an 
idea of the required rate of concrete production from the 
time allowed for the contract, an examination of the drawings 
and his assessment of site conditions. The size of the batch-
~ng plant is then set and space requirements for the storage 
of aggregates and access roads for trucks.can be determined. 
The rate of concrete production also dictates the method of 
placing (such as by wheel barrows or dump trucks, or by crane 
hoisted skips ,or concrete pumps). Once all similar consider-
ations have been taken into account, the price of a cubic,meter 
of concrete may be determined on this particular job. 
In such a manner, all the items in the.bills of quant-
ities are priced from a.break down into the cost of plant, labour 
and material. Certain items do not appear ~n the bills of 
quantit~es such as electricity, accommodation for the con-
tractor's si~e staff, telephone bills, and other overhead 
items •. Such .costs have to be distributed ,among the unit.prices · 
of the bill items or else they may be included in the.P & G 
bill as a lump sum together with management fees. 
A practical method used to distribute bot4 overheads· 
and profit is to mark up each bill item by a certain percent-
age and then make the final adjustment to the total price for 
the job by altering a lump sum item ~n the P & G bill. This 
permits late adjustments .. to be made. at any time right up untU 
the tender ~s submitted. This does; however, "unbalance" the 
tender price to some extent, but.this topic will be dealt with 
later. 
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The above description is of a detailed estimate. In 
many cases it is not.necessary or practicable to form such an 
accurate picture of the cost of a project. For example, 
during the feasibility study stage of a project, only the 
approximate cqst is called for. Rough estimates may also be 
used by contractors when planning their future operations, 
i.e. when deciding whether to make a serious bid for a project 
or not •. Approximate estimates may also be used to check more 
detailed estimates. 
The easiest way of making an approximate estimate.is to 
compare the project with a completed one of known cost, making 
adjustments for any differences in prevailing labour and 
material costs or in the structure itself. 
Slightly more detailed methods.include the following 
a) Unit of floor are~ met~od. The total floor area of the 
building is determined and this is multiplied by the past 
cost per unit of .floor area of buildings.of the same type; 
b) Unit of volume method. This is essentially the same as 
the previous method except that the total volume of.the 
building i~ determined. This method is generally more 
accurate than the unit of floor area method; 
c) Panel met~od for buildi~gs. The building is split up ~n­
to different types of'panels" (e.g. certain wall.or 
floor elements). The cost of one of each type is measured 
and this is then multiplied.by·the number of such panels 
to obtain the total cost of the building; 
d) Bay method for buildings. This method is useful for factory 
build,ings or warehouses comprising of several similar 
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bays. When totalling the individual costs, due allowance 
must be made for features such as end walls a~d windows. 
It is noticeable that the above.methods apply ex-
clusively to buildi~gs. Civil engineering projects might be 
classified into kilomet~rs of roadway, cubic·meters of reservoir 
capaci.ty or length of pipeline, but physical conditions domin-
ate .. to such an extent and are .so variable· from project to pro-
ject, that approximate e$timates are almost meaningless and 
if consider:ed, should be,looked at with extreme scepticism. 
It is important·to be systematic when preparing an 
estimate of any type. Checklists are invaluable in r~duc""". 
ing the likelihood of omitting any item of cost. Estimators 
generally .check. their work against act;ual. costs whenever 
possible. This-feedback of information from the site is 
useful both to the estimator and for controlling .actual con-
struction costs, though when comparison$ are made, the estimat-
or's plan of construction must be borne in mind as any .diff-
erences from the actual method of construGtion would.provide 
price .differences. If the site management was-not present 
during the estimating stage of the project, then decisions 
and· observations ·made concerning the method of constructi.on 
would have been communicated to them together with the cost 
estimates and tentative program. Hence the construction wi~l 
in most cases proceed along the lines originally envisaged. 
Another way the estimator may check his work if the 
tenqer is unsuccessful is to determine the cost of the project 
from the other tender prices. A good approximation may be 
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obtained if the tender bids are averaged without consider-
ing the lowest or highest of them. An expected profit margin 
should then be subtracted and the estimator has a reason-
able priee with which to compare his own. 
Section 2.2 Bills of Quantities 
Bills of quantities describe every item of labour and 
material which goes into the work, and also list the contract-
or's obligations with respect to temporary work, liabilities 
for defects, insurances etc. The estimator has first of all 
to check that the quantities entered opposite each of these 
items are correct and then he calculates the unit prices or 
lump sums relating to each item. 
Two distinct types of bills are usually included ~n the 
tender documents. These are the "Preliminary and General" 
(P & G) Bill and the "Measured" Bill. 
The Preliminary bill includes items that cannot be measur-
ed easily such as allowances for setting out, temporary site 
offices, dewatering, etc. It also includes an allowance for 
contingencies to cover unforseen occurences. This lump sum 
may also be used to adjust the.final tot~l tender price as 
explained previously. It is even conveivable that this or 
any.other item in the Preliminary bill could have no sum of 
money attached to it, depending on the opinion of the con-
tractor. 
The Measured bill is made up of a detailed schedule of 
the work involved ~n the. project. Each item is carefully 
described and.the quantity involved is statedo In the most 
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usual type of contract involving bills of quantitites, the 
contract is awarded to the lowest total tender price after 
which the unit rates entered in th~ bills of quantities are 
used to calculate the.actual quantity of money due to.the 
contractor when he has completed part of the work. These 
unit rates,are multiplied by the number of units of work 
actually done, which might often be different to the billed 
quanti,!:y. 
The bills .of quantities will often also include two 
special items, . These are "Prime Cost" items and "Provision-
al Sums". The promotor has a fixed sum of money entered 
opposite these items and no work needs to be done on them by 
the contractor's estimator. These sums are however included 
in the total tender price. 
Prime cost items cover materials that are to be ob-
t~ined by the contractor under the specific directions of 
the promotor's representative. The contractor has_no right 
to choose the supplier or the price of such items •. Should the 
cost of these.items differ from the sum appearing in the bills 
of quantities, then an adjustment is made· and, the_ contractor 
is fairly reimbursed. 
Provisional sums are.allocated in the same way for 
work not yet finalised at the time of tender. Such work may 
have to be done by either the contractor himself or else by 
sub-contractors. Naturally, payment is made only for the work 
done and.not for the sum shown in the bill. 
The present form of bills of quantities is under 
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severe critis~sm ~n the United Kingdom at present. It is 
felt that the ·form in use at. the moment is ill-suited for 
~se on any contract where equipment like cranes, concrete 
mixers, compressors electricity generators, etc •. are used 
to comp~ete more than one.item of work. The problem is to 
distribute the cost·of such plant fairly. In point .. of 
fact, bills of quantities were originally used on labour 
intensive projec~s, but with the advance of technology.in 
the construction industry, more mechanical equipment is now 
used, the cost of which forms a large part of the project con-
struction cost. In addition, .the bills of quantities in use 
at present are poorly suited for processing by computer to 
facilitate easier and· faster estimating. and .cost control. 
Essentially, separate bills are required for the maJor 
portions of the work of a different nature! Also the ideal 
bill of quantitie~ should separate the labour, plant, material 
and indirect costs and also give an indication of.the respect-
ive difficulty of the differen~ parts of work. Several new 
types of bills have been suggested, among which are 
a) Operational and Activity Bills. These.both.set out the 
quantities in the same logical order.in which the con-
struction will be executed. Operational bills split 
the work items up into plant, material and labour. 
requirements, while Activity bills keep to the conven-
tional format •. Both. these bills turn out to be longer 
than usual, but. this difficulty is overcome by the use 
of computers tq process them. 
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b) Component Bills. These identify the individual cost 
of items of work that are prefabricated and keeps 
separate the cost of fixing them. An obvious area 
of application is industrialised building. 
Section 2.3 Job Planning 
Job planning has been mentioned before, but as.this is· 
such a critical part of being able to offer the lowest con-
struction price, it shall be examined in greater detail. 
Before. the contractor's estimator ever sees the tender 
documents, the time available for completion of the job will 
have.been assessed.together with its affect on the project as 
a whole. Time is an important factor in deciding whether to 
put the contract out to tender or to negotiate a price with 
a particular contractor. Also it will have a bearing on the 
actual design of the project, for .instance whether industrial-
ised building methods should be used rather than convention-
al methods. 
But time is perhaps most important during the construct-
ion st~ge of .the project. Direct costs sucll. as those. of labour 
and plant tend.to rise with less availaqle time, .but on the 
other hand most indirect costs such as.supervision and of~ice 
overhead drop. Figure 2.3.1 shows the effect of decreasing 
the time to cons true t ·a project on the. to ta 1 cost of the project. 
It is noticeable that the optimum time for completion of the 
construction is in general somewhat less than the normal rate 
of working. 
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However; in most practical situations, the time for 
the contractor to complete a project is set by his client's 
requirements and by the fact th~t he will be hard pressed to 
meet them with the resources at his disposal. No contractor 
has unlimited resources. 
Once the time is known, efficient job planning involves 
deciding the quantity of plant or labour to use that will 
minimise the time during which these resources will be lying 
idle while still getting the job finished on time. For.instance, 
the size of cranes to be used on the job is important. Large 
cranes can.handle large loads but.will seldom be working to 
capacity, while smaller cranes able.to lift only lighter loads 
will probably be in action all the time. This could also 
affect among other things, the size of shuttering panels for 
concrete formwork. All this involves a detailed appreciation 
of precisely what ha.s to be done during each stage. As has 
been explained.before, only practical men of experience are 
really qualified to plan a job effectively. 
2/10 
Another important aspect of job planning ~s deciding 
whieh parts of the job should be sub-contracted and defining 
clearly the limits of responsibility of each sub-contractor. 
Time is well spent on this during the planning of a job to 
avoid any alterations later. 
The use of network techniques such as CPM or PERT is 
becoming widely used on large projects at the present time, 
but their use at the tender stage is severely limited by 
the lack of time available.for their preparation and they 
are only being drawn up after the contract has been awarded. 
However, in the United States and.Australia, more time is 
being allowed to tender for Government contracts and, in-
deed in some cases.the submission of a network is a pre-
requisite to the tender documents. It is hoped that such 
will become the case in South Africa, as networks are ~n­
valuable in locating potential areas of difficulty in a 
construction project. 
Section 2.4. Materials : 
The .costs of materials to be used in the project are 
relatively simple to estimate. It should be not~d however 
that such costs must include the total costs incurred up 
until the materials are delivered on site. This includes 
the price paid to the manufacturer, transport, handling and 
insurance costs until they arrive on site, and inspection 
and testing costs where applicable. Variations in price 
must be taken into account since dealers usually only give 
fairly short options on pric~s which are subject to fluctuation. 
This problem becomes more difficult w~en the project is likely 
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to last.a long time. 
The best sources of information on prices are quotes 
from manufacturers coupled with adequate past personal 
experience of price variations. However, it.is conceiv-
able that published data·may be used after adequate ad-
justments have been made to take into acount local con-
ditions. The most important South African publication 
is that by Merkel (24). The main problem with thi.s method 
~s that the best estimating information is generally kept 
secret. Some firms quote low costs for publication as they 
do not wish to disclose their inefficiencies while others 
might possibly even quote high costs tq try and discourage 
low bidding by competitors. In any event, published data is 
more often than not classified differently from the manner in 
which the estimator uses it. Also adjustment for local con-
ditions is seldom very easy. 
The wastage of materials should not be overlooked when 
estimating their cost. Percentages vary from job to job and 
certainly depend on the method employed to fix the· materiaL 
The ordering of standard lengths of steel reinforcement should 
be co-ordinated with the length of bars to be used in the 
structure, for instance. Also, concrete wastage is reasonably 
high when hatching is done on strength criteria, but it drops 
when volume methods are used. These and other factors should 
all be kept in mind by experienced estimators. Blatant mis-
takes in the placing of material are of course not considered. 
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Section 2. 5 Labour : 
The cost of labour to perform any particular task.is 
found by multiplying the number of man hours required to do 
that task by a relevant wage rate. 
This wage rate varies with the type of labour needed 
to perform the task. Artisans are paid more than crane drivers 
who are paid more than ordinary labourers. Furthermore, wages 
vary from place to place in South Africa. Also, it is im-
portant to include the total cost to the,contracting company 
when calculating wage rates. The cost of welfare and pension 
fund contributions as well as holiday bonuses, etc. must not 
be overlooked. Hence the hourly wage rates .used for estimat-
ing will be considerably higher than the amount handed to the 
men on payday. 
Additional labour costs will be incurred if labour has 
to be, imported to the work area from other parts of the countryo. 
A discussion of the present situation.in the Western Cape is 
presented in Appendix A. 
The wage rates deterrQined as al>ovehave to be multiplied 
by the relevant number of manhours to complete a part of the 
worko This will depend on the production of the labour which. 
in turn is dependant upon working conditiqns. The nature of 
the site is important as well as the quality of supervision. 
In this regard the,choice of foremen and engineers on the. 
job will have a marked effect on the total construction costs, 
and when estimating, allowances should definitely be made for 
the quality and cost of supervision available for the projecto 
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Further variations 1n labour production rates are 
caused by the state of the labour market as a whole. In an 
inflationary env¥3~ent when jobs are plentiful and wages are 
high, production tends to dropo The reverse is also true, 
and when there is a slight recession 1n the construction 
industry, production rises. Variations of this 
not usually considered by the estimator, though 
type are 
top manageml 
I 
might well, qnd indeed should take them into account when 
deciding on th~ final allowance to be made for profit. 
Generally, when calculating the quantity of manhours 
required to complete a portion of the work, estimators make 
use of tables. and diagrams. relating production to various 
factors. These production rates are obtained from records 
prepared on site to show the amount of work done, the number 
of workers used (classified into ordinary-labourers, operators, 
artisans, etc.), and.the time taken over the work. Any con-
ditions likely to affect the rate of production are carefully 
noted down, and the records themselves cover short time in-
tervals only, so that the conditions do not vary. 
The total duration of the project could also be taken 
into account whep deciding on production rates. At the start 
of a job, production tends to be relatively low until the men 
adjust themselves to the project and to the supervision. The 
job only starts going smoothly after some time, and the.more 
repetitive work the.re is, the more pronounced is the efficiency. 
Also, if there is only a small amount of work of a particular 
nature, such as laying bricks, the production rates _used for 
estimating should be lower than usual. However, in practice 
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this is difficult.to assess. 
Section 2. 6 Plant 
The term plant includes machinery, tools and temporary 
buildings and.other structures that are not included in the 
permanent works. Another important item,cl plant is shutter-
ing, but its cost.is generally included in the material rates. 
Temporary works such as site accommodation, electric 
light installations and wate.r tanks are usually estimated in 
detail and entered in the P & G bill. Others such as scaffold-
ing and timber to provide access to parts of the structure may 
be estimated and then distributed into the concrete or formwork 
prices. 
The cost of items of machinery such as cranes, compress-
ors,and concrete mixers must include the following : 
a) Depreciation. This is the cost of the equipment less its 
salvage value divided by its life in hours or i~ units of 
production. 
b) Investment. This is the cost of having capital tied up 
in an item of equipment. If the contractor had to borrow 
money to buy the machine then it is equal to the interest 
he has to pay on that sum of money, and if he used his own 
money, then it is the interest he could-have been earning 
with it. 
c) Insurance, taxes and licencing. These costs might vary 
with the .area in which the equipment is used. 
d) Repairs and maintenance. Such costs will vary extensively 
with the conditions under which the machine is put to work. 
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The·use of past data is essential in estimating these 
costs. 
e) Fuel, oil and tyres where applicable. These costs will 
also vary with operating conditionsi 
f) Operators. Their rates are obtained in the same way as 
for other labourers. It must be remembered that some items 
of equipment require more than one man to operate them; 
for .instance labourers to keep the site clear for easy 
' 
operation of a crane or greasers to keep the crane lubricat-
ed. 
g) Transport, erection, moving and dismantling. These costs 
vary considerably with different types of equipment and of 
course with site cqnditions and location. 
The costs of equipment mentioned above may be distribut~d 
amongst the.items in the 9ills of quantit~es in proportion to 
the.amount of output consumed by each item, but this is quite 
difficult to estimate in some cases. Anothe~ way is to distribute 
the cost in proportion to the estimated total material and labour 
cost of the items or else 1n proportion to tqe labour cost alone. 
Alternatively, the equipment costs may simply be included.in 
th~ P & G bill as job overhead, but this will unbalance the 
estimate somewhat, as explained previously. 
When estimating the cost of tools and other small items 
such as nails, survey pegs etc., it is common practice to apply 
a small percentage to the estimated total cost of the works, 
or else to make.additions to the labour cost of artisans, once 
it has been decided how many will be necessary on the job. 
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Section 2. 7 Overheads : 
By definition, overhead or indirect costs are costs which 
cannot be attributed to any particular item in the bills of 
quantities. However, this depends on how the costs are.collect-
ed. For instance when the job is underway, the costs of an 
electric generator can easily be distributed if meters are 
installed to measure the quantity of electricity used at every 
draw-off point. But when estimating, and in most cases in the 
field, this.cannot be done. 
Such indirect costs may be split into two categories. 
On the one hand·there areJob Overheac;l costs which can be charg-
ed to a particular construction project, but which.cannot be 
included under materials, labour or equipment. Such costs in-
clude the salaries of engineers, foremen, timekeepers, etc., 
temporary buildings; legal and professional services; testing 
of concrete; progress reports; protection of work such as 
lighting and watchmen; computer services, and many others. 
On the other hand. there are .. General Overhead costs which 
cannot be accurately associated with any particular project. 
Thes~ include the costs of running a head office and pay~ng 
for the staff to fill it; advertising costs, etc. 
It is impossible to draw any definite line between job 
and general overhead costs. For example, the cost of running 
motor cars for engineers might be considered as general or 
job overhead. Also typists spend certain amounts of time 
processing work for a particular job, but it.is difficult to 
keep track of such a cost. Firm guide lines should be set by 
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top management to decide which costs should be.included under 
what category and this will affect the tender prices quite 
considerably in some cases. 
If rather more indirect costs are collected under general 
overheads, then small projects will bear ·somewhat less than 
their fair share of such costs and the price of large jobs.will 
be higher. Therefore if the company·policy is to obtain the 
larger contracts, an accurate and detailed distribution of costs 
should be achieved. 
Job overhead costs are usually estimate4 in detai~, but 
a percentage obtained from past experience may be applied to 
the estimated combined cost of materials, labour and·plant; 
or else to the labour cost alone. This percentage will depend 
on the nature of the job, its size, the probable difficulties 
that will be encountered, previous experience on that_type of 
job, etc. 
General overhea4 costs may be distributed among jobs 
according to their total estimated cost or their estimated cost 
of labour alone, or else according to their relative durations. 
An example of the distribution of general overhead costs is 
as follows 
Average annual value of construction 
= R 3 000 000 
Average annual cost of general overhead 
R 90 000 
.Rate to be applied to each project 
90 000 X 100 
= = 3% 
3 000 000 
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On very small project_s, it is even possible that the 
two types of overhead may be combined into one and a single 
percentage applied to the estimated cost. 
Section 2.8 Contingencies 
Estimates can never be made with complete certainty. 
This is caused by the very nature of construction, and it is 
this perhaps that makes contracting a stimulating occupation 
t~ nearly all who undertake it. Unfortunately, human nature 
tends to underestimate potential difficulties, and this is 
why careful consideration should be given to areas of the esti-
mate where information is incomplete. 
Of particular importance is data concerning subsoil 
conditions. Should this appear to be·particularly scanty, the 
contractor-might even conduct pre-tender tests at his own ex-
pense. The more fl?usual approach though, is to estimate the 
amount of money necessary to overcome any likely adverse 
conditions, .and add this to the P & G lump sum item for con-
tingencie~. 
The term contingency applies to future occurrences 
which cannot be predicted with any reliability. More specifical-
ly, it applies to occurrences which will cost the contractor 
an additional amount of money •. For this reason, the lump sum 
is set aside in the bills of quantities. 
The exact quantity of money that should be set aside 
is decided by the estimator from his practical experience, and 
by his being able to recognise potential trouble spots. 
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Aspects of the project likely to influence the size of 
the contingency sum, apart from subsoil conditions already 
mentioned, include any natural hazards such as icy conditions, 
floods or ordinary rainy weather. Also variations in the 
market situations of labour,or materials should be anticipated 
as far as possible, and adequate financial provision made. 
The nature of the project itself might also .warrant the 
inclusion of a financial safety factor., For example, if an 
estimate was being made for a reservoir, the,cost of repairing 
any leaks might be taken into consideration, especially if work-
ing conditions were difficult. This leads on to another point, 
If the conditions of contract (to be dealt with later) include 
severe penalties for overrunning a time limit and the estimat-
or considers it to be a fairly difficult one to meet, then a 
sum might be included with the contingencies. 
Of course, it must be appreciated that the larger the 
sum of contingencies, the smaller will be the probability of 
winning the tender in competition with other contractors. 
Therefore,a really careful and thorough examination of the 
estimate by competant.construction men is necessary. 
Section 2. 9 Profit : 
Business concerns may be broadly defined as mechanisms 
for increasing the value of their input resources by trans-
forming them into output products of higher value. The differ-
ence in monetary a~ount is known as profit. Constructi9n firms 
are no exception to this description. 
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The amount of profit for any particular job is usually 
expressed as a percentage of the ,estimated cost of the job. 
This percentage might in some cases include the allowance for 
overheads, but it.is better practice to separate the two 
when tendering. Instead of being entered in the bills of 
quantities as a lump sum, some contracto.rs apply a fixed per-
centage to material costs to cover profit and then add different 
percentages, which will vary from job to job, to labour and 
equipment rates. 
A "normal company profit policy" might be to decide on 
the profit amount for a job in much the.same way as overheads 
are determined. For instance, the annual dividend paid to 
ordinary shareholders might be distributed amongst the firm's 
contracts in proportion to their estimated cost. This is not 
a very good method in the opinion of this writer as no allow-
ance is made for company growth. A rather better method 
would be to base the profit percent on the budget for the forth-
coming year. The projected profit for the year should simply 
be divided by the.anticipated turnover for the year to yield 
a percentage value. 
However, most contractors.work on a rule of thumb 
whereby 10% is considered a normal margin to cover both profit 
and overheads, and it is altered depending on the circumstances 
of the project. 
Such alterations may depend upon some of the following 
factors 
a) The Competition. Obviously the more competitive the tender-
ing situation, the less will have to be allowed for profit 
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so that the contractor has a better chance of securing 
the job. 
b) The Risk. This LS particularly important·when tendering 
for earthworks •. Although an amount-of money may be set 
aside for contingencies, if there is a chance that the 
contractor might lose badly on a job, a higher profit 
margin is· usually required. 
c) The Job location. If the project site is fairly removed 
from the contractor's usual sphere of operations·he will 
require more profit on the job to induce him to extend his 
area of activity, 
d) The Duration of the job. If the job is a long one and will 
provide a certain.source of employment for the.contractor's 
resources, a decrease in profit for the job is usually con-
sidered a reasonable price to pay for increased securityo 
Conversely, if the job is a short one, a higher profit is 
generally sought. 
e) The Size of the job. Generally speaking, the smaller the 
job, the higher the percentage profit considered worthwhile 
by co.ntractors. The only possible justification for this 
is much the same a9 that concerning job duration, namely 
security. Another possible reason is that smaller jobs 
make smaller contributions.to office overheads. 
f) The Firm's need for the job. Less profit will be required 
on jobs when the contractor is likely to have some of his 
resources lying idle if he does not win the.tender. Also, 
if top management has decided to branch into a new field of 
construction, contractors might even be prepared to suffer 
losses to obtain experience which will eventually boost 
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long term profits. 
g) The· Type of supervision to be expected,. If ·the contractor 
has had previous experience with the supervisory consulting 
engineers or local authority and has found their critisisms 
to be unrealistic and unhelpful in the past; then he will 
increase his estimate by a larger profit percentage than 
usual. The opposite is also true. He will decrease the 
profit margin if he has enjoyed·a pleasant relationship 
with the promotor's·representatives. 
h) The Quality of the estimate •. If the contractor knows the 
estimate tq be a good one, he will not mark it up by as 
large a percentage as if he knew it to have been prepared 
in haste without overmuch attention to detail. 
In general then, the percentage addition made to the 
estimate for profit is at present decided almost.entirely Ln~ 
tuitively. The contractor simply decides upon the profit for 
which he considers the undertaking of the job to be worthwhile 
and then he adjusts this slightly to conform to what he believes 
are the current market conditions. This writer considers that 
considerable improvements may be made to this method by adopt-
ing operations research techniques, and a large portion of this 
thesis will be devoted to that end. 
Financial aspects are also important when profit is .. 
considered. For instance, if a contractor proposes to. buy· 
special equipment for a particular job, and intends using a 
loan to finance it; his banker will take a very close look at 
the profit the venture seems likely to make before giving his 
approval •. Also, the potential profit on the capital expenditure 
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necessary for a job should be compared with the interest and 
security that.might be gained by soundly investing the money. 
Finally, certain considerations-about profit margins 
are peculiar to negotiated contracts. It must be clarified 
at the outset whethe~ the.allowance for ,profit is to include 
overhe~d costs or not. Also, it is important to agree exactly 
on which sum the profit percent is to apply. Obviously, the 
inclusion of overheads into the basis will increase the profit 
amount, but whether the percentage is to be applied to the cost 
of the construction to the contractor, or to the promotor also 
will have quite an effect on the monetary amount •. An elementary 
example is given in figure 2.9.1 to clarify this. 
· C.ost of materials, labour, plant and .overheads C 
Profit percentage P 
If the profit margin is to be applied to the cost of the 
project to the contractor : 
profit PC 100 
But if it is to be applied to the cost of the project 
to the owner 
profit = PC 100 + c . 
p 
100 
The .second amount. is greater than the.first. 
Figure 2.9.1 Profit Example. 
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Section 2.10 Accuracy and Mistakes : 
As has been me~tioned before, it would be a very rare 
occurrence indeed if the final cost of a construction project 
were to be exactly the.same as the estimated cost. 
The most important factor affecting the accuracy of an 
estimate is the availability of cost data. Ti~e and money are 
well spent in developing aneffective feedback system from the 
site to the estimator's office. Accuracy and accessibility of 
cost information also depends to a large extent on the account-
ing system used and. the company secretary always considers the 
estimator when deciding how to collect and store information 
from the .sites, The availability of cost, data will also depend 
upon the number of past jobs that have been completed which are· 
similar to the prc>posed project. For this reason, more accur-
ate information will be available for conventiqnal building 
jobs than for roadways if the contractor is city based and has 
generally specialised in.buildings, for example, 
Another factor that helps the accuracy of the estimator. 
is the degree to which the job has been split up when the bills 
of quantities were prepared. To this end, the.new operational 
bills mentioned previously (Section 2.2) should.be of ad-
vantage. 
The concept of accuracy as used above in no way should 
be confused with mistakes. These are results not of inaccur-
ate cost data (the collection of which is not usually the 
province of the estimator) but rather of carelessness ~n 
ordinary·arithmetic, or in leaving out an item in the bill of 
quantities. The use of check lists should avoid the occurrence 
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of the latter, and.the former may usually be-avoided by having 
two people total the estimate separately. 
However, mistakes conceivably_,· might st~ll escape the 
notice of the contractor. Should this be the case, and the 
mistakes are only noticed when the tenders are under scrutiny 
by the,promotor _or his representatives, the_tender-is usually 
altered in such a way-that the total amount remains the.same. 
The following example should clarify this 
Preliminaries 
Earthworks 
Bridgeworks_ 
Roadway construction 
.R 5 000 
R45 000 
R20 000 
R30 900 
Assume that the contractor _had totalled this to RlOO 000 instead 
of the correct amount-of RlOO 900- i.e. his-total was R900 too 
smalL 
The procedure in common use is to apply a percentage 
reduction to the_measured items. Note' that preliminary items 
and prime cost or provisional sums are not adjusted. This is 
because the-contractor _does.not apply his profit percentage to 
these amounts. 
The measured items total R95 000, of which R900 ~s 0,95%. 
This is the reduction made.to the measured items. The revised 
amounts are.as follows : 
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Preliminaries 
Earthworks 
Bridgeworks 
Roadway construction 
Total. 
R 5 000 
R44 600 
Rl9 800 
R30 600 
RlOO 000 
However, should the error be detected only after ~he 
award of the contract; then. no alterations are usually ma,de,. 
If the contract is based on unit rates, then.the total.price 
is disregarded and the given rates are deemed to apply. If 
the contract is based on a lun1p sum, then the total as sub-
mitted by the contractor is held to apply. 
Should the error in tqis case be to the contractor's 
disadvantage and if i~ can be proved that.the owner knew of 
mistakes in the tender before the contract·was signed, then 
the contractor might take the .. case to court and a charge of 
fraud would probably be upheld. Naturally, it would be 
extremely·difficult to provide a~equate evidence.in support 
of such a charge. 
Section 2 .ll Unbalancing : 
Tenders are unbalanced when the contractor purposefully 
alters his unit rates from those he has estimated to be the 
most likely ones that will apply to the bill items. Obvious-
ly this will only apply to unit price contracts. 
The main·reason that contractors.unbalance their tender 
bids is that they feel that the quantities shown in the tender 
documents will prove to be different when the job is.actually 
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underway. Consider the following example, 
'. 
A contractor might be estimating the cost of excavation 
for a construction project, and the following quantities might 
be given in the tender documents : 
Rock 
Soil 
The normal prices that he would quote for excavating in rock 
and in soil might be R2,00 and Rl,OO per m3 respectively. 
Thus, his pr~ce for the whole excavation would be RS 000. 
But let us imagine that this particular contractor had 
previously done.a large amount of work in the area adjacent 
to the site, and that only one third of his excavations had 
been in rock~ Furthermore, he.was reasonably certain that. 
this would also be the case this time. In other words, these 
quantities would apply 
Rock 
Soil 
1 000 m3 
2 000 m3 
Should this turn out to be the case, and he had quoted 
his normal prices, he would only receive R4 000 for the work. 
There are now two courses of action open to him. On 
the one hand he might reduce his contingency allowance for the 
tender by R 1 000, while.still quoting R2;00 for rock and Rl,OO 
for soil excavation. This would reduce the total price of his 
tender and· give him a greater chance of winning the contract 
over his competitors while the actual profit he finally re-
ceives on the job is no different. 
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Alternatively, he could alter his rates so that he would 
receive more for the excavation after their final measurement 
than if he ~eft the.rates as they were. This could be done 
py quoting Rl,50 for both rock and soil ex~avation. In 
this case, the total for excavation appearing in the.bills of 
quantities would be.R 4 500, while if the quantities turned 
out as he anticipated, the contractor would receive R 4 500. 
In this way he would have increased his chance of winning 
the contract as.well as increasing the.amount he.would be 
paid in the.end. 
He ·could even improve on this .if he quoted Rl ,00 for 
rock excavation and R2,00 for soil e~cavation. His tender 
price .for the excavation would then be R 4 000 while the 
actual price he would be paid, assuming his assumption of 
quantities was correct would be R 5 000. At his normal rates 
he would have bee~ paid R 4 000 and so he would be making 
R 1 000 extra for no additional work. 
Practical limits are of course set on this since a 
price for rock excavation lower than that.for soil would be 
viewed with considerable suspicion when the tenders.are under 
scrutiny before the award of the contract• In fact, a tender 
may be rejected completely if it is felt that it is too bad-
ly unbalanced, though this is an extremely difficult decision 
to 111ake because of normal variations that will be present in 
the.rates quoted by different contractors. 
Naturally, the contractor would be at.a considerable 
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disadvantage if conditions should not be as he predicted. 
His decision whether or not to unbalance his prices would 
take this into account. 
Further reasons for unbalancing would be to disguise 
true costs from competitors if the complete tender results 
were to.be published, and also to ensure.early·payment for 
parts of the contract. If the pr~ces of bill items that will 
be completed towards the beginning of the contract are in-
flated slightly while later ones are decreased, the contractor 
will receive more cash sooner than normal, and.he would be 
able to use this for financing later parts of the project. 
This will result in monetary advantages because he.would not. 
have to keep as much capital tied up in the project. 
Operations research techniques may be used with advant-
age when,deciding how to unbalance a tenqer bid; and·more will 
be written about.this topic later (Appendix H). 
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CHAPTER 3 CONDITIONS OF CONTRACT 
Section 3.1 Legal. Aspects : . 
An important ,point is that a contract can be legally. 
binding even though it has·not been formally signed before 
appropriate.witnesses, Exchanges of letters, or even. telephone 
conversations may constitute.contracts, but there are obvious 
practical difficulties. 
The basis of any contract is agreement. This is reach-
ed when an offer has been made by the. one party ·.and it has 
been, accepted by the other. These concepts of offer and 
acceptance are of prime importance~ 
Invitations to tender are rarely offers in themselves. 
This.would only be tQe case when the employer has included words 
to the effect that.the lowest of the tender prices will de-
finitely be accepted. This does not often happen. It is 
rather the. contractor's tender bids the.msel ves that are the 
of:l;ers. However, this would not be the case if the contractor 
should insert words like "subject to contract" which would 
imply-that his prices would only become.firm when the contract 
was signed. This would probably reducethe desirability of 
the tender, though, and so the usual procedure is,for the 
offer to originate from the contractor and the acceptance to 
come from the employer. 
From this, it may _be seen that no _contract is in exist-
ence when the contractor makes .his offer, and.so he has to bear 
the.cost-of his estimate. However, shouldhe be able to prove 
3/1 
that the employer invited.him to submit a tender without 
ever-intending to consider it for acceptance, then the con-
tractor would be able to charge the employer with fraud and 
claim the costs of the estimate from him. 
An offer may be withdrawn at any time before it is 
accepted. The exact timing, however, is .. important~ The 
revocation takes effect only when it is ,received· by the person 
to whom the offer was made,.and not from the tillle the offeror 
decides to revoke. Thus,, if the notice of withdrawal of the 
offer is .sent by mail, it takes effect when it is received and 
not when it is posted. On the other hand, if the contractor 
had specified .that acceptance of his tender was-to be posted 
to him, his offer .would be aGcepted at the time the employer 
actually posted his.letter and not.when.the contractor receiv-
ed it • In most cases,. though, the tender bids are opened 
publicly in the presence of the contractors, and after their 
appraisal by the employer, he gives his formal acceptance to 
the.contractor in person. 
I~ some cases; disputes arise as to the meaning of 
certain clauses in the contract" Should legal action be 
taken, the courts either.adopt the meaning of the wording of 
the contract if it is clear, or else they try and ascertain 
the meaning tqat both parties intended at the time of sign-
~ng. This is.an important·basis of contractural law in South 
Africa. 
Finally, in all conditions of contract in general 
use·for Civil Engineering projects ~n South Africa it is im-
portant to note that there is no contract,between the owner 
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and the sub-contractors. This means that.the ma~n contractor 
is fully responsible for the work and other actions of his 
sub-contractors. 
Also,there is no contract between the contractor and 
any architect or engineer representing the employer. This . 
implies that the employer is liable for all the acts of his 
representing engineer and is himself responsible to the con-
tractor for any negligence on the part of his engineer. The 
contractor may not sue the eng~neer or architect. 
Section 3.2 General Remarks :. 
In this and the following·sections, we shall consider 
the conditions of contract that are most generally used for 
construction in South Africa. 
The terminology that contracts are made between the 
"employer" and the "contractor"·is generally used in these 
conditions and shall be adopted ~n the following discussions. 
Conditions of contract are used primarily to define 
the relationship between the employer and the contractor and 
to set out the procedure to be followed should this relation-
shio be disturbed for any rea~on. 
The author obtained copies of and studied several sets 
of Conditions of Contrac~ in use in South Africa, and a list 
of .these appears below : 
a) "General Conditions of Contract and Forms of Tender, 
Agreement and Bond for Use in Connection with Works of 
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Civil Engit;~.eering Construction", approved by the South 
African Institution of Civil Engineers, the South African 
Association of Consulting Engineers and. the South African 
Federation of Civil Engineering Contractors. 
b) "Agreement and Schedule of Conditions of Building Contract", 
approved and recommended by the Institute of South African 
Architects, the Chapter of South African Quantity Surveyors 
and the Building Industries Federation (Squth:African). 
c) Conditions of Building Contract used by the Department 
of Public Works. 
d) "Conditions of Contract (International) for Works of Civil 
Engineering Construction" as recommended·by the Federation 
Internationale des Ingenieurs- Conseils (F.I.D.I.C.)~ 
Federation Internationale des Enterpreneurs Europeens de 
Batiment et des Travaux Publics (F.I~E.E.B.T.P.) and the· 
International Federation of Asian and Western PacifiG 
Contractors. Associat~ons. (I.F .A. W. P. C .A.;). 
e) "Cape Provincial Adn;1inistrat;ion Departmet;~.t of Roads -
General Conditions of Contract for Construction of Roads 
and Bridges and Supplementary Works". 
f) "City of Cape Town - Contracts for Civil Engineering and 
Building Works- Conditions of Contract". 
These present a general cross-section of conditions. ~n 
use~n Squth Africa at ,the present time. The last· two may be 
considered,typical of conditions of contract used by local. 
authorities, while the first three are in more general use. 
A comparison of the important·clauses of these con-:-
ditions. is presented in summary in Appendix B. These. clauses 
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will be more fully·discussed below. 
Sec ti.on. 3. 3 Surnm~ry of Clauses : 
In thi$ section, a di~cussion,will .be given of the.main 
clauses of the conditions of contract.mentioned aboye. Not 
an of.·. these clauses will have a direct influence: on the con-
tractor's estimate, but they are included tQ present. the com-
plete picture of his responsibilities during the c~nstruction 
period of the project. 
3~3.1. Assignment and Sub-contracting. Suchclauses.re-
quire that.neither the employer nor the.contractor may ass~gn 
the whole or any part,of·their responsibilities to somebody 
else without, the cpnse~t of .the other. Also, these clauses· 
usually provide.that the c<;>ntractor may not sub-let the whole 
of the works, and .that.he is. responsible for everything done. 
by·his sub-.con~ract;:ors. Thecontractor·usually has·.to submit. 
a list of his probable sub-contractors at.the t~nder stage; 
and this is confirmed whe~ the contr.ac t, is· awarded. It is 
import<;1nt ·that th.e ·contractor. should impose the same liability 
for defects (Sub-sectipn 3.3.11) on.his sub-contractors as 
has been imposed·on.him, othet;"wise he might find .himself in 
some difficulty. Finally, some conditio~s of contract provide 
for the employer to pay. the sub~contractors directly, should 
the main·co~tractor.default. Should this·not be the case, it 
is legally possible for the sub-contractor to c1aim '\.u:i.just 
enrichment' .. ' frotn the main. contract<;>r, should the ,latter have 
be~n pa~d for the.sub-contracted portion of the work, and the 
sub-contractor had not completed it· himself yet. 
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3.3.2 Arbitration. Litigation is both expensive and 
time consuming, and so such clauses are.included to provide 
for the appointment of an umpire. The arbitrator is usually 
either the head of the relevant Institution approving the 
conditions of contract, some other prominent person, or else 
. \ 
some one agreed upon by both parties e~ther before.the contract 
is signed or when a dispute arises •. The arbitrator can decide 
on.most,disputes, but he does not have jurisdiction to decide 
whether a contract is void or whether he himself in fact has 
jurisdiction upon any question, should this be challenged. 
These points have to be.referred to a court of law. 
3.3.3 Bankruptcy. Should the contractor be declared 
insolv~nt, then the employer has several courses of action 
open to him : 
a) He may terminate the contract and only pay the contractor 
the balance of any money due to him after the employer's 
expenses have been deducted. 
b) He may allow the contractor's liquidators or sureties 
to complete the contract• 
c) He may allow the original contractor .to complete the 
. project, should this .. be possible. 
d) He may employ another contractor to complete the contract 
and deduct any additional expen$eS from any money owing 
to the original contractor. 
The original contractor is only paid at the end of the 
contract (i.e. after the maintenance period), if at all. 
Should the employer be declared insolvent then the 
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contractor has first to remove his plant and equipment and 
any unfixed materials from the site and shall be paid any money 
due to him, in addition to money for any losses he might incur 
from the determination of the contract. However, it would be 
very unlikely that any payment would actually be received, 
and.so a careful inspection of the employer's financial state 
of affairs obviously is advisable before.the contractor.enters 
into a contract. 
3 •. 3. 4 Certificates and Payment. Such clauses will be dis-
cussed later together with other financial conditions (Chapter 
4). 
3.3.5 Completion and Delays. The time for completion 
and the amount of "liquidated damages" for any delay beyond· 
this time are usually set out in the tender documents. Ex-
tensions to this time are possible should written requests for 
such extensions have been submitted to the engineer at the time 
of any unforeseen delays. The date·of completion is marked by 
the issuing of a certificate by the engineer, and these may 
also be issued when individual sections of the work are ready 
for use by the employer. Should this be the case, the amount 
for liquidated damages will be reduced by an appropriate amount. 
The completion date set out ~n the .tender will cease to apply 
when any alterations or omissions are made to the quality of 
work, and.in such cases, a new date has to be agreed upon, 
Should the contractor exceed his time limit, then the agreed 
amount of money for damages that he owes-shall be deducted from 
any money due to.him from the employer, and due allowances for 
3/7 
such damages might be made in the contract<;>r's bid, should 
the time restrictions appear tight. 
3.3 • .6 Contractor's default. The remedies that the em-
player might have against the contractor are set out in these 
clauses and they are the same as those given-in connection 
with the bankruptcy clauses. The situations in which such 
remedies come into effect are also given, and in general these 
are when the contractor has abadoned the contract or has not 
started work within a reasonable time of the agreed date, or 
else has ignored the engineer's written instructions concern-
ing any disregard the contractor has shown for any of the 
conditions of contract. 
3.3.7 Vesting of.the Contractor's Equipment. Such claus-
es are not always included in the conditions of contract. They 
require that ownership of any equipm~nt or materials brought 
on site by the contractor passes to the employer until the 
works have been completed, or until the contractor has been 
allowed- to remove them.- This .latter usually may not be done 
without the permission of the engineer. The purpose of these 
clauses is to provide the employer with some security against 
any default by the contractor, in which case the employer may 
use the equipment and materials to complete the project, or 
else sell th~m to help pay for any losses. 
3.3.8 Contractor's Representatives and.Workmen. These 
ctauses require that the contractor should supply adequate super-
vision as well as competent workmen for the project. The 
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e n g i n e e r  i s  g i v e n  t h e  p o w e r  t o  d i s m i s s  f r o m  t h e  w o r k s  a n y  
w o r k m a n  w h o  a r e  u n a c c e p t a b l e  f o r  o n e  r e a s o n  o r  a n o t h e r ,  a n d  
hi~ w r i t t e n  a p p r o v a l  o f  t h e  c o n t r a c t o r ' s  s i t e  a g e n t  i~ r e -
q u i r e d .  A d e q u a t e  w a g e s  a n d  h o u s i n g  h a v e  a l s o  t o  b e  p r o v i d e d  
f o r  l ? b o u r e r s  a n d  d a t a  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  n u m b e r  e m p l o y e d  a n d  
t h e i r  w a g e s ,  e t c . ,  i s  t o  b e  p r o v i d e d  t o  t h e  e n g i n e e r  o n  h i s  
r e q u e s t .  
3 . 3 , 9  
D a m a g e  t o  p r o p e r t y  a n d ·  i g j  u r y  ·  t o  p e r  s o n s .  U n t i l  
t h e  c e r t i f i c a t e  o f  c o m p l e t i o n ,  t h e  c o n t r a c t o r  i s  c o m p l e t e l y  
r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t h e  c a r e  o f  t h e  w o r k s  a n d  f o r  a n y  d a m a g e  t o  
p e r s o n s  o r  p r o p e r t y  r e s u l t i n g  f r o m  h i s  o r  a n y  o f  h i s  s u p -
c o n t r a c t o r s '  negligence~ a n d  h e  i s  r e q u i r e d  . t o  in~emnify t h e  
e m p l o y e r  a g a i n s t  a n y  c l a i m s  f o r  s u c h  d a m a g e ;  .  T~e c o n t r a c t o r  
i s  n o t  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  c e r t a i n  " e x c e p t e d  r i s k s "  s u c h  a s _ r i o t , .  
w a r ,  e t c . ,  c a u s e s  d u e  t o .  t h e  e m p l o y e r ' s  u s e  o f  c o m p l e t e d  . p o r t i o n s  
o f  t h e  w o r k ;  o r  c a u s e s  d u e  t o  f a u l t s  i n  t h e  e n g i n e e r ' s  d e s i g n  
o f  t h e  w o r k s .  T h e  c o n t r a c t o r  a l s o  d o e s  n o t  h a v e  t o  i n d e m n i f y  
t h e  e m p l o y e r  a g a i n s t  c l a i m s  a r i s i n g  f r o m  t h e  p e r m a n e n t  
o c c u p a t i o n  o f  l a n d  f o r  t h e  w o r k s  o r  f r o m  a n y  a c t i o n s  b y  t h e  
e m p l o y e r  o r  h i s  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .  A n y  a l t e r a t i o n s  t o  t h e , g e n e r a l  
a s p e c t s  o f  t h i s  c l a u s e  a r e  u s u a l l y  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  t e n d e r  d o c u -
m e n t s .  S h o u l d  t h e  w o r k s  a p p e a r  t o  i n v o l v e  c o n s i d e r a b l e  r i s k  
t o  t h e  c o n t r a c t o r ,  i t  . i s  c o n c e i v a b l e  t h a t  h e  w i l l  r a i s e  t h e  
p r i c e  o f  h i s  b i d  a s  a  m e a s u r e  o f  p r o t e c t i o n .  
3 . 4 . 1 0  
D r a w i n g s .  
T h i s  c l a u s e  i s  i n s e r t e d  t o  e n s u r e  t h a t  
t h e  c o n t r a c t o r  i s  k e p t  s u p p l i e d  w i t h  d r a w i n g s . a n d  o t h e r  i n -
f o r m a t i o n  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  w o r k ,  a n d  a n y  d e l a y  c a u s e d  b y  h i s  n o t  
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h a v i n g  t h e m  w i l l  b e  a t t r i b u t a b l e  t o  t h e  e m p l o y e r  t h r o u g h  t h e .  
e n g 1 n e e r o  I n  s o m e  c a s e s ,  t h e  c o n t r a c t o r  m i g h t  b e  r e q u i r e d  t o  
s u b m i t  
1 1
a s  b u i l t
1 1  
d r a w i n g s  • .  T h e  e n g i n e e r  i s  a l s o  p e r m i t t e d  
t o  r e v i s e  a n y  s u b m i t t e d  d r a w i n g s  p r i o r  t o  t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  
o f  t h e  r e l e v a n t  p i e c e  o f  w o r k .  
3 . 3 . 1 1  
D e f e c t s  l i a b i t i t y .  T h i s  c l a u s e s  o u t l i n e s  t h e  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  t h e  c o n t r a c t o r  f o r  a n y · d e f e c t s  t h a t  m i g h t  
b e c o m e  a p p a r e n t  i n  t h e  w o r k s  a f t e r  t h e  c o m p l e t i o n  c e r t i f i c a t e  
h a s  b e e n  s i g n e d .  T h e  p e r i o d  f o r  w h i c h  t h e  c o n t r a c t o r  i s  r e -
s p o n i b l e . i s  u s u a l l y  s e t  o u t  i n  t h e  t e n d e r  d o c u m e n t s ,  t h o u g h  
s o m e  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  c o n t r a c t  i n c l u d e  s e t  p e r i o d s  o f  m a i n t e n a n c e .  
A s  a  s e c u r i t y  m e a s u r e ,  t h e  e m p l o y e r  u s u a l l y  r e t a i n s  a  c e r t a i n  
p e r c e n t a g e  o f  t h e . c o n t r a c t  pric~ u n t i l  t h e  c o m p l e t i o n  o f  t h e  
m a i n t e n a n c e  period~ a t  w h i c h  t i m e  a  c e r t i f i c a t e  i s  i s s . u e q  a n d  
t h e  c o n t r a c t o r  i s  p a i d  i n  f u l l .  T h e  d e t a i l s  o f  r e t e n t i o n  m o n e y  
w i l l  b e  d i s c u s s e d  i n  f u l l  a t  a  l a t e r  s t a g e  ( C h a p t e r  4 ) .  S h o u l d ·  
a n y · d e f e c t s  b e c o m e  a p p a r e n t  d u r i n g  t h e  p e r i o d  o f  m a i n t e n a n c e ,  
a n d  s h o u l d  t h e  e n g i n e e r  d e c i d e  t h a t  t h e y  w e r e  c a u s e d  b y  f a u l t y  
w o r k  o n  t h e  p a r t o f  t h e  c o n t r a c t o r ,  t h e n  t h e  l a t t e r  i s  r e q u i r -
e d  t o  r e c t i f y  t h e m  a t  h i s . o w n  e x p e n s e .  S h o u l d  t h e  c o n t r a c t o r  
f a i l  t o  d o · t h i s ,  t h e n  t h e  e n g i n e e r  m a y e m p l o y  s o m e b o d y  e l s e  
t o  d o  t h e  w o r k  a n d  d e d u c t  t h e  e x p e n s e  f r o m  t h e  r e t a i n e d  a m o u n t  
t h a t  i s  d u e  t o  t h e  c o n t r a c t o r .  
3 . 3 . 1 2  
E n g i n e e r  o r  A r c h i t e c t .  
T h e  c o n t r a c t o r  i s  o b l i g -
e d  t o  c o m p l y  w i t h  a n y  d e c i s i o n s  m a d e  b y  t h e  e n g i n e e r  o r  hi~ 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ,  u n l e s s  p r o v i d e d  f o r  u n d e r  t h e  A r b i t r a t i o n  
c l a u s e .  T h i s  c l a u s e  i m p l i e s  t h a t . a n y  i n s t r u c t i o n s  w i l l  b e  
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g i v e n  b y  t h e  a r c h i t e c t  o r  e n g i n e e r  a f t e r  t h e  te~der h a s  b e e n  
a c c e p t e d ,  a n d  n o t  b y  . t h e  e m p l o y e r  h i m s e l f .  I t  s e e m s  p o s s i b l e  
t h a t  u n d e r  c e r t a i n  c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  , t h i s . c o u l d  b e c o m e  i m -
p o r t a n t ,  a n d  t h i s  w r i t e r  f e e l s  t h a t  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  s h o u l d  b e  
m a d e  m o r e  s p e c i f i c  o n  t h i s  p o i n t .  
3 . 3 . 1 3 .  E x e c u t i o n  o f  t h e  W o r k .  T h e  c o n t r a c t o r  i s  
r e q u i r e d  t o  c o m p l e t e  e v e r y  p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  w o r k  i n  s t r i c t  
c o m p l i a n c e  w i t h  t h e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s ,  a n d  w h e r e  a n y  p a r t  o f  
t h e  w o r k  i s  n o t  e x p r e s s l y  p r o v i d e d  f o r ,  t h e  c o n t r a c t o r  h a s  
e v e n t u a l l y  t o  p r o v i d e  a  s t r u c t u r e  w h i c h  c o m p l i e s  w i t h  t h e  
engi~eer's s p e c i f i c a t i o n .  
3 . 3 . 1 4  
F a u l t y  W o r k o  
T h i s  c l a u s e  a l l o w s  t h e  e n g i n e e r  t o  
r e j e c t  a n y  w o r k  t h a t  h e  f e e l s  i s  n o t  i n  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  t h e  
specifications~ a n d  t h e  c o n t r a c t o r  i s  r e q u i r e d  t o  r e m e d y  t h e  
defec~ t o  t h e  s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  t h e  e n g i n e e r .  S h o u l d  t h e  c o n -
t r a c t o r  r e f u s e . t o  d o  t h i s ,  t h e  e n g i n e e r  m a y - e m p l o y  s o m e b o d y  
'  .  
e l s e  t o  r e c t i f y  t h e  w o r k  a n d  c h a r g e  t h e  c o n t r a c t o r  _ f o r  a n y  
a d d i t i o n a l  e x p e n s e  o r  d e l a y .  S o m e  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  c o n t r a c t  m a k e  
p a r t i c u l a r  r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  c o v e r i n g  u p  o f  w o r k  s u c h  a s  f o o t -
i n g s  o r  r e t a i n i n g  w a l l s .  T h e  c o n t r a c t o r  i s  . n o t  a l l o w e d  t o  d o  
t h i s  b e f o r e  t h e  e n g i n e e r  h a s  a p p r o v e d  t h e  w o r k ,  a n d  i f  h e  d o e s  
s o ,  t h e  e n g i n e e r  m a y  o r d e r  t h e  w o r k  t o  b e  u n c o v e r e d  a t  t h e  
c o n t r a c t o r ' s  e x p e n s e .  
3 . 3 . 1 5  F l u c t u a t i o n s  i n  P r i c e ,  
I n  s o m e · c o n d i t i o n s  o f  
c o n t r a c t ,  s u b s e q u e n t  v a r i a t i o n s  i n  t h e  p r i c e s  o f  m a t e r i a l s  b r o u g h t  
a b o u t  b y  c h a n g e s  i n  i m p o r t  d u t i e s  o r  r a i l a g e  c h a r g e s  a r e  a l l o w e d ·  
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A l s o ,  c h a n g e s  i n  t h e  p r i c e  o f  c e m e n t  a n d  r e i n f o r c i n g  s t e e l  
a n d  o t h e r  m a t e r i a l s  o f  c o n t r o l l e d  m a n u f a c t u r e  a n d  s u p p l y  a r e  
s o m e t i m e s  p e r m i t t e d ,  a s  w e l l  a s  v a r i a t i o n s  i n  t h e  l e g a l  m i n i -
m u m  w a g e s  p a y a b l e  t o  w o r k e r s  i n  t h e  a r e a  o f  t h e  w o r k s .  T h e  
p r i c e s  q u o t e d  f o r  t h e s e  i t e m s  i n  t h e  c o n t r a c t o r ' s  t e n d e r  w i l l  
n o t  c o r r e s p o n d  t o  t h e  r u l i n g  m a r k e t  p r i c e s ,  b e c a u s e  o v e r h e a d  
c o s t s  w i l l  h a v e  b e e n  i n c l u d e d .  H e n c e ,  a d j u s t m e n t s  a r e  m a d e  
w h i c h  c o r r e s p o n d  t o  t h e  c h a n g e s  i n  t h e  m a r k e t  r a t e s .  T h i s  
c l a u s e  i s  o b v i o u s l y  a n  i m p o r t a n t  o n e  t o  c o n s i d e r  a t  t h e  t e n d e r  
s t a g e ,  e s p e c i a l l y  i f  c o n d i t i o n s  a r e  s u c h  t h a t  p r i c e s  a r e  l i a b l e  
t o  c o n s i d e r a b l e  f l u c t u a t i o n  a t  a n y  t i m e .  
3 . 3 . 1 6  
I n s p e c t i o n  a n d  T e s t i n g .  
T h e  a r c h i t e c t  o r  e n g L n e e r  
i s  a l l o w e d  t o  i n s p e c t  a n d  t e s t  i f  n e c e s s a r y  a n y  p a r t  o f  t h e  
w o r k s  e i t h e r  w h e n  t h e y  a r e  i n  p r o g r e s s ,  o r  w h e n  t h e y  a r e  f i n -
i s h e d .  T h e  c o s t  o f  a n y  t e s t  i s  t o  b e  b o r n e  b y  t h e  c o n t r a c t o r  
i f  a l l o w a n c e  h a s  b e e n  m a d e  i n  t h e  t e n d e r  d o c u m e n t s ,  b u t  s h o u l d  
t h i s  n o t  b e  t h e  c a s e ,  t h e  c o n t r a c t o r  h a s  t o  p a y  o n l y  i f  t h e  
w o r k  i s  s h o w n  t o  b e  d e f e c t i v e  o n  a c c o u n t  o f  h i s  n e g l i g e n c e ,  
3 . 3 . 1 7  
I n s u r a n c e .  
U s u a l l y ,  t h e  c o n t r a c t o r  i s  o b l i g -
e d  t o  i n s u r e  h i m s e l f  a g a i n s t  a n y  r i s k s  f o r  w h i c h  h e  i s  l i a b l e ,  
a s  s e t  o u t  i n  t h e  a b o v e  s e c t i o n  o n  d a m a g e  t o  p r o p e r t y  a n d  i n -
j u r y  L O  p e r s o n s  ( S u b - s e c t i o n  3 . 3 . 9 ) .  I n  s o m e  c o n d i t i o n s ,  t h i s  
i s  n o t  a  s p e c i f i c  r e q u i r e m e n t ,  t h o u g h  i t  w o u l d  o b v i o u s l y  b e  t o  
t h e  c o n t r a c t o r ' s  a d v a n t a g e .  T h e  c o s t  o f  i n s u r a n c e  h a s  t o  b e  
i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  c o n t r a c t o r ' s  t e n d e r  p r i c e ,  a n d  s o  a n  a c c u r a t e  
a s s e s s m e n t  o f  a d e q u a t e  i n s u r a n c e  c o v e r a g e . m u s t  b e  m a d e  a t  t h e  
t e n d e r  s t a g e .  
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3 . 3 . 1 8  
P a t e n t  R i g h t s .  T h o u g h  thi~ c l a u s e  i s  n o t  a l w a y s  
i n c l u d e d ;  i t  i s  o c c a s i o n a l l y  u s e d  t o  p r o t e c t  t h e  e m p l o y e r  
a g a i n s t  c l a i m s  a n d  a g a i n s t  h a v i n g  t o  p a y  r o y a l t i e s  o n  a c c o u n t  
o f  t h e  . c o n t r a c t o r  m a k i n g  u s e  o f  p a t e n t e d  m e t h o d $  o r  m a t e r i a l s  
o n  t h e  w o r k s .  T h e  c o n t r a c t o r  i s  r e q u i r e d  t o  i n d e m n i f y  t h e  
e m p l o y e r  a g a i n s t  a n y  s u c h  a c t i o n s .  
3 . 3 . 1 9  
P r o v i s i o n a l  a n d  P r i m e  C o s t  S u m s .  
T h i s  · c l . a u s e  
s e t s  o u t  t h e  p r o c e d u r e  t o  b e  f o l l o w e d  w h e n  t h e  e n g i n e e r  d e c i d e s  
t o  m a k e . u s e  o f  a n y  p r o v i s i o n a l  o r  p r i m e  c o s t  s u m s ,  a  d e s c r i p t i o n  
o f  w h i c h  a p p e a r s  i n  s e c t i o n  2
9
2 ,  I m p o r t a n t  p o i n t s  t o  n o t e  a r e  
t h a t  w o r k  d o n e  t h a t  w a s  o r i g i n a l l y  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e . b i l l  o f  
q u a n t i t i e s  a s  p r o v i s i o n a l  i s  p a i d  f o r  i n  t h e  s a m e  w a y  a s  o r d i n a r y  
v a r i a t i o n s  t o  t h e  w o r k  ( S u b - s e c t i o n  3 . 3 . 2 5 ) ,  a n d  g o o d s  o r  
m a t e r i a l s  i n c l u d e d  a s  p r i m e  c o s t  i t e m s  a r e  p a i d  f o r  w i t h o u t  
a l l o w i n g  a n y  m a r g i n  f o r  p r o f i t  o r  o v e r h e a d s .  H o w e v e r ,  t h e  c o n -
t r a c t o r  i s  u s u a l l y  a l l o w e d  t o  t a k e  a d v a n t a g e  o f  c a s h  d i s c o u n t s  
w h e n  p u r c h a s i n g  p r i m e  c o s t  i t e m s .  A l s o ,  w h e n  s u b - c o n t r a c t o r s  
f o r  p r o v i s i o n a l  w o r k  a r e  n o m i n a t e d  b y  t h e  e m p l o y e r ,  t h e n  t h e  
, ;  
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c o n t r a c t o r  i s  a l l o w e d  t o  r e c e i v e  a  p e r c e n t a g e  o n  t h e i r  w o r k .  
"  
I  
H o w e v e r ,  i n  t h e  . c a s e .  o f  b o t h  p r o v i s i o n a l  a n d  . .  p r i m e  c o s t  s , u m s ,  
/ ' /  
t h e  c o n t r a c t o r  h a s  t o  p r o v e  t h a t  h e  h a s  h i m s e l f  p a i d / f o r  t h e  
7  )  
. .  t  
w o r k  o r  m a t e r i a l s  b e f o r e  h e  m a y  r e c e i v e  a n y  m o n e y  f r o m  t h e  
e m p l o y e r .  S h o u l d  t h e  e m p l o y e r  h a v e  n o m i n a t e d  a n y  s u b - c o n t r a c t -
o r s  f o r  w o r k  o r i g i n a l l y  i n c l u d e d  a s  p r o v i s i o n a l ,  t h e n  t h e  c o n -
t r a c t o r  m a y  o b j e c t ,  a n d  i f  h i s  o b j e c t i o n s  a r e  r e a s o n a b l e ,  t h e  
e m p l o y e r  i s  u s u a l l y  o b l i g e d  t o  r e c o n s i d e r  h i s  n o m i n a t i o n s  a n d  
a p o i n t  o t h e r  s u b - c o n t r a c t o r s  i n  t h e i r  p l a c e .  T h u s  t h e  c o n -
t r a c t o r  i s  n o t  u s u a l l y  o b l i g e d  t o  w o r k  w i t h  s u b - c o n t r a c t o r s  
w h o  h a v e  b e e n  d i f f i c u l t  t o  w o r k  w i t h  i n  t h e  p a s t .  I n  t h e  
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l o n g  - r u n ,  t h i s  w i l l  b e  t o  t h e  a d v a n t a g e  o f  t h e  c o n t r a c t  
a s  a  w h o l e .  
3 . 3 . 2 0  
S e c u r i t r  f o r  P e r f o r m a n c e .  
T h i s  c~ause, w h e n  u s e d ,  
r e q u i r e s  t h e  c o n t r a c t o r  t o  p r o v i d e  t h e  e m p t o y e r  w i t h  a  p e r f o r m -
a n c e  b o n d  o r . b a n k  g u a r a n t e e  u s u a l l y  t o  t h e  v a l u e  o f  1 0 %  o f  t h e  
t o t a l  c o n t r a c t  p r i c e .  T h e  p u r p o s e  o f  t h i s  i s  t o  g u a r a n t e e  t h a t  
t h e  c o n t r a c t o r  w i l l  ca~ry o u t  h i s , o b l i g a t i o n s  a n d  t h a t  t h e  e m -
p l o y e r  w i l l  b e  p a i d  a n y  m o n e y  h e . m i g h t  o t h e r w i s e  l o s e  i f  t h e  
c o n t r a c t o r  s h o u l d  d e f a u l t  i n  a n y  w a y .  T h i s  w r i t e r  i s  o f  t h e  
o p i n i o n  t h a t  i f  s e c u r i t i e s  o f  t h i s  n a t u r e  a r e  r e q u i r e d  b y  t h e  
c o n d i t i o n s  o f  c o n t r a c t ,  t h e  a m o u n t  o f  r e t e n t i o n  m o n e y  ( s e e  
S u b - s e c t i o n  3 . 3 . 1 1 )  s h o u l d  b e  c o n s i d e r a b l y  r e d u c e d ,  i f  n o t  o m i t t -
e d  a l t o g e t h e r .  I t  w o u l d  a p p e a r  t h a t  t h e  e m p l o y e r  w o u l d  b e  r e -
c e i v i n g  d o u b l e  s e c u r i t y ,  a n d  t h i s  s h o u l d  h a r d l y  b e  n e c e s s a r y ,  
especia~ly i f  t h e  c o n t r a c t o r ' s  r e p u t a t i o n  a n d  f i n a n c i a l  s i t -
u a t i o n  h a d  b e e n  c o n s i d e r e d  b e f o r e  t h e  c o n t r a c t  w a s  a w a r d e d .  
3.~.21 
P o s s e s s i o n  o f  S i t e .  
T h i s  c l a u s e  e n s u r e s - t h a t  t h e  
c o n t r a c t o r  i s  g i v e n - a d e q u a t e  a c c e s s  t o  t h e  s i t e ,  s o  t h a t  h e  
m i g h t  p e r f o r m  h i s  d u t i e s  a s  q u i c k l y  a n d  s a f e l y  a s  p o s s i b l e .  
T h e  c l a u s e  a l s o  r e q u i r e s  t h e  contra~tor t o  a l l o w  t h e  e n g i n e e r  
t o  b e  a d m i t t e d  t o  a n y  p a r t · o f  t h e  s i t e  h e  m i g h t  w i s h .  I n  
a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  c o n t r a c t o r  i s  a l s o  o b l i g e d  t o  g i v e  a c c e s s  t o  
a n y  o t h e r  c o n t r a c t o r s  t h a t  m i g h t  b e  w o r k i n g  o n  th~ s a m e  s i t e .  
T h i s  i s  a n  i m p o r t a n t  c o n s i d e r a t i o n , . e s p e c i a l l y  w h e n  c o n f i n e d  
s p a c e s  m a k e  w o r k i n g  d i f f i c u l t ,  O n  c o m p l e t i o n  o f  t h e  w o r k ,  
t h e  c o n t r a c t o r  i s  u s u a l l y  r e q u i r e d  t o  m a k e  g o o d  a n y  d a m a g e  
t h a t  m i g h t  h a v e  b e e n  d o n e  t o  f e n c e s ,  s h r u b b e r y ,  e t c .  
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3 . 3 . 2 2  
S t a t u t o r y  a n d  o t h e r  R e g u l a t i o n s .  
I n  t h i s  
c l a u s e ,  t h e  c o n t r a c t o r  i s  r e q u i r e d  t o  c o n f o r m  w i t h  a n y  regula~ 
t i o n s  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  r u n n i n g  o f  t h e  s i t e ,  w h e t h e r  t h e y  a r e  m a d e  
b y  t b e  G o v e r n m e n t ,  o r  b y  a n y  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t y .  A l s o ,  t h e .  c o n -
t r a c t o r  h a s  t o  p a y  f o r  a n y  n o t i c e s  o r  l i g h t i n g ,  e t c . ,  t h a t  
m i g h t  b e  r e q u i r e d ,  u n l e s s  s u c h  i t e m s  h a d  bee~ i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  
t e n d e r  d o c u m e n t s .  U s u a l l y ,  t h e  c o n t r a c t o r  i s  a b l e  t o  c l a i m  
f r o m  t h e  e m p l o y e r  i f  a n y  r e g u l a t i o n s  a r e  c b a n g e d  d u r i n g  t h e  
c o n s t r u c t i o n  p e r i o d  a n d  i n v o l v e  h i m  i n  e x t r a  e x p e n s e .  
3 . 3 . 2 3  
S u f f i c i e n c y  o f  T e n d e r .  L e g a l l y ,  t h i E l  i s  a n  i m p o r t -
a n t  c l a u s e  a s  i t  s t a t e s  t h a t  t h e  c o n t r a c t o r  m u s t . h a v e  t a k e n  
i n t o  a c c o u n t  a n y  p o s s i b l e  ele~ent o f  c o s t  o r  u n c e r t a i n t y  w h e n  
c a l c u l a t i n g  h i s  t e n d e r  p r i c e .  T h i s  m e a n s  t h a t  t h e  c o n t r a c t o r  
i s  n o t  a l l o w e d  t o  p l e a d  i g n o r a n c e  i f  h e  i s  i n v o l v e d  1 n  a n y  u n -
f o r s e e n  e x p e n s e ,  n o r  w i l l  a n y  m i s t ' a k e s  o r  o m i s s i o n s  b e  t o l e r a t -
e d  i n  h i s  t e n d e r  p r i c e ,  t h o u g h  t h i s  a s p e c t  i s  d i s c u s s e d  m o r e  
f u l l y  i n  s e c t i o n  2 . 1 0 .  H o w e v e r ,  u s u a l l y  t h e  c o n t r a c t o r  i s  
a l l o w e d  t o  c l a i m  f o r  a n y  u n f o r s e e n  e x p e n s e s  i f  t h e  e n g i n e e r  i s  
c o n v i n c e d  t h a t  t h e y  c o u l d  n o t  r e a s o n a b l y  h a v e . b e e n  a n t i c i p a t e d  
b y  a  c o m p e t e n t  contr~ctor. T h i s  p a r t  o f  t h e  c l a u s e  i s  a d -
v a n t a g e o u s  t o  t h e  e m p l o y e r  a s  w e l l ,  s i n c e  t h e  c o n t r a c t o r s  a r e  
a b l e  t o  r e d u c e  t h e i r  a l l o w a n c e s  f o r  c o n t i n g e n c i e s ,  r e s u l t i n g  
i n  g e n e r a l l y  l o w e r  t e n d e r  p r i c e s .  
3 . 3 . 2 4  
S u s p e n s i o n  a n d  D e l a y s .  
T h e  c o n t r a c t o r  i s  r e -
q u i r e d  t o  s t o p  w o r k  i f  t h e  e n g i n e e r  d e c i d e s  t h a t  i t  i s  u n w i s e  
t o  c o n t i n u e  u n t i l  a  l a t e r  d a t e ,  a n d  h e  i s  u s u a l l y  a l l o w e d  
t o  c l a i m  h i s  e x t r a  c o s t s  i n  s u c h  a  s i t u a t i o n ,  u n l e s s  t h e  t e n d e r  
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d o c u m e n t s  h a d  m a d e  s p e c i f i c  p r o v i s i o n  f o r  d e l a y s  o f  t h a t  
t y p e .  
3 . 3 . 2 5  
V a r i a t i o n s  t o  t h e  W o r k .  
T h e  proble~ o f  a n  e m p l o y -
e r  c h a n g i n g  h i s  m i n d  a b o u t · a s p e c t s  o f  t h e  p r o j e c t  w h e n  i t  i s  
a l r e a d y  u n d e r  c o n s t r u c t i o n  i s  a  r a t h e r  d i f f i c u l t  o n e .  W i t h o u t  
e x c e p t i o n ,  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  s t a t e  t h a t  t h e . c o n t r a c t  i s  n o t  v i t i a t -
e d  ( r e n d e r e d  u s e l e s s )  b y  a n y  v a r i a t i o n s ,  t h o u g h  t h e s e  m u s t  o b -
v i o u s l y  b e  k e p t  t o  a  r e a s o n a b l e  l e v e l .  T h i s  m e a n s  t h a t  th~ 
c o n t r a c t o r  h a s  t o  c a r r y  o u t . a n y  v a r i a t i o n s  t h a t  m i g h t  b e  o r d e r -
e d ,  t h o u g h  e x a c t l y  h o w  m u c h  i s  t o  b e  p a i 4  i s  l e f t  o p e n  t o  a g r e e -
m e n t  • .  I f  a g r e e m e n t  c a n n o t  b e  r e a c h e d ,  m o s t  c o n d i t i o n s  t h e n  
al~ow t h e  v a r i a t i o n s  t o  p e  c a r r i e d  o u t  o n  a  d a y w o r k  b a s i s .  
T h i s  m e a n s  t h a t  t h e  c o n t r a c t o r  i s  p a i d  t h e . c o s t  o f  t h e  m a t e r i a l s  
a n d  l a b o u r ,  e x c l u d i n g  s u p e r v i s i o n ,  p l u s  a  p e r c e n t a g e  a d d i t i o n  
t o  e a c h  f o r  o v e r h e a d s  a n d  p r o f i t .  T h e  u s u a l  a d d i t i o n s  a r e  1 0 %  
t o  m a t e r i a l s  a n d  3 3
1
1 3 %  t o  l a b o u r
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S p e c i a l  C l a u s e s .  
T h e  c~auses m e n t i o n e d  a b o v e  
c a n n o t  c o v e r  e v e r y  e v e n t u a l i t y  o n  e v e r y  c o n t r a c t .  T h e r e f o r e  
e m p l o y e r s  o f t e n  i n c l u d e  c l a u s e s  t o  c o v e r  s p e c i f i c  c o n d i t i o n s  
p e c u l i a r  t o  t h e  p r o j e c t  i n  q u e s t i o n .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  t h e  D e p a r t -
m e n t  o f  P u b l i c  W o r k s  i n s i s t s  t h a t  p u b l i c  t r a n s p o r t  i s  u s e d  f o r  
p r o v i d i n g  m a t e r i a l s  t o  o u t l y i n g  s i t e s . ·  B e c a u s e  o f  t r a f f i c  
c o n g e s t i o n ,  t r u c k s  m a y  o n l y  b e  a l l o w e d · a c c e s s  t o  u r b a n  s i t e s  
d u r i n g  o f f - p e a k  p e r i o d s .  A n o t h e r  e x a m p l e  i s  t h e  b l o c k i n g  o f  
r i v e r s  o r  r a i l w a y  l i n e s . .  T h i s  m a y  o n l y  b e  a l l o w e d  f o r  s p e c i f i c  
s h o r t  p e r i o d s  o f  t i m e , .  
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T h e  a b o v e  l i s t  o f  i t e m s  c o v e r e d  i n  a  s e t  o f  c o n -
d i t i o n s  o f  c o n t r a c t  i s  c e r t a i n l y  n o t  e~haustive o f  t h e  s u b -
j e c t ,  b u t  i t  i s  h o p e d  t h a t  a  g e n e r a l  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  t h e  l e g a l  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  o f · a  c o n t r a c t o r  . h a s  b e e n  g i v e n .  S u c h  r e -
s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  h a v e  c e r t a i n l y  t o  b e  c q n s i d e r e d  a t  t h e  t e n d e r  
s t a g e .  
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C H A P T E R  4  F I N A N C I A L  A S P E C T S  O F  T E N D E R I N G  
T h i s  c h a p t e r  p r o v i d e s  a  b r i e f  i n t r o d u c t i o n  t o  t h e  
f i n a n c i a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  t h a t  h a v e  t o  b e  b o r n e  i n  m i n d  w h e n  
t e n d e r i n g  f o r  a  c o n s t r u c t i o n  c o n t r a c t •  
S e c t i o n  4 . 1  
C o s t  C o n t r o l  i n  C o n s t r u c t i o n  :  
T h e  t e r m  ' ' c o s t . _ : c o n t r o l "  s h o u l d  n e v e r  b e  c o n f u s e d  w i t h  
b o o k - k e e p i n g .  B o o k - k e e p i n g  i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  a n  h i s t o r i c a l  
activi~y. I t  w i l l  i n f o r m  a  c o n t r a c t o r  w h e t h e r  h e  h a s  m a d e  a  
p r o f i t  o n  a  c o n t r a c t  a f t e r  i t  h a s  b e e n  c o m p l e t e d ,  b u t  i t  c a n  
n e v e r  e n a b l e  h~m t o  a n a l y s e  a n d  c o n t r o l  t h e  c o s t  o f  h i s  l a b o u r  
o r  p l a n t  w h i l e  t h e  c o n t r a G t  i s  u n d e r w a y .  
C o s t  c o n t r o l  h a s  t h r e e  m a i n . f u n c t i o n s  i n  a  c o n s t r u c t i o n  
c o m p a n y .  
T h e  f i r s t  o f  t h e s e  i s  o b v i o u s l y  t h e  p i n p o i n t i n g  o f  o p -
e r a t i o n s  w h i c h  a r e  b e i n g  c a r r i e d  o u t  u n e c o n o m i c a l l y .  I n f o r m -
a t i o n  p r o v i d e d  b y  t h e _  c o s t .  c o n t r o l  s y s t e - q t  i n  u s e  m u s t  b e .  s u c h - -
a s  t o  e n a b l e  t h e  s u p e r v i s o r  t o  m a k e  a  t i m e l y  d e c i s i o n  o n  h o w  
t o  r e m e d y  t h e  s i t u a t i o n .  O n e  p o s s i b l e  c o u r s e  o f  a c t i o n  m i g h t  
b e  f o r  t h e  c o n t r a c t o r  t o  s p e e d  u p  p r o d u c t i o n  o n  c e r t a i n  p a r t s  
o f  t h e  j o b  o r  t o  s l o w  d o w n  o n  o t h e r s .  I n  t h i s  r e g a r d ,  c o s t  
c o n t r o l  i s  c l o s e l y  l i n k e d  w i t h  t h e  t i m e  c o n t r o l  s y s t e m  ( s u c h  
a s  t h e  C r i t i c a l  P a t h  M e t h o d )  u s e d  o n  t h e  c o n t r a c t .  
T h e  s e c o n d  m a i n  p u r p o s e  o f  a . c o s t  s y s t e m  i s  t o  f e e d  
i n f o r m a t i o n  b a c k  t o  t h e  e s t i m a t o r .  T h e  m a i n  i n f o r m a t i o n  f r o m  
t h e  s i t e  w i l l  c o n c e r n  t h e  c o s t s  o f  l a b o . u r  a n d  e q \ . l : i p m e n t ,  . b u t _  
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a n o t h e r  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t · i t e m  i s  d a t a  c o n c e r n i n g  wastage~ A n  
e x a m p l e  o f  t h i s  m i g h t  b e  i n f o r m a t i o n  r e g a r d i n g  c o n c r e t e  u s e d  
f o r  b l i n d i n g .  T h e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  f o r  t h e  p r o j e c t  m i g h t  h a v e  
r e q u i r e d  a  m i n i m u m  o f  · f i v e  c e n t i m e t r e s  . u n d e r  e a c h  f o o t i n g  
o f  a  l a r g e  n u m b e r  o f  c o l u m n s .  T h e  e s t i m a t o r  h a s  t o  a s s e s s  
t h e  a c t u a l  q u a n t i t y  o f  c o n c r e t e  n e c e s s a r y ,  k e e p i n g  i n  m i n d  
t h e  f a c t  t h a t . u n e v e n n e s s  i n  t h e  d e p t h  o f  t h e  e x c a v a t i o n s  f o r  
t h e  f o o t i n g s  w i l l  c a u s e  t h e  t h i c k n e s s  o f  t h e  b l i n d i n g  l a y e r  t o  
v a r y o  T h e  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  e x t r a  c o n c r e t e  w h i c h  t h e  e s t i m a t o r  f e e l s  
i s  n e c e s s a r y  m i g h t  i n v o l v e  a  c o n s i d e r a b l e  s u m  o f  m o n e y ,  a n d . s o  
a c c u r a t e  i n f o r m a t i o n  f r o m  s i m i l a r  c o n t r a c t s  w i l l  b e  i n v a l u a b l e o  
T h e  thi~d f u n c t i o n  o f  a  c o s t  c o n t r o l  s y s t e m  i s  t o  p r o v i d e  
i n f o r m a t i o n  c o n c e r n i n g  v a r i a t i o n s  i n  t h e  p r i c e s  o f  c e r t a i n  
m a t e r i a l s  a n d  i n  t h e  w a g e s  p a y a b l e  t o  l a b o u r e r s  f r o m  t h e  b i l l e d  
r a t e s .  I f  s u c h  v a r i a t i o n s  a r e  a l l o w a b l e  i n  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  
p a y m e n t  f o r  t h e  · c o n t r a c t ,  t h e  c o n t r a c t o r  m a y  c l a i m  e x t r a  m o n e y  
p r o v i d e d  t h a t  h e  ca~ p r o d u c e  a d e q u a t e  p r o o f  o f  t h e  v a r i a t i o n s o  
T r a d i t i o n a l l y ,  c o n t r a c t o r s  h a v e  t a k e n  l e s s  a d v a n t a g e  
o f  c o s t  c o n t r o l  s y s t e m s  t h a n  t h e i r  as~ociates i n  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  
e n g i n e e r i n g  i n d u s t r y .  P o s s i q l y  t h i s  i~ b e c a u s e  c o n d i t i o n s  c h a n g e  
f r o m  c o n t r a c t  t o  c o n t r a c t  a n d  t h e  d e t a i l s  o f  a  s y s t e m  h a v e .  t o  
b e . s e t  u p  a n e w  w i t h  e a c h  f r e s h  c o n t r a c t  u n d e r t a k e n .  T h i s  h a s  
c a u s e d  t h e  s m a l l e r  c o n t r a c t o r  t o  f e e l  t h a t . a n  a d e q u a t e  c o s t  
c o n t r o l  s y s t e m  i s  n o t  w o r t h  t h e .  t i m e  a n d  m o n e y  t o  h i m .  A  
f r e q u e n t  r e s u l t  o f  t h i s  i s  t h a t  w h e n  s o m e  c o n t r a c t o r s  e v e n t -
u a l l y  f i n d  o u t  t h a t  th~y h a v e  l o s t  m o n e y  o n  a  c o n t r a c t ,  t h e y  
s u b m i t  c l a i m s  f o r  e x t r a  p a y m e n t ,  m o r e  o f t e n  t h a n  n o t  b a s e d  
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o n  i l l e g i t i m a t e  g r o u n d s .  O f t e n  t h e  s i z e  o f  t h e  c l a i m s  w i l l  
b e  d e t e r m i n e d  b y  w h a t  t h e  c o n t r a c t o r  h a s  l o s t  o n  t h e  p r o j e c t .  
B e f o r e . a  c o s t  co~trol s y s t e m  i s  s e t  u p  f o r  a  c o n t r a c t ,  
t h e  r e q u i r e d  a m o u n t  o f  d e t a i l  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  i t s  h a n d l i n g  m u s t  
b e  d e c i d e d  u p o n .  T h i s  w i l l  n a t u r a l l y  v a r y  f r o m  s i t u a t i o n  t o  
s i t u a t i o n .  T h e  f o l l o w i n g  f o u r  m e t h o d s  o f  c o s t  c o n t r o l  m a y  
b e  u s e d ,  d e p e n d i n g  o n  c o n d i t i o n s  • .  
a )  B y  c o m p a r i s o n  w i t h  c o s t  st~ndards s u c h  a s  t h e  e s t i m a t e d  
c o s t s  a t  t h e  t e n d e r  s t a g e .  
b )  B y  c o m p a r i s o n  w i t h  t h e  a m o u n t  p a i d  f o r  w o r k  d o n e  a t  
m o n t h l y  o r  o t h e r  i n t e r v a l s .  
c )  B y  c o s t i n g  o n l y  c e r t a i n  p a r t s  o f  t h e  w o r k  w h i c h  a r e .  
l i k e l y  t o  p r o v e  u n n e c e s s a r i l y  e x p e n s i v e  i f  n o t  c o n -
t r o l l e d  p r o p e r l y !  
d )  B y  c o m b i n i n g  t h e  c o s t  c o n t r o l  a c t i v i t i e s  w i t h  o t h e r  f u n c -
t i o n s  s u c h  a s  b o n u s  i n c e n t i v e . s c h e m e s  o r  l a b o u r  u t i l i z a t i o n  
s c h e m e s .  
T h e  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  p o i n t  t o  b e  k e p t  i n  m i n d  . w h e n  d e s i g n i n g  
a  c o s t  c o n t r o l  s y s t e m  i s  i t s  s i m p l i c i t y  a n d  e a s e  o f  u n d e r s t a n d i n g .  
S i t e  s t a f f  a r e  n o t o r i o u s l y  w a r y  o f  e x c e s s  b o o k w o r k ,  a n d  s o  t h i s  
s h o u l d  b e  k e p t  t o  a  m i n i m u m .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  i f  t h e y  a r e  e a s i l y  
a b l e  t o  s e e  t h e  p u r p o s e  b e h i n d  w h a t  t h e y  a r e  d o i n g ,  t h e y  w i l l  
c o - o p e r a t e  b e t t e r .  
E x p e r i e n c e  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t . t h e  b e s t  w a y  o f  c o l l e c t i n g  
s i t e  c o s t s  i s  f o r  t h e  f o r e m a n  o r  c h a r g e - h a n d  t o  a l l o c a t e  
c o s t s  d a i l y .  T h i s  m i g h t  b e  d o n e  b y  c o m p l e t i n g  a  p r i n t e d  f o r m  
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o n  w h i c h  t h e  d e t a i l s  c o n c e r n i n g  l a b o u r  a n d  p l a n t  w o r k i n g  u n d e r  
h i m  a r e  e n t e r e d .  S u c h  d e t a i l s  w i l l  i n c l u d e  t h e  n a m e s  a n d  n u m b e r s  
o f  e a c h  l a b o u r e r  a n d  a  b r i e f  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  t h e  w o r k  d o n e  b y  
e a c h  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  h o u r s  t a k e n .  A  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  t h e  e q u i p -
m e n t  u s e d  w i l l  a l s o  b e  g i v e n  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  w o r k  p e r f o r m e d  a n d  
t i m e  t a k e n  w o r k i n g  a n d  s t a n d i n g  i d l e .  A n o t h e r  i m p o r t a n t  e n t r y  
o n  t h e  f o r m  i s  a  s h o r t  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  s i t e  c o n d i t i o n s  s u c h  a s  
t h e  w e a t h e r .  A s  t h e y  w i l l  a f f e c t  p r o d u c t i o n ,  t h e y  a r e  i m -
p o r t a n t  t o  t h e  e s t i m a t o r  w h e n  p r e p a r i n g  n e w  e s t i m a t e s  o f  u n i t  
c o s t s  t o  b e  u s e d  f o r  o t h e r  t e n d e r s .  
T h e s e  c o m p l e t e d  f o r m s  a r e  t h e n  s e n t  t o  t h e  a c c o u n t i n g  
d e p a r t m e n t  w h o  p r o d u c e  p e r i o d i c  s u m m a r i e s  f o r  t h e  u s e  o f  
m a n a g e m e n t .  A  c o m p u t e r  m i g h t  b e  u s e d  t o  a d v a n t a g e  a t  t h i s  
s t a g e ,  t h o u g h  m o r e  c o n v e n t i o n a l  m e t h o d s  m i g h t  b e  b o t h  f a s t e r  
a n d  c h e a p e r .  
F r o m  t h e s e  s u m m a r i e s ,  t r o u b l e  s p o t s  s h o u l d  b e c o m e  a p p a r e n t  
~n g o o d  t i m e  t o  t a k e  c o r r e c t i v e  a c t i o n  w h e r e  n e c e s s a r y ;  a l s o ,  
m o r e  r e a l i s t i c  r a t e s  w i l l  b e  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  u s e  i n  t h e  e s t i m a t i n g  
d e p a r t m e n t  o f  t h e  f i r m .  
S e c t i o n  4 . 2  
C o n d i t i o n s  o f  P a y m e n t  :  
P e r h a p s  t h e  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  c l a u s e  i n  a n y  s e t  o f  c o n -
d i t i o n s  o f  c o n t r a c t  i s  t h a t  r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  p a y m e n t  o f  t h e  
c o n t r a c t o r .  
F i r s t  o f  a l l ,  a  c e r t i f i c a t e  h a s  t o  b e  i s s u e d  b y  t h e  
o w n e r ' s  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  b e f o r e  a n y  p a y m e n t  m a y  b e  m a d e  t o  t h e  
c o n t r a c t o r .  T h i s  i s  g e n e r a l l y  d o n e  a t  m o n t h l y  i n t e r v a l s  w h i l e  
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the work is being carried out. The general procedure is for 
the contractor to submit·a claim for payment for the work that 
he has completed since the previous certificate was issued, 
This is then checked by the owner's representative, and when 
.\-, 
he is atisfied, the certificate of payment is issued. 
Also included in the certificate of payment is an amount 
for.materials bro~ght onto .the site, but not yet used ~n the work. 
The contractor might have to provide proof of ownership of such 
materials, such as invoice from the supplier. Often, only a 
certain percentage (e.g. 75%) of the cost of such materials will 
be paid to the contractor before they are.used. The contractor 
is thereby effectively forced to guard against the loss of such 
materials, though other conditions of contract such .as those 
relating to the delivery ?f materials and the passing of pro-
perty also bind him to do this. 
Other important certificates issued by the owner's 
representative are those at the beginning and end of the 
maintenance period, relating as they do to the payment of any 
retention money that might be required by the owner. 
Retention money is a term describing money that is not. 
paid to the contractor immediately it becomes due to him, but 
which is retained by the .owner as security against any default 
by the contractor. Bankruptcy and the failure to make good any 
repairs necessary during the maintenance period are the most 
important misdeeds of the ·contractor considered• 
The amount·. of money retained by the owner usually takes 
the.form of a percentage of the value of the.work completed up 
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to that time. Upper limits .are often set on the amount of money 
retained and these are described in Appendix C of this thesis. 
A common.amount is 10% of the total value of the contract. 
The quantity of retention money for a contract is important 
when preparing the estimate. This is bec~use.the contractor will 
have to provide this amount·of extra working capital for the 
project.. This .capital might be earning a useful return if it 
was invested elsewhere and this lost amount: of return should be 
included in the estimate as an "opportunity cost". More will 
be written about tnis topic ~n the following s~ctions of this 
chapter. 
Most conditions of contract allow repayment of half of 
the retention money .when. the last certificate is issued at the 
start of the maintenance period~ The balance is paid at the issue 
of the final certificate. 
Some conditions of contract allow the contractor to be 
paid interest on the retention money. This should naturally be 
taken into account when the estimate is being prepared.by the 
contractor •. 
Interest usually has also to be paid by the employer if 
he is slow to pay the contractor after .a certificate has been 
issued. 
The reader is referred to Appendix C .where this and other 
clauses appearing ~n Conditions of Contract used in South Africa 
are compared. 
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Section 4.3 The Time Value of Money 
In this section, an introduction will be presented to 
the effect of time on a decision involving cash flows. 
A cash.flow is a sum of money that changes.hands when 
a businessman makes a capital investment. The·.cash flow is 
termed positive if it is paid in to the investor and negative 
if it is paid out by him. 
Consider: the example of a contractor. purchasing a bull- . 
dozer. The negative cash flow is the money paid by the con-
tractor to the dealer for the bulldozer. The positive cash 
flows are the sums of money earned by the bulldozer while work-
ing on contracts awarded to the contractor. It is important 
to note t~at at the end of each year of the economic life of. 
the bulldozer, the,contractor will show a 4epreciation cost 
~nhis annual income.statement. This-is.not a.cash flow, as 
no mon~y actually changes hands. 
When the contractor .takes the.decision to buy the bqll~ 
dozer, he must be certain that the positive cash flows from 
his investment will exceed the negative cash.flows. The im-
portant point,here.is that the cash flows will ta~e place at 
different times. Furthermore, a Rand earned at any particular 
time will always be worth more than a Rand earned at.any time 
later. Thi~ is because the original Rand could·have been in~ 
vested at a certain rate of interest so that it would have. in-
creased by the time the second Rand was earned. 
Decisions concerning capital .investments such as the 
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buying of a bulldozer are usually made by comparing the values 
at any given time of the positive and negative cash flows re-
sulting from the investment. The time chosen is usually the 
present - i.e. the time at which the decision is being taken -
and hence the term "Present Value Method" is often used. 
Another.common·term for this type of analysis is "Discounted· 
Cash Flow", 
The reader will appreciate that if an amount of ·x Rand 
is invested at a.rate of return i per year, then after n years 
it will have g~own to 
x ( 1 + i )n • .. • , ( 4 • 3 • 1 ) 
A~ternatively, an amount x paid n ye~rs hence,will have a 
present value of· 
X 
••••• (4.3.2) (1 + i)n 
Values given by these formula~ are widely tabulated 
and so present value .calculations are easily performed once 
the cash flows and their. dates have been established. 
It.then.becomes a matter of choosing the investment 
yielding the highest present value. 
Section 4.4. - Cash Flows During a Construction Project : 
Figure 4.4.~ sh~ws diagramatically the cash flows at 
various times, of a construction contract. The c~rves of cumu-
lative income and expenditur.e may be derived from a bar chart 
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or network,drawn up at the tender stage to show when each 
activity of the work is .to be performed. Naturally, such a 
plan will not.normally be very detailed before.the contract 
has been awarded, but nevertheless it would give an indication 
of the sizes and times of the cash flows to take place over 
the d~ration of ~he contract. 
By calculating the net present values of all the cash 
flows relating to a particular plan of performing the work, the 
contractor is able to compare it with other plans, whose ass~ 
ociated net present values.have also been calc~lated. 
Also, should the contractor be. forced to decide which of 
two tenders to bid seriously when a lack of resources pro~ 
hibit him from being able to accept both contracts, a com-
parison of the net present values of the cash flows likely 
to be associated with each.contract will provide an excellent 
criterion on which to bas~ his decision. 
In conclusion it should be pointed ·out that the.results 
of this method of deciding between ways of performing a con-
tract, or between different contracts, .should not be accepted 
at face value. They are-obviously dependent.on the estimates-
of times and.costs on which.the analysis is based. However, 
this method does take into account.the effect of time which 
would otherwise be impossible, and also, the person making 
the comparison is forced to consider his motives more carefully _ 
than.normal. 
4/10 
CHAPTER 5 CERTAIN SUBJECTIVE .FACTORS RELEVANT TO THE TENDER BID 
When the contractor has completed his estimate of the cost 
of a project, his tender is not yet ready for submission. This 
~s because he has still to consider the amount of profit he 
requires.from the job. The concept of profit has already been 
discussed in Section 2.9, and it was mentioned that certain 
factors influenced the amount of profit that will make a job 
seem worthwhile to a contracto.r. The effect of condi ti.ons of 
contract has been dealt·with (Chapter 3). Generally speaking, 
a contractor will increase his price if the conditions of 
contract to be used on a job appear unusual, or in any way 
unfair to him. Other factors (dealt with in Chapter 4) are 
the financial aspects of a tender and in particular, the time 
value of money. In this chapter, a discussion will be given 
of certain other factors which must be considered if the 
contractor is to ensure that he has made his.best possible 
bid for the job. 
Section 5.1. Competition : 
The competition he is likely to encounter from his fellow 
tenderers is perhaps a major factor influeqcing the .contractor's. 
decision on how much profit allowance to add to his estimate. 
It. is here that experience, not only-in general contracting, 
but in contracti~g in the particular locality of the project 
will count most. The state of the contracting ind~stry varies 
from place to place~ as well as from job type to job type. 
Also, when there are fewer.jobs.open for tender, competition 
will force all the tenderers to lower their profit margins, 
while .if there is an excess of jobs and· contractor~ are.working 
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close.to capacit-y, all th~ prices received when a job is put 
out to tenqer might be·higher than usual. 
There can be no certainty associated with a co~tractor's 
ass.essment of his competitor, The methods he might use. vary 
from the· simple."hunch".to elaborate opertions research 
techniques; involving the· use of.information obtained from 
past· tende~s. Contractors also find the. mait1.tenance. of 
personal contacts in. the· industry of use, These might include 
suppliers of equipme~t or .materials who might be able to pro.,. 
vide some information on· the degree of interest shown by ;other 
contractors in a particular tender. 
It is .hoped that the following chapter~ of this thesis 
will be able t~ provide a contractor with mathematical models 
whieh might be used together with conventional methods .to 
assess. the likelihood of winnicyg a contract· and· to .choose· 
an optimum bid·amount. 
Section 5.2 Risk 
It has·been mentioned before that it would be eJ!:tremely 
improbable for the final price of a contract to be the.same. 
as the contractor estimated it at.the tender stage• 
Human nature·is.such.that potential difficulties are. 
usually under-estimated. Figure 5.1 shows how a probable 
frequency distribution of the ratio .between the final price 
of a contract to the estimated price is generally skewed to 
the left. For this reason the contractor has to be aware of 
the.care with which his estimators have prepared their 
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Figure 5.1 Distribution of True Cost 
information. - This .is usually done at a. meeting between manage-
ment and the estimators at some time just before the_tenders 
are due. The estimates are then read thoroughly and manage-
ment attempts to pinpoint any .weaknesses-that might become 
apparent. Such a meeti~g could t~ke from 15 minutes to several 
days, depending on the,complexity of the project. The con-
tractor's confidence' in the _estimate.will influence the amount 
of profit he will seek. 
Ano~her element of risk will be the number _of natural 
hazards.that could be encountered on the job. The most common. 
of these are unexpected sub-surface conditions and. the effect 
of adverse weather. This is where the,contractor's past 
experience of loc8;1 conditions is obviously most valuable 
at the .tender stage. Competent contractors are seldom pre~ 
pared to.gamble, and so unknown factors generally extend 
thei£ profit requirements. 
Should the conditions of contract not_allow any 
variations in the price of materials purchased by the 
5/3 
contractor for the project (see section 3.3.15), then such 
variations.should be considered a potential risk by the con-
tractor, and he should consider this when deciding on his 
final bid price. 
Finally, the contractor must make a careful estimate 
of the financial stability of his intended.client. This is 
especially important if the job is to be of long duration. 
Not only should the contractor try to obtain copies of the 
employer's balance sheets and income statements for a few 
preceeding years, but he should also consider the effect of 
the current project on the client's business. In spite of 
any conditions of contract designed to protect the contractor 
against bankruptcy of the employer, there is no doubt that 
he will lose heavily if this ever happens. If there should be 
any real risk of this, it might be better for the contractor 
not to submit a tender than simply to increase his prices some-
what, as this might only aggrevate the situation. 
Section 5.3 Company Size : 
The size of the contractor's company will provide a 
very obvious limitation to the amount of work he might under-
take. Of particular importance.is the number of men that 
can be used. 
A contractor would be foolish to underestimate or ignore 
his manpower requirements. In fact, if a client was to pre-
sent him with a very attractive cost reimbursement contract, 
the contractor might even have to refuse it if the work was 
such that he would have to increase his labour force by a 
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large ·amount·. 
His decision to turn,down. the contract would. be a 
good one· if a recession was forecast. in the construction 
industry. Having gone to a great deal of trouble and ex-
pense to comply with Government regulations cortcerning the 
importing of labour from other parts ,of the country (see 
Appendix B), the contractor might find himself in the position 
of having too many labourers for his needs~ 
Men can hardly be laid off whenever they are not need~ 
ed and so the contractor's costs per unit of labour production 
would show a considerable increase~ This might possibly off-. 
set any advantages.that.would be gaine4 from the presentation 
job. 
The size of the company also has an important bearing 
on the overheq.d costs that have to be borne.by each job it 
undertakes. The·more contracts there there.are in hand at 
any particular time, the lower will be t~e proportion of office 
overhead costs to be borne by each individual job. It follows. 
. i.etv . . 
that, dur~ng a recess/' when there ~s a scare~ ty of work, a 
higher proportion of the revenue from each job will go to~ 
wards the cost of overheads, unless these are reduced in some 
way. It .is important· for a contractor to be able to forecast 
his·requirements-so that.he might anticipate changes in office 
expenditure where possible. 
Also, the size of his company will dictate the amount of 
risk a contractor is willing to undertake on any particular 
job. If his company is small, a loss on a single job could 
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bankrupt his organisation, while large companies should be 
able to withstand-the effect of unforeseen losses. This will 
have an overall effect on the caution with which each con-
tractor sets his margin for profit, part_of which may be 
considered as_a margin for error. 
Section 5.4 Planning : 
When tendering for a contract, the contractor has to 
consider_the impact his.execution of the job will have on his 
future~ 
lt is pos~ible, for instance, th~t the job will provide 
the contractor _with.experience that will be of use in. the 
future. Here again, the co~tractor's judgment is important. 
It is pointless.to acquire specialised knowledge for a particular 
contract-when in all probability, jobs of such a type will not-
be constructed again in th~ contractor's area of operations. 
However, such experience might prove invaluable, and the con-
tractor has to decide whether this_will be the case. In this 
context; experience covers more-than the simple acquisition 
of knowledge by personnel; It also includes the purchasing 
(and paying for) specialised equipment and other things such-
as ~omputer progrannnes. 
The contractor might also bid purposefully low to be 
given an opportunity to work for a particular client. Should 
the client be planning an extensive expansion progrannne, of 
which a.particular job is but the first part, then the con-
tractor would be well advised to make a favourable impression 
so that_he might be approached by the client to negotiate 
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further contracts. Naturally, the contractor.should not bid 
too low on the job, because the client would hardly be i~­
pressed with the capabilities of the_ contractor if he knew 
that he was losing money. 
Section 5.5 Past.· Experience : 
Naturally, a contractor will be ,able to produce a 
more accurate·estimate for a job when he has had previous ex-
perience either of-the job type, or of working in the vicinity 
of the job site. Here again, experience of the job typein-
cludes both knowledge and the ownership of specialised equip-
ment.· 
Experience in. working in the vicinity -of the job site 
means that the contractor will have a reasonably good idea of 
sub-surface problems, as well.as a knowledge of local labour 
and transport conditions. His supply-lines should also have 
been established and should be ready for use. This is im~ 
portant in outlying areas. 
A contractor with little or no experience would have 
to estimate his ·costs higher to be certain. of not getting in-
todifficultie~?, and so would be atan obvious disadvantage 
from the start. 
Section 5.6 Alternative Designs : 
Occasionally, the tender documents-make specific pro-
vision for the submission of tenders based on alternative de-
signs by the_contractor as well as on the original designs. 
However, even if this is not th~ case, it _might be of advantage 
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for the contractor to suggest certain alterations to the 
design, while ensuring that the use to which the completed 
str.ucture is to be put is ·in no way impaired. The purpose 
of such alterations would·be to reduce the cost of the pro-
ject by making it easier for the contractor.to construct by 
using other materials etc. This will also- decrease the time. 
spent on construction. 
An.objection to the submission of an alternative 
design might.be that·it would damage the relationship 
between owner and contractor. The former might get the Lm-
pression that the contractor is just trying to be clever and 
might think that.the effort of checking the alternative would 
be,wasted. Also, the engineer mighttake it as a personal 
criticism if his design is altered. The·contractor should take 
these. relationships into account wh~n deciding whether to sub-
mit an alternative. Also, he should not.waste his own time 
and money in seeking alterations when.they would most probab-. 
ly be rejected outright. 
Should his alternative be accepted, the contractor and 
th~ client usually share the monetary advantages in some agreed 
manner between themselves. It is important that the contract~ 
or should take· ca.re in planning his .submitted alternative 
designs, as the client could be te~pted to take advantage of 
the new. design by adopting it as .the basis.£or a new set of 
tenders. However, this would hardly be an ethical procedure. 
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PART 2 
STATISTICAL APPROACHES TO TENDERING 
CHAPTER 6 INTRODUCTION TO STATISTICAL APPROACHES TO TENDERING 
Section 6.1 The·Objectives and limitat~ons. of 
Mathematical Models : 
A model may;be defined as arepresentation of a system. 
It may be a physical representatiQn such as ~ ~erspex scale 
model of a proposed new bridge, or it may be an abstract re-
presentation suchas a:mathematical equation used to calculate 
the flow of water through a pipeline under differe~t pressures. 
The. particular model to be developed in the. remaining 
chapters of this thesis is one to represent the competitive 
bidding situation that.occurs when a construction contract 
is put out to tenqer, 
The purpose of a model is to predict. It is used to 
predict the outcome.of various changes to the system which it 
represents. 
The model is manipulated rather than the real-world system 
because.it is easier and cheaper to do,so. Indeed it is often 
impossible to manipulate the original system. For example it is 
impossible to place actual loads on a bridge which has not yet 
been built. 
Models are set up in order to make decisions, In this 
regard, they do not ha~e·to represent every single aspect of 
a system. They have, only .to provide the i~formation necessary 
to make a correct decision~ 
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Chapter 9 of this thesis includes.recommendations for 
the integration of professional judgment with the predictions 
made by the competitive bidding model developed and tested 
in C.hapter .8. 
Section 6.2 The Expected Value Concept. : 
There are many processes whose outcomes cannot be pre-
dieted with certainty. The tossing of a coin is a prime example 
of such a process. 
Each outcome of the process has a particular probability 
of occurrence. For example, if the coin is unbiased, the prob-
ability of it landing heads is 0,5. 
These processes are termed "probabiUstic" as opposed 
to "deterministic" processes, the outcomes of which can be pre-
dieted in advance. 
This concept of .a probabilistic process or system is ~m-
portant in this thesis bec~use a competitive bidding system 
falls into this category. Each contractor tendering for a 
project cannot predict with certai~ty whether he will be 
awarded the,contract. The best he can do is to assign a value 
to the probability that his tender will be the lowest •. Even 
if his tender is the lowest, the contract might still be 
awarded to somebody else •. 
When dealing with probabilistic processes, the ex-
pected value of the random variables (outcomes) of these 
processes is an important. concept •. · 
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Repeated use will be made of this concept in the 
following chapters of this thesis and so it will be given a 
brief introduction in this section. 
The expected value of a random variable may.be defined 
as the weighted average of all the possible values of the 
variables, each weighted by its probability of occurrence. 
The important point to realize is that this .is identical 
to the arithmetic average. 
Let us return to the tossing of a co~n. Consider a 
situation in which a person is given RlO if the coin lands 
heads• If the coin lands tails, he is given-nothing. The 
expected value to him of the tossing of the coin is calculated 
as follows. : 
The probability of his obtaining RlO is 0,5 (assuming 
the coin is unbiased), and.the probability of him obtaining 
nothing is also 0,5. The expected value of the random variable 
(his gain) is given in equation 6.2.1. 
Expected Value = 
This reduces to R5. 
(10 X 0,5) + (0 X 0,5) 
(0,5 + 0,5) ••• (6.2.1) 
It is important.to note that this is the average amount 
he will receive each time if the coin is tossed a large number 
of times. 
It must also be appreciated that the expected value is 
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not an actual amount of money which the person will receive 
after the coin has been tossed. He will receive RlO or 
nothing. 
In general then, the_ expected value is not a. real value 
assumed.by a random variable. Rather, it may be considered to 
be·the average value of the random variable when a particular 
process is repeated often. 
This concept will be expanded upon in section 8.1 where 
the criterion on which to base the optimal bid amount for a 
construction tender is discussed. 
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CHAPTER 7 - A SURVEY OF PUBLISHED LI'J_'ERATURE CONCE~NING TENDER 
ANALYSIS AND DECISION TECHNIQUES~ 
The literature contains relatively few papers on com-
petative bidding in the construction industry, and it is of 
interest tQ note that those available all· originated in· the. 
U.S.A, This chapter contains summaries of the more.im-
portant work done on bidding strategies to date, and where 
possible the present writer has at.tempted to rephrase the 
statistical passages in order to make them more readable 
by a con~rac~or with little or no kno~ledge of the principles 
:r: 
of st~tisticf:1, However, this has not always been possible 
owing to the dependence of decision theory on statistics, 
Section 7.1. - Friedman : 
This author's paper (12) was first presented in 1955 
and was. published a year later. As such, .it is generally 
recognised (4,25,40a,42) as the first appearance of literature 
on cbmpetitive bidding, though as Friedman himself remarks : , 
11Unfortut1ately details of the successful applications of 
operations research to the development of bidding str~teg-
ies cannot be made public for reasons of industr.ial security". 
The pres.ent writer considers this still to be, a problem at 
the moment •. 
The bidding situation co.nsidered by Friedman is one 
common to t"pe c<;mstruction industry, , though he. made no specific 
reference to this application. Each competitor submits a 
closed bid, or tender price, to the client who publicly opens 
them aU at .a prescribed time •. Generally the contract is 
awarded to the lowest bidder. 
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Friedman remarks that each tendering company could 
haye one·or more·of several objectives in submitting a bid. 
af Maximization of total expected profit. 
b) Gains of a certain percentage of the market:. 
c) Minimization of expected losses. 
d) Minimization of the profits of competitors. 
e) Keeping production go~ng, even if _the contract 
~ s won at a 1 o s s • . 
These objectives will naturally affect the strategy 
to b~ adopted by the company _and Friedman chooses the first -
maximization of total expected profit- as the basis-for his 
strategy. 
Before the mathematical part of Friedman's model ~s 
described, on~ should consider this concept of expected profit 
maximization. It is important to note that-the great majority 
of jobs for which a contractor tenders are essentially different, 
·' ~·""""' from e3 ~ther in many respects- the site location, th~ sub- Jr·~ 
soil conditions, the availability of labour, the supervision 
available for the job, the state of the company's finances, 
etc •. Is one justified in using the expect.ed profit to make 
a .decision concerning a particular job? As previously point-
ed out, (Sect:~on 6.2), the expected profit is not the actual 
excess of revenue over expenditure that will result.from 
completing the contract; Further it is the average profit 
that would be made if that particular .contract .was tendered 
for a large number of times. · 
The·use.of expected values ~n making .decisions ~n 
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"one off" situations like a construction tender, i.e •. sit-: 
uations that are unique and .will not recur, ~s receiving 
considerable attention at the moment (24a), and though the 
present writer can profess no specialis~d knowledge on the 
subject, this aspect will be .discussed at a later stage 
(Section 8.1). 
Friedman begins his mathematical presentation by r~-
cognising that the true cost of the contract is invariably 
different. from the estimated .cost - a point neglected by 
several .later writers on the subject (13,15,25,40a), let 
c be the estimated cost of the contract• If enough past 
data is studied, a relative frequenty distribution of S, _ 
the ratio of the true cost to c may be constructed. Friedman 
sugg~sts that it might take the form shown in figure 7.1.1. 
Figure 7 .1.1 Reliability of the Cost Estimate 
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If h(S) ~s con$idered to be the probability 
density function of S, then the probability that.S lies 
between.S and S + dS is h(S)dS. It follows that the expect-
ed cost of completing the contract is given by : 
00 
Expected cost, = s SC h(S)dS 
0 
····~ (7.Ll) 
If the contractor's bid is b, his profit will then be 
aO 
Profit = b - j SC h(S)dS 
0 
•••.•• ·(7.1.2) 
But this amount will only be realised if the contractor actual-
ly wins the contr,ct, i.e. if his bid is the lowest. Hence 
this quantity must be multiplied by the probability P(win) 
that the contractor wins with bid b, to give his expected profit 
for the contract E. 
E = P(win) [ b J: sc h(S)ds] • • • • • (7 .1. 3) . 
Friedman·ref~rs to SC h(S)dS as "The estimated 
cost corrected for bias.". This concept that·th~ cost of per-
forming the work is a .random variable (i.e. cannot be predict-
ed with certainty) is an important one, and more.will be 
written about this subsequently (Section 9.1). 
Friedman then gfves a sketch of the ,move, of E vs. b 
(figure 7.1~2) and suggests that the bid yielding the maximum 
value of E should be used. 
Perhaps the crucial part of Friedman's model ~s that 
introduc.ed by his statement that "The· difficu~ ty in determin-
ing the expected profit lies in determining P(win), the pro-
bability of winning as.a function of the amount bid". 
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Figure 7 .1. 2 Expected Profit Curve 
Essentially, Friedman. s~ggested th~t if the probability that 
a particular contrac~or would bid lower than competitors 
A;B and C were respectively P(A), P(B) and P(C), then the prob-
.~bility that he would win is given by : .. 
P(win) = P(A) P(B) P(C) ••••• (7.1.·4) 
Also, if the probability of beating the average com-
petitor .in the market was·P(ave), and if there were pn aver-
age n competttors per job, then the probability of winn~ng would 
be·: 
P(win) = n P(ave) ••••• (7.1.5) 
This implies that the probability of the.contractor 
bidding lower than competitor A is statistically independent 
of the probabilit~es of his bidding lower than competitors 
B or C~ This.has been contested by Ga,tes (14), and is 
dealt with in detail·later (Section 8.2). 
Friedman suggested that the probability of submitting 
a lower ten4er price.than a particular competitor may be assess-
ed by setting up a relative frequency distribu~ion.of·the ratio 
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R(A) of that competitor's bid to the contractor's cost 
estimate· : . 
R(A) Competitor A's Bid •••• -.(7.1.6) 
c 
Such a distribu~ion is shown in figure 7.1.3. The shaded area 
to the right of X, the ratio of the contractor 1 s bid·_.to his 
cost-estimate, represents the probability of-the contractor 
bidding lower than competitor A. 
Figure 7 ~ 1. 3 
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Relative Frequency Diagram for 
Competitor A 
Friedman continues to_say that the "average competitor's" 
bid ratio (ob~ained by averaging all·the competitors' bids for 
a past contract an4 then dividing this value by the con-
tractor's cost estimate for that job) is ganuna distributed. The 
present writer has not found this to be the case on th~ data 
he has studied (Section 8.3). The normal distribution fits 
the data clo~ely. 
However, as Friedman states, the number of contractors 
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tendering for a construction contract is Poisson distributed •. 
He.then extended equation 7.1.5 to take into account the random 
number of competitors : 
P(win) E (N) P (ave) ••••• (7 .1. 7) 
where E(N) is the expected value of N, the (random) number of 
' ' 
competitors for the contract. 
By using the Poisson and Ganuna distributor's respective-
ly for E(N) and P(ave), Friedman showed that P(win) evolved 
as the cununulative of the Poisson distribution. The mathematics 
will not be presented as the present writer feels that.the use 
of the Ganuna distribution is unjustified. Friedman then suggest-
eq that freely available tables of the cununulative Poisson 
dist+ibution could be used to give the probability of the 
contractor defeating n "average'' competitors ·for the lowest 
bid. 
Finally, Friedman proposed that· the number of bidders. 
on any particular contract· should be related to the CQ.ntractor' s 
cost estimate for the job, A regression analysis could then be 
made to find the relationship between these two variables. Un-
fortunately, tJ:le present writer did not find this to be the case 
(Section 8.7) .• ' The only way to predict the probabil~ty of 
enc9untering a certain numl;ler of competitors.on a particular 
project is to make use of the f~ct that.that number is Poisson 
distributed. 
Section 7.2· Gates (A) : 
In his paper (15), Gates ~dopted .a completely different 
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approach to the problem. Indeed, it seems that he,was unaware 
of Friedman's paper (12) from the absence of any reference to 
it· in his work. 
What Gates did was to establish a relationship 
between the size of a.contract and the "spread" or difference 
between, the lowest and second lowest bids. He selected certain 
rq~d construction tenders whose results were published in the 
press at the time. He was.careful to exclude;any unusual·jobs 
that were "not·representative of the usual·highway projects 
encount~red''. Gates then classif.ied the. contracts according 
to the value of the lowest bid and computed the geometric·mean 
of the spread for each j9b in the group. He then took the 
geometric mean of the job values in each group and plotted the 
pairs of co-ordinates so obtained on log-log paper. He found 
a line~r relationship to exist. 
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Gates then constructed a di~gram re~ating the.size 
of tbe cohtrac~ (as given"by the lowest bid) to the probabili-
ty of the spread being a certain amount, The probabilities 
were obtained.from an observation of the scatter of ·the a~tual 
spreads on jobs of particular size about the predicted spread 
given by the regression equation. 
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The analysis in the form of this diagram was then 
applied in various ways, the first of which was to the problem 
of determining whether the lowest bidder had made a gross mis-
take. Gates assumed·that if there was less.than a 3% chance 
of the spread on·a job being as large as.it was, then a "rare" 
event had taken place, and the lowest bidder had made a gross 
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mistake. ·He suggested that a client should·allow the lowest 
bidder· to _withdraw his bid without penalty in. such a case,. 
should he.wish to do so. Naturally, the fact that .t'tle spread 
was ~n fact so l~rge did not me;:tn that the lowest bidder had 
~n f~ct made a mistake, and· the decision to withdraw should 
be,1eft in the hands of the contractor. 
The present writer consider this to be a most.practical 
use of the ana~ysis as no contract will ever be c~mpleted _sat-
isfactorily when the contractor knows tha~ he cannot avoid mak~ 
ing a loss. 
However, as a corollary to this, it would seem that if 
the lowest and second lowest bids were so close that there was 
less than a 3% chance of the.spread being so small; the client 
should assume that there had_been collusion between.these bidders 
and· disregard. them both. The present author is of the. opinion 
that·in practic~ this would be a very difficult step to takeo 
The next application of the.analysis.that Gates made 
was to thematt.er of the."bid guarantee". This is the;amount 
of money to be paid by the contractor should he be awarded the 
contract and then withdraw. Gates proposed that;: the.amount 
should correspond to the limiting spread beyond which_there 
would bea mistake in t'tle bid- i.e. the probability that the 
spread would be less than this amount would be 0,97. This 
was because it was the limiting amount of extra _money that 
the_client would have to pay should he.have.to accept the 
second lowest bid~ 
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Bid guarantees.are seldom if ever required in South 
Africa as the cost of making the.estimate is considered t0 be 
sufficient waste of money by the contractor to deter him from 
withdrawing from the contract. However? a case could~be made 
for the American practi~e since it does protect the client from: 
the financial loss, that he himself. would sustain. Itf t~t event 
of bid guarantees b~ing required, Gates' method .. of setting 
their.amount does seem logical. 
Gates thereupon turned his attention to the use of 
average unit prices in the bid. , He reasoned that the size 
of the spread was closely related to the.precision of the 
estimate. Since.approximately one.third of the contracts ha,d-
spreads above the average, it was concluded that the same pro-
portion of each estimate could be made up o~ "going" prices 
obtained from trade journals. Gates suggested that minor 
items should be chosen for estimation this way and· that even if 
more.effort was expended in producing accurate assessments of 
the costs of such items, little or no extra_precision would 
result in the tot~l estimate. 
The logic behind the adoption of Gates' analysis in 
this way does. seem rather loose; but the pres.ent writer discuss-
ed this point with a prominent local contractor (40b) who agree-
ed in principle with Gates' conclusion. 
Gates then turned his attention to bidding stra~egies 
by which a contractor might make use of his. analysis. The first 
of these he termed the "Method of, Constant, Work','. If the con-
tractor requires to win n. jobs per year. to keep his company 
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optimally loaded with work, and from past experience he is 
able to evaluate his average probability of success at tender-
ing as.p%. then the optional number of jobs for which he must 
tender a price each year is : 
100 n 
N ••••• (7.2.1) 
p 
Gates proposed that the contractor could ·increase his 
profits by making use of a spread analysis, This is done by 
first assuming that b, the bid he has prepared, is 100% certain 
to win·the contract. If he adds on amount b' to b the 
contractor will increase his profit if he is still the lowest 
bidder, but he will naturally reduce the probability that his 
bid is the lowest. From a spread ana~ysis, the contractor may 
assess his new probability of being the low bidder as q. 
This is done by entering the diagram relati~g job size to the 
probability of the spread being a particqlar .size.with b. 
The probability of the spread being greater than b' is read 
off and this is assumed to be the probability q that the 
contrac~or will still win the contract~ 
In this way., if the contractor .decides to add a constant 
100 b' persentage ( b ) to all of his tender prices, h~ should 
bid on 
N 100 n pq 
contracts per year 
••..•• (7.-2.2) 
assuming that he is confident that such 
an amount of jobs will come up for tender. 
The present writer ~s of the opinion that there are several 
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points of doubt ~n this application.of Gates' work. 
a) n, the optional number of jobs per year for the con-
tractor to win has little meaning in the context of 
civil engineering contracting where the nature of 
each job and. its duration determines the quantity of 
the contractor'. s resources to be us.ed. 
b) p, the probability of success at tendering varies con-
siderably from job to job, depending a~ it does on many 
factors which have been ennumerated elsewhere in this 
thesis (Appendix A). 
c) The assumption that the contractor's bid ~s the lowest 
before the increase is applied is hardly likely to be 
co+rect in most cases. Should it not be the lowest, then 
the probability associated with any inc+ease ~n the bid 
will be incorrect and this will lead to an invalid 
conclusion. 
Gates termed his next application the "Method of 
Maximum Income''. If the contractor had prepared his bid in-
cluding an amount of profit a (the "anticipated profit") the 
problem is to determine the amount he shou~d increase this bid 
so that the probable gain minus the probable loss is a 
maximum, i.e. : 
qb' a (1 - q) = max ••••• (7.2.3) 
where b' is the increase in the bid amount and q is the probabil-
ity of still winning the contraGt after adding b'. 
Once again, the present writer considers this to be 
fallaGious in that to use the Gates analysis of spread 
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probcbilities the contractor must assume that· his bid will be 
the lowest, The only other way of determining p is by means of 
the method Friedman proposed, of which Gates makes no mention. 
Finally, Gates extended the "Method of Maximum Income" 
to the "Method·of Maximum Profit". He recommends this method 
to contractors "if work is plentiful and past experience in-
dicates that it ~s not·practical to attempt to estimate the 
net profit fro~ a bid". It follows directly from the previous 
method, the only difference being that the sole input required 
is the contractor's cost estimate. The spread analysis is used 
to decide upon the final addition for profit. 
The present writer is of the op~n~on that the same argu-
ment is applicable.here as was to the "Method of Maximumincome"-
the probabilities g~ven by the analysis could be considerably 
wrong. 
It seems then that the value of Gates' paper lies ma~n­
ly in its use to clients in assessing tender·bids received for 
a, partic4lar job. Its contribution to this problem is con-
siderable, in the opinion o~ the present writer. Gates' 
suggestions.to apply this type of analysis to the contractor's 
problem of deciding on an optimum markup, while appearing some-
what misdirected, did however attempt to place that subject 
on a logical basis in the construction industry .. 
Section 7 .3· Gates . (B) 
In a later paper (14), Gates .treats the subject in con-
siderable depth. He proposes several different strategies to 
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be used. by the contractor in various circumstances depend-
ing mainly on the cbntractor' s knowledge about his. competition. 
He carries Friedman's work further and also discusses the app-
lication of game theory to competitive bidding, and the.un-
balancing of bids. 
The first situation considered by Gates LS one where 
the contractor finds himself the only tenderer for a contract. 
In this case; the contractor should model his bid on what 
Gates terms the."Lbne Bidder Strategy"~ It·is essentially for 
adoption by the contractor against his client. In it the 
contractor makes subjective estimates of the probability of the 
client accepting his tender price with various amounts. of mark-. 
up for profit •. The co.ntractor then chooses .the markup that 
would give hi~ the,maximum expected profit- his profit allow-
ance times the probability of .. his bid being acc~pted. 
This ·strategy does appear to be sound in theory, but the. 
present writer is o:l; the.opinion that the probability assign-
ments are .of suc;:h·a subjective nature and are unable to be sub-
stantiated by historital dat~, that perhap~ a ·direct estimate 
of the best. allowanc;:e for proFt will be ju·st as effective. 
Published discussion on this strategy centred around 
the proble~ of how·the contractor was to know whether he was Ln 
fact the orily bidder and wha.t the "engineer's estimate'.' was~ 
In .his closur.e, Gates .countered the .first problem by suggesting 
that a few minutes bef.ore. the deadline for submission of· the 
tenders, the.contractor sqould be able to. find out. how many 
t~nderers there were, an4 an item such as one Ln the P & G bill 
could have been left blat;lk for filling. Ln at the last moment. 
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The present. writer has seen this done in practice -
indeed· there is usuq.lly an item entitled "fees" in the P & G 
bill. 
With regard to the.problem of determining the "engineer's 
\ 
estimate",.Gates pointed out that in the United States, for. 
every project on which such an estimate was kept a secret, there 
was one for which it was actually.published. The present,writer 
has discussed this-proble~ with a local consulting engineer (19a), 
and it seems that there is·no reason why the consultant's.estimate. 
should be.kept a secret. 
Gates thereupon presented an application of game theory 
to a situation where there were·only two tenQ.erers for a contract. 
A brief description of the elements of game theory is given 
elsewhere (Appendix D) and it is sufficient to nqte that Gates' 
application is rather artificial. 
The possible actions described ~n the game are given 
below. 
a) Both tenderers do not increase their bids because they are .. 
the only competitors for the.cpntract. 
b) Both tenderers do increase their bids. 
c). The· one, tenderer does. increase his bid while.the other does 
not. 
d) Vice versa. 
The payoff matrix consisted of the expecte<;l profits 
from one of the.bidders point.of view• These were evaluated fron;~ 
subjective estimates of the probability of winning in each sit-
uation. The resutling two person, zerp-:-sum, two .by·two game 
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conveniently produced a saddle point to provide each competitor 
with .a grand s~rategy. As pointed out in Appendix D, t~is is a 
rare occurrence and tends.to highlight the possible over-
simplification adopted by Gates •. 
The next strategy presented by Gates was one which he re-
commended for use by contractors when competing against many 
competitors. Essentially, the method of maximizing expected 
profit as presented in Friedman's paper was used• The difference 
wa,s that Gates considered only the lowest compeJ:itor's bid for 
each past tender in deciding on the probability of winning re-
lated to various profit allowances. Unfortunately, possibly 
because of industrial security, Gates did not .use the actual 
contractor's cost.estimate in determining the competitor's 
bid to cost ratio for each job. Instead, he assumed that the 
contractor had·adopted a steady 5% markup on each job. This de-
tracted somewhat from the.analysis. but.nevertheless showed the 
method clearly enough. 
Gates next discussed the application of Friedman's 
method to a situation where the contractor knows exactly which 
competitors he is going to meet when competing for a particular 
tender. Relative frequency distributors were to be set up as 
before, but the important advance that Gates made was in the com-
bination of the probabilities of beating each of the competitors 
to yield the. probability of winning the contract. It will be re-
called that if P(A), P(B), P(C) are the probabilities of beating 
competitors A, B and C respectively, then Friedman suggested 
that the probability of beating all of the competitors together 
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was given by 
P(win) P(A) P(B) P(C) ..... (7.1.4) 
However, Gates refuted this and suggested that the probability 
be given as : ·. 
P(win) = 
1-P(A) 
P(A) 
1 
+ 1-P(B) 
P(B) 
+ 1-P(C) + 
p (C) 
1 •• (7.3.1) 
Unfortun~te1y, Gates did not offer a proof of this ~n his paper, 
b~yond stating that it was "the mathematical model of a 'coloured 
balls in the urn' problem" •.. 
The present writer supports the use of equation 7.3.1 and. 
its proof appears subsequently (Section 8.2). 
Gates then presented the "least spread strategy". This 
was the same as the method given in his previous paper (15) and 
has already been described in Section 7.2~ of this.thesis. 
The next strategy Gates gave was that of "unbalancing" 
the bid. , This can only be employed for unit price tenders. It 
cqnsists of the.contractor altering the unit prices in such a 
way as to keep the total tender price consta,nt while. inc-r:eas-
ing the ultimate monetary benefit accruing to.the contractor. 
The following situations .could warrant unbalancing of the. 
bid. 
a) The contractor might.:not have enough capital.on hand to 
meet the needs of the project. By inflating the unit prices 
of items that will be completed early in the contract, the 
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contractor will receive extra money that might be used to 
finance the remaining items of the project, 
b) If the contractor believes that the quantities of certain 
items are in doubt, he might alter the unit prices of such 
i terns to his adv~antage. . For instance, if he believed that. 
there was l~ss rock.and more earth 1n the excavation for a 
substructure, .. the contractor would be sensible. to increase 
the unit price of e~rth excavation and decrease that of 
rock excavation, while keeping his tender price for the 
whole excavation a cq~stant•, 
Naturally there 1s a var~1ng degree of risk attached to 
suc:h practices, a fact; not.to be taken lightly by any contract-
or. 
The present writer envisages the best application of un-
balancing bidding to be the maximization of the present value of 
the cash flows associated with the contract, This is presented 
in detail in Appendix H. 
Finally, Gates presented various topics from probabili-
ty theory that might be used in association with bidding strategies. 
These included a short discussion on the binomial, Poisson 
and normal distributions. 
Section 7.4 Ortega Reichert 
In his report (27), Ortega Reichert examines several 
different bidding processes from a game theoretic point of view. , 
of the various types of auction he considers, the single stage 
closed biddi~g process is of interest to us, as this is the 
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type most, connnonly used for construction" tenders in, this 
country. 
Ortega Reichert considered the following facts to be 
relevant to his analysis : 
a) uncertainty about the reliability of the .bidder's in-
formation concerning the exact nature and amount of the 
work; 
b) .unce:rtainty about the actual profit.the bidder wil~ make 
if he is successful and is awarded the .contract; 
c) the bidder's uncertainty about his opponents'. str~tegies 
if they have. particular co_st estimates; 
d) uncertainty from the. bidder's point of v~ew about the cost 
estimates on which his opponents will base their bids. 
Ortega Reichert developed several bidding strategy models. 
a) Each of the bidders was assumed to have perfect information 
about his own cost and uncertainty about his opponent's 
cost. Only two bidders were considered (the contractor 
versus the rest), and the objective was for each to maximise 
his expected profit. A differential equation was set up 
and solved to yield the bidding strategy to be adopted by 
each competitor as a function of his cost. The optimal 
strategies were found to be in equilibrium. In other words, 
each competitor should adopt the same strategy.' 
b) The above model was altered to allow for the optimization 
of a non-linear utility function instead, of the expected 
profit V!llue,. 
c) The model was extended to an n.,.person game and it,y;ras observed 
that the bid resulting from the optimal strategy for a 
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given cost decreased as the number of co~petitors increased. 
d) The model was extended to cqver the case where each competit-
or was uncertain of the number of opponents he.has. 
e) Model (a) was altered in that each of the two competitors 
was considered to have differing degree of uncertainty 
abou~ his cost estimate. The conclusion drawn by Ortega 
Reichert was that each competitor should assume that his 
opponent:.has t:he S!'lme {ltnount of in~ormation concerning the 
proj~ct as himself. 
Generally, that author endeavoured to produce. exact sol-
utions to the differential equ!'ltions that·were set up, though 
this was only rarely possible, To overcome this diffic~lty, 
in one part (}tf tP.e paper he treated model (a) as a "discrete 1f 
j 
adaptive process". This means that a solution.was sought to 
the differential equations by generating a series of strategies 
for each competitor. , Consider the two opponents A and B. 
The first step is when competitor A makes a bid following a 
particular strategy. Then competitor B makes .his bid follow-
ing his strategy, but taking into acco~nt A's bid. This process 
is continued with each competitor obtaining more,and more in-
formation regarding the other's strategy. Ortega Reichert found 
this method to be unsuccessful as the process was often un-
stable, 
The present writer noted that throughout this paper, 
the probability of beating several opponents in competition 
for the lowest bid was assumed to be that given by equation 
7.1.4. As pointed out1.n the previous sections of this chapter, 
the use of this equation is in doubt, and this will have an 
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effect on several of Ortega Reichert 1 s models, though not all. 
Furthermore, .the present writer noted that the success-
ful solution of the differential equations that were proposed 
involved considerable simplifications which generally reduced 
the equations to those which Friedman presented in.his paper(l2). 
The advantage of such a game theoretic approach as adopted by 
Ortega Reichert is therefore questionable. 
Section 7~5 Morin and. Clough 
A description of a general computer program, OPBID, for 
use by contractors wqen deciding on the optimal markup to 
apply to their cost estimates for construction tenders is 
presented by the authors (25). The program is designed for 
use·by contractors with no previous experience in operations 
research techniques.' 
The opinion of the present writer is that previous 
experience - if not expertise - in such matters is a pre-
requisite for their successful use. It seems that the untrain-
ed use of OPBID or any similar program could lead a con-
tractor seriously astray. 
The model takes cognizance of five factors 
a) cost estimate; 
b) true cost; 
c) number of competitors; 
d) identity of competitors; 
e) nature of the work. 
Essentially, Friedman 1 s model 1.s adopted with several 
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slight alterations •.• 
Firstly, Norin and Clough disregard the distinction 
between the true cost and the estimated cost• They state that 
on the jobs which they studied, the mean of the ratios between 
the true and·estimated.costs tended to 1,0 and the standard· 
deviat~on was of the order of 0,02. The present author has 
not had the opportunity ofstuding similar data under local. 
conditions, but such a situation does seem to be somewhat. 
idealized, especially for civil engineering projects where there 
is always a varying amount of uncertainty with regard to site 
conditions. 
The probability of bidding lower than several competitors 
was given as in equa tio'Q. 7. L 4, following the Friedman model. 
Gates (14) has shown this to be incorrect and·he reiterated 
his formula 1.n the discussion on this paper by Morin and Clough. 
In OPBID, the probability of beating any particular 
competitor is determined from a discrete distribution of the 
ratio between the. competitor's bid and the contractor's cost 
estimate. The present writer favours the use of a continuous 
rather than a discrete probability distribution, and more.is 
said about this later (Section 8.3). 
Also in OPBID, only certain competitors were considered 
significant enough to warrant the construction of a probability 
distribution of beating them alone. Part of the input to the 
program was a "key competitor factor" which was a number between 
zero and ninty. Only if a competitor had been met on a larger 
proportion of past jobs than that factor,.was a.distribution 
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constructed to assess the probability of beating him individual-
ly. The bid ratios of all the other competitors were collected 
into one "average" distribution. 
With regard to the number of competitors for any particular 
job, OPBID used the average number met on past tenders. The 
authors refute Friedman's suggestion that the,number is a, function 
of the monetary size of the job, a fact that.has nQt been support-
ed by the results of work done by the present author .either 
(Section 8.7). 
In OPBID:, Morin and Clough considered differences in the 
nature of the work (i.e. pipelines or road bridges) to be sig-
nificant. Discrete probability distribution were set up for 
each type of job and only the ones corresponding to the type 
of project in hand were used to assess the.contractor's chances 
of bidding lower than any particular competitor. Theoretically 
this i$ sound, but in practice one meets the problem of not 
having enough data to draw up reasonably accurate distributions. 
for each type of job. The relation between accuracy and·the 
number of data is presented later in this thesis (Section 8.3). 
Finally, Morin and Clough felt that re~ent data should 
be given more importance than older data because the relative 
position in the market of a construction company changes with 
time. An exponential weighting scheme was adopted : 
q K exp (-K't) + c ••••• (7.5.1) 
where q is the relative weight given to any particular 
bidding data; K,K' and c·are constants; 
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t is the time difference ~n days between the date 
of the tender from which the bidding data was 
taken and the tender under consideration. 
The ex per~ence of the present writer indica.tes that the 
relative positions of civil engineering contracting companies 
in a particu~ar market depend mainly on the a~ount of work·each 
has in handand·there is not a smooth cb,B;nge in positions with 
time.. Had· Morin and Clough clarified the evaluation of the 
constants in the weighting equation, they might have shed more 
light on this particular problem. 
Section 7,6, - Benjamin 
In his report (4) Benjamin expounded at length on the 
elements of the competitive bidding problem. 
Firstly, he considered factors having an effect on the 
cost.of performing the work (as distinct frqm the cost estimate),. 
which he took to be a random variable and hence to have a 
probability distribution associated with it. He ennumerated 
several factors influencing theuncertainty in the cost estimate, 
all of which have been dealt with in the first part of this 
thesis (Section 5.2). 
Benjamin then presented three me~hods of developing the 
probability distribution of the ratio of the true cost of tb,e 
project to the estimated cost. 
a) By performing a multiple regression analysis·to determine 
the relative influence of each of its elements on the 
tot?l cost of .the project. The uncertainties associated 
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with each of these.regression equations should then be 
summed to give the parameters of the distribution of the 
total cost estimate. This will be a normal distribution 
because of the process of addition involved in its cqn-
struction. Benjamin did not elaborate on this method, but. 
it seems similar to the way Gates (15) set up his spread 
probabilities (Section 7.2). 
b) By giving three prices for each item of the cost - the 
most;pessimistic, the most likely and the most optimistic. 
These three prices are used to form subjective bet' dis~ 
tributions for the cost of each item and·their sum is a 
normal distribution of the total cost of the job. This 
method is the same as that used in PERT network.analysis 
to develop the probability of completing a~project by a 
given date. 
c) By obtaining historical ratios of actual to e~timated cost 
and .. combining these into a distribution in the .same way as 
probability distributions of bid rat;ios, as previously 
demonstrated by Friedman. · 
Benjamin then went on the enumerate var~ous factors that 
bear an influence on the amount of profit that a contractor 
would seek for any particular job. The first of these proved 
to be. of interest. Benjamin termed it "intensity" - the ratio 
of the duration of the project to its cost. He suggested that 
the relationship between required profit and intensity should 
be as shown. in figure 7.6.~. 
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Figure 7.6.1 Effect of Job Intensity 
That author pointed out himself that-intensity should 
not influence the profit requirement if .office and job over~ 
heads have been includ~d in the cost estimate. 
The shape of the curve may be explained by the fact that 
if the contractor ,has to keep the job to a ver;y tight schedule 
and if t~ere are.penalty clauses for late completion -.i.e. if 
it is of high intensity - he will need to manage the project 
very carefully. This will be expensive and·so the job over-
heads will rise. On the other hand, .Benjamin does not explain 
why low intensity jobs require a high amount of profit. The 
present writer .imagines that this is because the cost of tying 
up capital in the job for a relatively long duration is high. 
The money could probably earn a higher rate of return elsewhere. 
The present writer is also of the opinion that this curve 
becomes superfluous when job overheads and· financial costs are 
properly included in the total cost estimate; as they should be. 
Nevertheless, this concept of ,intensity is an unusual and 
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interesting one, and the present writer has not seen any other 
reference to it. 
The rema1n1ng factors that Benjamin mentioned as having 
an influence on the amount of profit that a contractor would 
require are all related either to the risk involved 1n under-
taking the work or to the overhead cost of the job.· 
That author. then proposed that all the above factors 
could be used in a regression model to assess the probability of 
winning with different bids., Unfortunately he did not carry this 
idea further. 
Benjamin thereupon entered the mathematical phase of his 
dissertation. He began by considering the cqmpetitive bidding 
problem as a "two stage lottery". The prize of the first stage 
was the opportunity of actually undertaking the work, and of the 
second.stage was making a profit on the job- i.e. having a 
lower final cost than the amount.bid for the contract. 
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Figure 7.6.2 Two Stage Lottery 
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the probability of actually making a profit on the job is the 
product of the probability of the actu~l cost of the job being 
less than the bid amount and the probability of the bid amount 
being the lowest tendered. In fact, this is exactly the same 
approach as Friedman took, only Benjamin's terminology is 
more cqntemporary. 
Benjamin then.considered the maximization of the contractor's 
expected utility instead of expected prefit, as most previous 
authors had done. He considered two types of utility functions 
- the bilinear and the exponential, both of which are shown in 
figure (.6.3. 
Figure7.6.3 Utility Functions 
It is regrettable that-Benjamin did not mention any 
method by which the contractor might establish his utility 
curve apart from in an empirically subjective way. This is a 
very serious problem if his model is to be,of any practical 
use at all. 
Benjamin cqmbined several different distributions of 
the probability of being the successful bidder and of making a 
profit on the. jeb with these two types of utility functions. 
He found that there was.no "closed form solution" to the equations 
.. 
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giving the optimal bid and· suggested that successively larger 
bid amounts should be taken; the expected util~ty calculated 
at each step, and the bid corresponding to the highest expected 
utility value taken as optimal. Benjamin therefore discarded 
Ortega Reichert's approach of forming differential equations 
to solve for the optimal bid (27). 
The present writer considers that Benjamin's work would 
have been of more value if the methods he presented had been 
de~onstrated on actual data, an appendix of which .he did in fact 
include. 
Section 7~7 Shaffer and-Michaeu 
In their paper (40a), the authors investigate the use of 
variou& models to predict the optimal markup to apply to the 
estimated cost.of a project for which a price is to be tendered 
in open competition •. 
The models used are given below. 
a) The "One-distribution" model.; Here, the ratios of the .bids 
of every competitor met on each past·job, to the contractor's 
cost estimate are combined to form a normal distribution, 
from which the ,probability of winning with any particular 
profit al)owance may be determined. The process of choosing 
the optimal expected profit is the same as in the Friedman 
model (12). 
b) The "Multidistribution" model, in which each individual 
competitor's past bid ratios are combined into a normal. 
distribution and then, when the opponent's for the particular 
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job under consideration have been identified, their dis-
tributions are combined into one normal distribution. 
From this point onwards,, the model is the same as the 
previous one •.. 
c) The 11 Low bidder 11 model, which· uses·a single normal dis-
t+ibution formed of the lowest bidders' bid ratios to 
predict the probability of winning. Otherwise it is 
the same as the two previous models. 
d) The OPBID model (25), as described in Section 7.5. 
Data on 50 previous jobs was used,· Information on each 
tender included the contractor's cost.estimate and all the bids 
submitted, together with the (fictitious) identities of the 
bidders, The contractor's tender price was includ~d as well. 
The authors used each of the .models in different ways. 
The low-bidder model was used with the lowest, second lowest and 
third lowest bids on each tender, both including and excluding 
the contractqr's own bids. Furthermore, diff~rent amounts of 
input were used - all the previous jobs, only the 40 immediately 
preceding jobs, only the 30, only the 20 and only the 10 previous 
jobs. TheOne-distribution and Multidistribution models were 
both used without considering the contractor's own bids, and 
they were also .used with varying amounts of information as with 
the low-bidder.models. The OPBID model was used with different 
key competitor factors. 
Using each of .these models on each of the past jobs in 
turn (the data had been kept in chronological order), the authors 
calculated the number of times the contractor would have been 
the lowest bidd~r if. he had used a particular model, the number 
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of times he would have been the second lowest bidder, the profit 
margin as a percentage that he would have made and the volume 
of work that he would have.undertaken. They then used these 
results to establish a "lower" and an "upper bound" for the 
contractor to base his bid on •. These were limit~, somewhere 
between which the contractor .should bid, depending on his own 
subjectiv~ appraisal of his competitive situation •. 
Shaffer and·Michaeu set the lower·bound as the price 
obtained from the model which yielded the highest number of 
lowest bids and the greatest monetary volume of work. The 
upper bound to the bidding was the price obtained from the model 
giving the,second lowest bid most often, as well as the.highest 
profit margin. 
Their conclusion was that the lower bound was g~ven 
by the low-bidder model using information from the 40 immediate-
ly preceding jobs. The second lowest prices were used and 
the contractor 1 S· own bids were included. The upper bound was 
given by the low-bidder model using the third lowest bid~ on 
the 20 immediately preceding jobs. The contractor's own bids 
were again included. 
Shaffer and.Michaeu then tested these models on four more 
tenders simultaneously with the contractor .who bid on them 
using his usual informal method. , The model yielded the · 
low bid twice and came second·on the remaining two tenders. In 
actual fact, :for these four tenders, both upper and lower bounds 
were the same, and so no subjective decision had to be made by 
the contractor •. If the two bounds are able to c~incide, the 
present writer .wonders whether the upper bound model chosen in 
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this way might not in some cases yield a lower bid pr~ce than 
the lower bound model. 
In fact, the authors seem to have disregarded theoretical 
considerations altogether in their choice of models - an unwise 
thing to. do when dealing with operations research. techniques. 
Firstly, the inclusion of the contractor's own bids 
as data input for the models seems theoretically unjustifiable. 
The present a,uthor ~s of the opinion that the .contractor's 
main purpose is to beat his opposition. The inclusion of his own 
bids in determining his probability of winning seems to be unduly 
conservative. He does not have to beat himself as well. 
Also, the present author considers that the use of the 
second and third lowest bids in drawing up distributiqns to 
determine the optimal bid will in the long run yield the bid 
that is most likely to be the second or the,third lowest •. The 
use of this bid seems little more than a "formally informal" 
meth()d of choosing the optimal price. 
Finally, the use of such small numbers. of data in 
chronologically using datc;1 only from the jobs that have.preceded 
the tender under consideration will cause very unstable. 
probabilities of w~nn~ng as the process continues. This 
instability will be most apparent at the beginning. The present 
writer's observations of such a process are presented in 
Section 8.6. 
Probability distributions are notoriously dependent 
for their accuracy on the number of data used as input. Little 
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confidence can-be placed in those distributions using as few 
as 10 or,l5 pieces of information. In fact, the mean and standard 
deviations of the ratios of the lowest prices to the contractor's 
cost estimates were respectively 100,6% and 6,4%. Using all 50 
lowest ratios, at the 10% level the confidence interval for the 
+ mean.was- 1,5%. This means.that the mean was anywhere between 
99,1% and 102,1%, and this could conceivably have_ a noticeable 
effect on the optimulll bid prediction. 
The present writer has studied this particular problem 
and his work appears later (Section 8.3). 
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CHAPTER 8 ANALYSES MADE BY THE PRESENT WRITER 
S~ction 8.1 Criteria on which to Base the Optimal Bid 
When a contractor submits a tender price, he might adopt 
one of several possible strategies. Gates (14) has given a com-
prehensive list and his mathematical strategies have·been des-
scribed and discussed in Chapter 7. The other strategies which 
he listed are as follows : 
a) Collusion among the competing contractors to control the 
price and to decide on who is to be awarded the contract; 
b) Collusion between a contractor and the owner's represent~ 
ative to give the contractor information not available to 
the other tenderers, thus.enabling him to lower his tender I price; 
c) ''Tieing up" of all economical sources of material for the 
project by buying or leasing quarries, brickfields, etc~, 
d) Finding a way to make money from waste materials such c:fs 
excess excavation resulting from the job; 
e) Guaranteeing to purchase vital materials or equipment from 
certain suppliers if they quote ~igher prices to the other 
contractors tendering; 
f) Including the price of some items in the tender at below 
cost and then sub-contracting them out to an inexperienced 
businessman at this price after the tender has_been won; 
g) Sending the.other competitors alterations to the tender 
documents on the owner's letter-head to cause them to 
raise their bids; 
h) Where no borings have been made on the site, digging test 
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pits and adding rock or water to make the sub-soil con- . 
. ditions appear more difficult th~n they are. 
Gates himself remarks that:"Not all (these strategies) 
are ethical or even legal", which is indeed an.understatement.; 
However, they do have one essential point in common; namely 
that the contractor is endeavouring to maximi~e his profit 
should he be awarded the contract" 
The concept of ptofit bears elaboration. Accountants 
define it as .the "excess of revenue over expenditure"· (la) and 
this may be more simply explained as the difference between 
the amount o~ money paid for a product or service and the. amount 
used to produce it. However most investors are interested in 
the profit yielded by the amount of capital used. It is the 
percentage yield that is importanto Therefore in this chapter, 
the .term profit wi~l be used to mean the. percentage profito 
Most workers in the field of competitive bidding adopt 
the profit as a percentage of the tqtal cost estimate of the 
project, including all overhead costs. Strictly speaking though, 
the profit percentage should bebased on the money that is in-
vested in the contract in the form of plant, working capital, 
and often retention money. After ,the initial setting up stage, 
certificates of payment start·being issued and the money received 
is used to cover further expenses such as wages, etc. There-
fore, the total cost of the contract actually far exceeds the 
capital investment made by the contractor, 
Hence if the profit is calculated as a percentage of the 
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total cost of the project, it will be considerably smaller 
than if it had been based on the actual amount of the con-
tractor's money tied up in the.contract. 
This is a subtle,point and.is·one that has.been universal-
ly overlooked ~n the literature up to-the present time. In 
fact it makes no diff~rence to the optimal bid values predicted, 
by the models that have been proposed (see Chapter 7), This 
is because the two values differ by a multiplying factor : 
profit 
= 
profit cost estimate --~--~~----- X --~--~~------~ cost estimate capital invested capital invested 
ooooo(8.Ll) 
In other words, the.bid that is optimal when considering the 
profit based on the capital invested will be t~e same as the 
optimal bid from the point of view of the profit based on the. 
total cost estimate, Only-the two profit values will be differ-
ent. 
It follows that comparison between optimal bidding 
techniques are meaningful if based on the profit calculated 
as a percentage of the total cost estimates of all the work 
undertaken (i.e. contracts won). 
As explained in Chqpter 7, bidding models.up to the pre-
sent time all concentrate on optimizing the expected values of 
the prof:i,.t or utility ,associated with the bid values. The. 
expected value concept has bee~ explained in.section 6.2. 
The expected profit associated with a given bid is the product 
of the actual profit that would be made if the bid was 
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successful and the probability of th~t bid being successful, 
i.e. of the contract being awarded. Similarly, the expected 
utility is the probability of winning the contract with a 
particular bid times·the utility to the contractor of being 
awarded the contra~t at that bid price. The concept of utility. 
is expanded upon below and in.Appendix E. 
There are many factors that influence the amount o~ pro-
fit for which a contractor considers a particular contract to 
be a fair undertaking·by his company. These have been describ-
ed in detail 1.n Part 1 of this thesis. Certainly, the amount 
of profit to be won is seldom the only consideration when decid-
ing on the final tender price. It .is here that utility theory 
might be used to advantage, though there are undeniable practical 
difficulties in its useful application by a contractor. 
Formal utility theory is briefly described in Appendix 
E of this thesis, and so the present discQssion will be confined 
to a more practical and·possibly more meaningful description 
for the non~specialist .in de~ision theory. 
For our present purposes, a utility function may be des-
cribed as a relationship between the monet~ry profit that would 
result from undertaking a contract and the (probably non-monetary) 
value or utility of that profit amount to the. contractor. 
Naturally, this function will be different for different con-
tractors, different types of work, different times of the year, 
etc., and it YJill alter together with the. contractor's work load, 
financial position, the availability of labour and many other 
factors enumerated .in Appendix A. 
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Figure 8.1.1 shqws a.sketch of a possible utility 
function for acontractor tendering for a construction 
contr~ct<> 
\hrL u-h\~ CJJ'Ne. 
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Figure 8.1.1 -Utility Curve 
The first point to be noticed.isthat a bid yieldi-qg 
zero profit has a positive utility value, i.e. is of use to 
the contractor. The present writer .considers .this generally 
to be the case as the contractor will at least be contribut-
ing towards his overhead costs (assuming that th~y have been 
included in his cost estimate, as they should have been). 
Furthermore, by winning the contract, he will have secure 
employment for his resources. This is an important consider-
ation when work is scarce, but as the market changes to one 
in which there are many work opportunities, so the utility 
value of zero profit will drop. The stage might even be reach-
ed.when a small positive profit will have zero utility to the 
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contractor. The important point 1s tha.t each pr0 j ect that 
comes up for tender will have a different utility curve for 
the contractor. 
At section a of the curve shown in figure 8.1.1, the 
utility generally increases in a direct proportion to the 
profit amount, however as this amount increases, the slope 
of the utility curve tends to drop as shown at section b. 
This is caused by the difference between profits of 29 and 
30 percent, say, being less important to the.contractor 
then the difference between profits of 3 and 4 percent. These 
utility differences do of course vary with the conditions 
surrounding the tender, and once again th~s·highlights the 
fact that the curve will be different for each tender and for 
each contractor. 
At section c of the,curve the slope steepens appreciably. 
Technically, this is termed "risk aversion" (from the way 1n 
which the curve is evaluated in practice). As the profit 
becomes more and more negative, the contractor has increasing-
ly less utility for it. TQere is generally a profit allowance 
below which the .contractor will not undertake the work. This 
value is. said to have zero utility to the contractor. Should· 
the contractor attach positive utility values to negative pro-
fit values (i.e. he is willing to undertake the contract at 
a loss - possibly to keep production going) he will usually 
be less concerned with differences between -1 and ~2 percent 
say, than with differences .between -9 and -10 percent" A 10 
percent loss could deal a crippling blow to his company. Hence 
the curve tends to dip more sharply as the, profit values become 
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more and more negative. 
As pointed out previously, such a utility curve is 
exceedingly difficult to draw up in practice. The method 
generally used is to pose a ser~es of questions to the con-
tractor when the cost estimate has been prepared and from his 
answers, the curve is constructed, The present writer feels 
tha.t most local contractors would lack the patience to answer 
such a set of questions before each tende~ price is submitted 
and would rather make a subjective appraisal of their best bid 
for the .contract. Furthermore it ha~ been impossible to attempt. 
a practical trial of this method under business conditionso How-
ever one trial was·performed, though not in a contracting con-
text, and it is described.in Appendix E. 
A possible set of questions that might be put to the 
contractor are listed below. 
a) What percentage of your cost estimate would you pay for 
the privilege of bidding for this contract if you-knew 
for certain that a price including a 50% profit margin 
had a 50:50 chance of winning this contract? Imagine you 
lose nothing if you don't get the contract, 
b) Imagine that you are to be awarded the. contract under the 
following conditions •. There are two possible outcomes -
either you make 50% profit, or else the contract costs a 
certain amount·more than your tender price, and so you· 
lose. If these outcomes are equally likely to happen, 
what pe~centage of the cost estimate would you·be pre-
pared to lose under these probability conditions? 
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c) What percentage of your cost estimate.would you be 
prepared to pay for the privilege of bidding if you 
knew for certain that you would be awarded the con-
tract under the .following conditions? Either you make 
50% profit or else you make the percentage you gave as 
answer to que~tion (a). Each of these outcqmes has a 
50:50 chance of occurring. 
d) Now what percentage of your cost estimate would you pay 
for the privilege of tendering when you knew for certain 
that your price would either win the contract giving you 
a percentage profit equal to your answer to question (a), 
or else would not,win the contract, both outcomes being 
equally likely to happen? 
e) What percentage of your cost estimate would you have to 
be paid to tender a bid.when only the following two out-
comes.were equally likely to happen? Either you make 
zero profit on the work, or else you lose a percentage 
equal to your answer to question (b). 
f) Finally, if you had to pay 50% of your cost estimate just 
to be allowed to submit a tender, and once again there 
was a 50:50 chance of your either being awarded the con-
tract and making a certain percentage profit x, or else 
of not being awarded the contract and losing only the 50% 
of the cost estimate you paid to tender, what percentage 
profit x would make such a situati.on worhtwhile for you? 
Thes~ questions are extraordinarily .cumbersome and would 
obviously try the patience of the most enlightened contractor. 
Also they are.very difficult to simplify without making them 
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appear somewhat frivolous. These are overwhelming practical 
difficulties. 
The reader will appreciate that another approach to 
this problem is for the.contractor to quantify all the abstract 
factors affecting his tender decision in monetary terms and to 
include these in his cost.estimate. Once again, this would 
usually be a lengthly and difficult task in practice. Indeed, 
utility theory was developed to avoid having to do this. How-
ever, the present writer is of the opinion.that there are 
certain circumstances when the contractor can.successfully 
apply subjective alterations to his cost estimate and hence 
avoid the utility function rigmarole. 
In the remainder of this chapter, .the bidding techniques 
developed are based on the optimization of expected profit values 
rather than expected utility values. This is because meaning-
ful utility values were unobtainable by the present writer and 
so comparative evaluations of the models would have been im-
possible. However, the models developed may be easily adapted 
to handle utility functions. 
The expected profit value criterion is open to c~iticism 
from the point of view of its use in making a decision about a 
single tender. The size arid nature of the contract together with 
all the relevant factors affecting it will never be exactly 
duplicated aga~n. Hence, the use of an expected .value is open 
to attack, being as it is, an "average" value. The reader is 
referred to Section 6.2 for a detailed discussion of the ex-
pected value concept. 
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However, the models described in Chapter 7 and developed 
later in this chapter all use data.from past tenders in evalu-
ating the expected value of the profit resulting from a particular 
bid. This means that the."average" is based on contracts which 
are all individually different to a greater and lesser extent. 
In other words, the expected profits used are the average pro-
fits that will be made in the long run on contracts of different 
size, nature, etc._ Hence the situation is incorrectly viewed 
as being unique (i.e, never to be,repeated), and the use of ex-
pected profits (or utilities) is justifieq. 
Finally, as pointed out by Friedman (12) and described 
in Section 7.1, the cost estimate is itself a random variable. 
This means that the contract might be won with.a bid including 
a healthy profit margin on the ·contractor's cost estimate, and 
yet he might still lose money on the job if his estimate has 
been too low. This uncertainty.in the cost estimate should be 
considered when evaluating the expected profit, and this may 
be done by means of the following equation : 
E = P(win) (b - c1) ••••• (8.1.2) 
where E is the e~pected profit 
P(win) is the probability of winning with bid b 
1 
c is the most likely cost. 
The practical difficulty lies in determining 1 c • 
Benjamin (4) has suggested three methods and these are described 
in Section 7.6. The present writer favours the. use of the beta 
distribution as used in PERT network analysis to evaluate the 
probability of completing a project by a certain.date. 
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For each item on the bill of quantities three costs are 
given - the most likely' the most optimistic nowest), and the 
most pessimistic (highest), Naturally, it is -probable that 
these three prices will coincide if the cost of the item is 
known with certainty. If m, a and b are. these costs respective-
ly, the expected cost (c) for that item is given-as : 
c = 
a + 4m + b 
6 •••• .-(8.1.3) 
The reader is referred to Richmond (35) or any PERT computer . 
package manual for justification of this equation. 
The total cost estimate.is then given by the sum of the 
expected costs of each bill item given.by equation 8.1.3, .and 
this total amount is substituted for c1 in equation 8.1.2. 
This method does have the advantage that the estimator 
will have to consider carefully the possible.variations in price 
of an item, and this closer attention should improve his approach 
to_ estimating in· general. . 
Unfortunately no data was available to the present writer 
and·so this point was persued no further. 
Section 8.2 The Probability of Submitting the Lowest 
Tender Bid : 
In the previous section it was decided.to choose the 
bid amount which yielded the maximum expected profit value -
the product.of the bid and the cost multiplied by the probabili-
ty of winning the contract with that bid. 
In this section, a method of evaluating the probability 
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of winning the contract will be developed. 
The methods described in Chapter 7 all used distributions 
of the.ratios of an opponent's bid tq the contractor's cost 
estimate.on past tenders. From these distributions, the probability 
of beating any particular opponent could be evaluated, and this 
was described in Section 7.1. 
However, the authors differed on.how the probabilities of 
beating individual competitors could be combined to give the 
probability of winning the contract.- i.-e. being the lowest 
bidder. Friedman (12) suggested that it. be given by the product. 
of the probabilities of beating each individual opponent, while 
Gates (14) proposed a formula connecting t~e different probabilit-
ies. 
Friedman's formula is illustrated by figure 8. 2. L This 
figure diagramatically represents a competition between three 
Figure 8.2.1 Proability Tree (1) 
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tenderers for a,construction contract, They are denoted by 
"the contractor", A and B. It is seen that for the contractor 
to win, he will have to bid lower than both A and B. This 
means that the probability of him winning will be 
P(win) = P(A) P(B) 00 ... (8.2.1) 
Where P(A) and P(B) are the probabilities of beating cqmpetitors 
A and B respectively •. These probabilities are assumed, to be in-
dependent of each other- i.e. whether the contractor has.beaten 
competitor A or not had rio bearing on the probability of his 
beating competitor B. 
The fallacy in this representation of the·situation is 
that the.contractor is-considered to compete first against 
Competitor A and then against.competitor B, or else the other 
way around. 
If the analogy is drawn with taking coloured balls out 
of an urn, each competitor having a different amount of balls 
of a particular colour representing his chance of beating the 
others this representation means that there are two urns - one 
representing his probability of beating competitor A and one 
that of beating competitor B. To win the contract his coloured 
balls h~ve to be drawn out of both urns simultaneously, 
The competitive situation should rather be described 
by one urn with different amounts of differently coloured balls 
representing the probabilities of.each competitqr winning the 
contract. Only one ball is drawn to decide the winner. This 
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~s represented in,figure 8.2.2. 
w prob. that contractor wins 
a = prob. that A wins 
b prob. that B wins 
Figure 8.2.2 Probability Tree. (2) 
If the probabilities that.the contractor, A and B win 
are respectively w, a.and b, and if P(A) and P(B) are the 
probabilities that the.contractor beats competitors A and B 
respectively we have the following equations : 
w + a + b = 1 ••••• (8.2.2) 
P(A) w ••••• (8.2.3) 
w + a . 
p (B) . w ···~·(8.2.4) = 
w + b 
Equations (8.2.3 and .. (8.2.4) are both given by Baye's 
Rule, .a fundamental probability theorem. They may also be seen 
intuitively by means of figure 8.2.2 •. 
These equations may be combined into the form· 
w t 1 + 1 - P(A) p (A) + 1 - P (B)\ P(B) = 1 ••••• (8.2.5) 
and if w is replaced by the previously used notation P(win), 
we have·: 
P(win) 
l + 1-P(A) 
P(A) 
1 
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+ 
1-P(B) 
p (B) 
••••• (8.2.6) 
This equation may readily be expanded·to cover the 
case.of any number of competitors, and is the formula used 
without derivation by Gates (14), 
This is the formula used throughout this chapter as 
representing the probability of beating any number .of competit-
ors. 
Section 8.3 The Dist.ribution of Historical Bidding Data : 
In Sectio~ 7.1 it was remarked that Friedman (12) had 
proposed that. the ratios between an opponent's bid and the con-
tractor'. s cost estimate for past contracts were gamma distributed. 
The present writer disputes this, and in this section it will 
be shown that theNormal distribution adequately describes these 
ratios. 
This is theoretically justified by the Central Limit, 
Theorem of Statistics. Benjamin and Cornell (3a) state it 
as follows 
"Under·very general condil;ions, as the numbe+ of 
variables in the sum becomes large, the distribution 
of the sum of random variables will approach the 
normal· distribution" •. 
It seems reasonable to assume that the ratio of a com-
petitor's bid to the contractor's cost estimate is made up of 
the sum of a.large·number of random variables. This is be-
cause the final cost estimate LS made up of the sum of the . 
estimates of the cost of each of the bill items. Therefore 
the use of the normal distribution to describe the bid .. ratios 
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seems justified. 
In support of this assumption, the present writer 
plotted the cumulative relative frequencies of.several sets 
of data on normal probability papero It was found.that 
straight lines resulted, thus justifying the use of.the normal 
distribution. 
Normal pr_o.babil~y paper is a special graph paper on 
which the ordinat~s are scaled ~n such a way that the.normal 
cumulative distribution function plots as a straight line. 
Hence if .the cumulative frequency polygon (or ogive) of the 
data is plotted on this paper, and turns out to be. a straight 
line, it_may be deduced that the data is normally distributed. 
Furthermore, the mean and standard deviation may be read direct-
ly from the plato 
The data is prepared for plotting by first of all rank-
ing the data from lowest to highest. The ordinate to be p~otted 
on the paper is then calculated for each piece of data. It is 
given by : 
2n - 1 
2m ••••• (8.3.1) 
where n is the rank of the data point and m is·the total number 
of data points~ This value corresponds to the centre of the 
cumulative frequency polygon "step" occurring at·the data value. 
This will be clarified by referring to figure 8.3.1. 
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Figure 8.3.1 Cumulative Frequency Polygon 
Another advantage of the use of probability p~per is the 
ease with which.the Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness of fit test may 
be performed. This test compares the largest difference between 
the theoretical (normal in this case) and the observed cumulative 
frequency functions with a tabulated.statistic. If the largest 
observed difference.is less than the tabulated statistic, the 
data is assumed, to conform to the theoretical distribution at 
the confidence level,for.which the statistic was tabulated. 
If the straight line best fitting th~ data is plotted 
on. the probability paper, the confidence lim~ts may easily be 
plottecj. rel~tive to it, and any points lying outside these 
limits may be seen at.a glance. 
The reader is referred to Benjamin and .. Cornell (3a) 
for a more complete discussion of this and other statistical 
topics. 
The following three sets.of data (listed in Appendix K) 
are;plotted in figures 8.3.2 to 8.3~4. 
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a) The tatios of the lowest bids to the contractor's cost 
estimates from historical data on 70 tenders supplied 
by a local c9ntractor. 
b) The·ratios of the average of the bids to the.contractor's 
cost estimate on.each of the above tet;1ders. 
c) The lowest bid:ratios of a set of ·data onl30 tenders 
listed by Benjamin (4). 
Without exception, all of these. sets of data cqnform 
to the normal distribution, It is therefore assumed in the 
remainder of this thesis that. the ratio~? of any opponent's 
bid to a contractor~s cost estimate are normally distributed. 
The present writer also examined the distribution.of 
the number of competitors met on each contract for the above 
sets of data. Tables 8~3.1 and 8.3.2 list the rest,1lts ,of the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness.of fit test based on the assump-
tion th~t the numbers of competitors were Poisson distributed. 
The results are presented graphically in figure 8.3.5. 
For the contractor's data, the maximum difference 
was 0,088 while the·critical K.G. statistic was 0,146; and 
for Benjamin's data the maximum difference was 0,038 while 
the.K.G. statistic was 0,107. 
Both of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic~ were given· 
at the 10% confidence level. This means that the data fitted 
the Poisson Model exceptionally .well. 
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Table 8.3.1 :- Contractor's Data (Mean= 4!17) 
No. ,of Act.ual '·Cum. Cum.Rel. Poisson Max. 
Competitor~? Freq. Freq. ·Freq. Cum.Freq. Difference 
1 2 2 0,029 0,080 
2 16 18 0,257. 0,212 
3 16 34 0,486 0,398 0,088 
4 11 45 0,643 0,591 
5 8 53 o, 7 57 0,757 
6 4 57 0,814 0,870 
7 5 62 0,889 0,938 
8 6 68 0,971 0,970 
9 2 70 1,000 0,989 
Table 8.3.2 - Benjamin's Data (Mean= 6,40) 
No •. of Actual Cum, Cum.Rel. Poisson Max. 
Competitors Freq. Freq. Freq, Cum.Freq. Difference 
1 0 0 0 0,012 
2 5 5 0,039 0,044 
3 7 12 0,092 o, 118 
4 13 25 0,192 0,230 0,038 
5 23 48 0,369 0,370 
6 21 69 0,530 0,530 
7 21 90 0,692 0,677 
8 18 108 0,830 0,795 
9 11 119 0,915 0,880 
10 7 126 0,969 0,935 
11 2 128 0,985 0,968 
12 1 129 0,992 0,984 
13 1 130 1,000 0,993· 
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Section 8.4 The Concept of "Spread" and Results Achieved 
In Section 7~2 reference was made to a paper published 
by Gates (15) in which that author examined the relationship 
between the lowest price .tendered for a construc4ion contract 
and the-difference between this price and the second,lowest 
price. Gates termed this monetary difference the "spread". 
This method by Gat~s has been described in detail, and 
with one notable difference, the present writer performed the 
same calculations on local data. 
Information was obtained from tender results published 
in the journal "Construction 1n Southern Africa" from June 1966 
until August 1971. 
Data on contracts of a civil engineering nature was 
carefully separated from that concerning building projects. 
The former category was taken to include earthworks, pipelines, 
roads and bridges, while housing schemes, blocks of flats, 
offices and industrial buildings fell into the second catego:ry. 
Maintenance work was excluded from both these groups, but major 
alterations were included among the contracts listed., 
The contracts were also grouped according to the areas 
1n which they were situated. The two regions considered were 
the Cape Peninsula and the Eastern Cape. This latter region 
was taken to include Port Elizabeth, Uitenhage and Grahamstown, 
and the areas surrounding these towns. -.-These regions were 
chosen because of their familiarity to the present writer. 
Each item of data used is listed in Appendix K of this 
thesis. 
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After being separated into four g~oups according 
to job type and location, the contracts were split into 
sections according to the lowest tender bid. The limits 
of these sections were chosen to conform approximately to 
the geometric,progression 2n where n is the group number. 
However, some sections were combined to conta~n at.least 10 
items of data. The section limits are listed in table· 8.4.1. 
The geometric mean was then taken of the lowest prices 
and the spreads in each section. The geometric mean was 
chosen for reasons that.will become apparent as the analysis 
proceeds. 
The results shown in table 8.4.1 omit any·contracts 
on which the spread was greater than twenty percent of the 
lowest bid. This was done because the lowest bidders on 
contracts with spreads larger than this were generally con-
tractors whose names appeared only once or twice in the 
tender results published by "Construction in Southern Africa". 
From this it was deduced that these were contractors of .little 
or no experience who were probably not awarded the contracts 
in any case. Approximately 10% of the total number of the 
listed contracts were omitted in this way. 
The results are plotted in figure 8.4.1. It was seen 
that the results plotted linearly when logarithmic scales were 
used. 
This use'of logarithmic rather than arithmetic scales 
was the reason for initially taking the geometric mean of the 
lowest bids and spreads falling in each group. 
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Table 8.4.1 Spread Analysis Results 
Job Type and Low Bid Group G.Mean G.Mean No Jobs 
location limits Low Bid Spread in Group. 
(RlOOO' s) (RlOOO' s) (RlOOO 1 s) 
Civil engineering 1 15 10,17 0,33 9 
Cape·Peninsula 15 - 25 19,64 1,10 8 
25 - 50 35,97 0,80 20 
50 - 125 79,74 2,67 34 
125 - 250 17 5,09 2,40 24 
250 - 500 309,42 10,03 16 
500 - 1000 679,14 15,65 15 
1000 - 8000 1988,08 43,34 8 
Building 1 - 10 8,11 0,45 13 
Cape Peninsula· 10 - 15 12,19 0,51 13 
15 - 25 18,25 0,78 14 
25 - 50 37,18 1,76 22 
50 - 125 79,28 2,86 35 
125 - 250 181 '71 6,10 47 
250 - 500 348 '71 11,36 29 
500 - 8000 1076,75 17,87 21 
Civil engineering 1 - 25 12,13 0,66 9 
Eastern Province 25 - 50 32,38 2,85 10 
50 - 125 79,02 5,41 24 
125 - 250 164,81 10,03 18 
250 - 8000 709 '72 . 24,31. 15 
Building 1 - 25 12,30 0,79 6 
Eastern·. Province 25 - 50 40,00 1,84 12 
50 - 125 . 84,04 3,12 27 
125 - 250 175,59 6,92 16 
250 - 8000 531,37. 18,67 16 
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The regression lines corresponding to each set of data 
points were obtained by the least-squares .method of.curve fit-
ting. The computer program used is listed in Appendix L of 
this thesis. 
Sine~ no significant difference between the four lines 
was apparent, a regression was then performed on all of the 
data points disregarding both location and job type. The 
resulting equation is 
s = 0,0745 1°'854 ••••• (8.4.1) 
where S is the spread (difference between the second and the 
lowest bids) and Lis the.lowest bid. Sand L are given in 
units of 1000 Rand. This equation plots.as a straight line 
.~ •• ~<·"· 
whenlogarithmic scales areused for both axes • 
..,-.~.~,,, 
The present writer then adopted a conunon.assumption when 
dealing with regression analysis. This assumption concerns t~e 
random distribution of the logarithm of the actual spreads 
corresponding to the logarithm of a given low bid value (see 
figure 8. 4. 4) • The mean of this dist;:dbution is given as a 1<. 
'.~ 
(linear) function of the log o~ '·the low bid value. This 
function is the regression equation. 
Furthermore, the distribution of the logs of the spreads 
about this,mean is assumed normal with a constant.standard 
deviation. Reference to figure 8.4o2 will help to clarify 
this point. 
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Figure 8.4.2 Assumed distribution 
For each individual value of the-logarithm -of the 
low bid, the logarithm of the spread has the distribution 
sketched in figure 8.4.4. 
It should be noted that this distribution is only 
normal bec~use of the linearity of the regression equation. 
This is why logarithmic values were used. 
The present writer found the above standard deviation 
to be 0,65256. 
A series of lines was then drawn parallel to the re-
gression line. They were each drawn a given-number of standard 
deviations away so that the.probability of the spread being 
greater than or equal to the amount given by that line would 
be a particular percentage. The cqlculations were based on 
tabulated cumulative values of the.normal distributiqn. The 
chart is presented in figure 8.4.3. 
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Gates did.not use the normal distribution in his 
analysis, but rather calculated the probabilities from his 
observed cumulative distribution of the spread values about 
the regression line. Reference to figure 8.4.1 convinced the 
present writer that no bias was apparent in the total dis-
tribution of all the spread values used and that the normal 
distribution was a reasonable assumption to make. 
The·reader is referred to Section 7.2 where possible 
uses for this type of chart.were enumerated. The present 
writer considered that its best usewas in determining whether 
the lowest bidder had made a mistake, 
Because 10% of the listed contracts were discarded by 
the present writer as having spreads greater than 20% of the 
lowest bid, the present writer is of the opinion that spread 
amounts having a probabi~ity occurring of less than or equal 
to 1% should-be considered significantly large or small. 
Gates used the 3% limit, but very few of the contracts which 
that author considered had spread amounts greater than 20% of 
the lowest bid. 
As explained in Section 7o2, if the spread amount was 
so large that there was less than a 1% chance of it being that 
size, the lowest bidder should be regarded as havi~g made a 
mistake; and should be given the opportunity of withdrawing 
his bid. 
Alternatively, if the spread amount:was so small that 
there was less than a 1% chance of it being that amount, collusion 
should be suspected amongst the bidders, and appropriate action 
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should be taken by the promotor. 
This subject 1s dealt with 1n detail 1n Section 7.2. 
Section 8.5 The Use of Simulation.to Compare Three 
Optimum Bidding Techniques : 
8.5.1 Introduction •. An artifical tendering situation 
was stimulated on the computer wherein four "contractors" 
competed against each other for the award of a large number 
of "contracts". 
Each of the "contractors" was considered to be us1ng 
a different bidding technique, each of which is described 
below. The Monte Carlo technique was adopted in that each 
imaginary contractor was assgiend a semi~random cost estimate 
of the project. These costs were drawn fro~ normal distributions, 
bearing in mind the resuLts of market analyses given in Section 
8.3. These normal distributions were given a common mean of 
100 and had different standard deviations. A pseudo random 
number generator was used to draw values from the distributions 
and this method is described in Appendix G. Different standard 
deviations·were used to study their effect on the bidding patterns 
produced by the techniques. 
8.5.2 Models Used. Three of the optimal bidding techniques 
used were based on the method of maximising the expected profit 
value, but each used a different way of predicting the probability 
of winning the contract. The fourth technique was one suggest-
ed by Gates (15) and described in Section 7.2, but which the 
present writer has rejected as being indefensible. The reasons 
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for this were set out in Section 7.2. 
There follows a more detailed description of the techniques. 
a) The first technique used the probability of winning the . 
contract.as the probability of bidding lower than the low-
est other competitor. A distribution of the ratio between 
the lowest other bid and the contractor's cost estimate 
was. set up from historical data as suggested by Friedman (12) 
and described in Section 7.1 of this thesiso The technique 
then consisted of a method of.choosing the percentage profit 
allowance which yielded the optimum expected profit valueo 
b) The second technique was similar to the first, but the 
probability of winning the contract was considered to be 
the product of the probabilities of bidding lower than 
each of the other competitors. In Section 8.2 it was 
shown that this method lacked theoretical justification, 
but. it is .included in the comparison to observe the effect 
is using a conservative estimate of the probability of 
winning the contract:. It is reasonable to suppose that 
this method would yield a lower optimum bid and hence should 
win more contracts. 
c) The third technique was againsimilar to the previous two, 
but the probability of winning tbe contract was given by 
equation 8.2~q. This estimate of the probability is con-
sidered by the present writer to be theoretically correct 
(see Section 8.2.), and was .expected to yield the highest 
percentage profito 
d) The fourth technique was based on the assumption that the 
contractor's cost estimate would be the lowest bid for the 
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contract if it was submitted without any addition for 
profit, A distribution was set up of the percentage 
differences between the se~ond and.the lowest bids on 
each'of the past contracts and·from this; the probability 
of the difference,being greater .than or equal to a given 
percentage was,able to b~-calcula~ed. In this technique 
it was. assumed that if a percentage ,allowance for profit 
wa~ added to the cost estimate; the bid would s~ill be 
tha lowest only i~ the.difference between the.lowest 
competitor '.s bid and the cost es.timate was greater 
than this profit allowance. The probability of this 
happening was then the probability of the contractor 
winning the contract, and.· so· the familiar: expected pro~ 
fit maximization method .could be adopted. 
The objection to this final method.has previously 
been poi~ted ,out as the,unli~elihood of th~ contractor's 
original assumption (that his cost estimate would be·the 
lowest bid) being true, The reader is,referred to Section 
7•2 for a full discussion on this~ .The·present writer 
nevertheless has_used this technique to simulate the effect 
of a contractor using an informal bidding method based on a 
subjective appraisal of the market situation. 
8.5.3 Probability Distributions Used. Several optimum 
bidding techniques.described in Chapter 7 employed discrete 
distributions.to predict the probability o:t; winning the c:,o:n-
tract with ,a given bid (see Sections 7,;3, 7.5 and 7.7). An 
example of a discrete cumulative relative frequency diagram 
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1s presented in figure 8.5.l(a). Figure 8.5.l(b) shows 
the resulting relationship between expected profit and 
bid amount. 
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Figure 8.5.1 Discrete Proability Distribution 
In their OPBID model (which used a discrete probability 
distribution), Morin and·Clough (25) employed a "uniform search 
technique" to arr1ve at the optimum bid amount. That is, they 
evaluated the expected profit at a large number of bid amounts 
spaced at regular intervals (1% of the cost estimate in their 
case). They then chose the optimum bid as the one yielding 
the_highest expected profit value. 
However, most of the effort involved in this methqd can 
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be avoided by.choosing the points whe1;e the optimum must· 
obviously lie, Three such points,are shown in figure 8.5.~(b), 
'rhese correspond to the historical ratios of the competitor's 
bid to the contractor's cost es~imate, from which the cum-
ulative relative frequency polygon was constructed. This 
method was adopted in the simulation. 
Further reference to figure·8.5.1 will conv~nce the 
reader that the use of such discrete distributions will hard-
ly result in very accurate results unti~ a large number of 
past bid to cost·ratios have been studied, The optimmum 
bid is·too dependent for its "smoothness" on the number 
of ind~vidual value~ of the ratios used to construct the 
frequency diagram. 
The present writer then ran the simulation with the 
first three optimum bidding techniques making use of con-
tinuous rather than discrete frequency diagrams. The 
fourth model was left unchanged, being indeed, as it was, 
merely to simulate a contractor using an informal bidding 
technique. The method in which the highest expected pro-
fit value was sought is presented in Appendi~ F of this 
thesis; 
The present writer expected more stable values of 
optimmum allowances for profit to be predicted by the model~ 
using continuous.distributions. Also they should yield 
higher profits as percentage of the value of the work 
undertaken, 
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8.5.4 - Program details. Flow-charts of the main program 
and of· the sub-routines. representing the four models are 
presented in figures 8.5.7 to 8.5.11. The complete pro-
gram is listed in Appendix L. 
Standard .deviations of 5, 10, 15 and· 20 were successive-
ly used for. the normal distribution from which the. random costs 
were drawn. Th~ mean was-100 in each case. 
An init:i,.al number (or "seed") was read from a data card, 
and using this, sufficient random costs were generated for 
100 "tenders". After they.had been "bid", and the results 
had been calculated, a new initial number was-read and the 
process was. repeated. This. was done. 10 ti.mes, for each standard 
deviation, usingboth discrete and continuous probabilit:y dis-
tributions, 
It was decided to use 10 sets of 100 tenders rather 
than 1000 tenders from the same initial random numqer, so 
that inaccuracies in the pseudo ran4om number generation would 
be neutralized. Fur:ther remarks.are made in. Appe~dix G ~n 
this.concern. 
Furthermore, the efficiency of these techniques under 
conditions of relatively little historical information was 
examined by restricting the number of past tenders to 100. 
This is important to a contractor using these methods for the 
first~time. 
8.5.5 Results. The· results _considered relevant· from each 
technique were 
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a) The total profit.made; 
b) TQ.e profit made as a percentage of the work under-
taken; 
c) The optimal profit allowance (markup) pre~icted after 
100 "tenders". 
Of·these, .the present writer .considered (b) to be the.most. 
signific~nt result for reasons explained in Section 8.1. 
The average results obtained from the 10 greater 
cycles .are presented _in· tables .8.5.], and 8.5.2~ 
In.these tables, the following figures are given for 
each model. 
a) The standard deviation of .the norma], distribution with 
mean 100 from whi~h ea~h imaginary contractor's cost 
estimate was ·randomly drawn •. 
b) The cumulative profit made by t~e imaginary contr~ctor 
using that particula~ model. The units are the same·as 
those used for the cost estimates. 
c) The above profit as a percentage·of the value of the 
contracts on which that particular model had yielded 
the lowest. bid. (i.e. the sum of. the .contractor's estimates 
of the costs of those contracts). 
d) The optimum percentage allowance.for profit, or markup, 
yielded by that model for the lOOth tender. 
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Table.8.5.1 - Using Discr~te Probability Distributions: 
Model Std,. Total Profit Markup Dev. Profit %. % 
(a) Based on lowest other bid. 2 43,98 2,175 2,322 
10 229,94 12,693 14,075 
15 355,51 18,172 20,464 
20 440' 60 22,266 24,814 
(b) Based on product of 2 50,17 1,562 1,510 
probabilities . 10 269,25 9,088 9,645 
15 400,76 14,271 14' 911 
20 468 '10 18,109 18,241 
(c) Based on equation 2 39,19 2,084 2,086 
8.2.q. 10 212,82 11' 247 12' 221 
15 284' 23 . 17,090 19,779 
20 325,50 22~365 25,263 
(d) Based on,Gates' spread •. 2 46 '67 1,826 1,855 
proposal 10 244,47. 11,200 10,796 
15 335,02 17,154 18,942 
20 403,10 20,897 22,329 
Table 8.5.2 - Usin& Continuous Probability Distributions: 
Model Std• Total Profit Markup Dev •. Profit (o % 
(a) Based on lowest other bid· 5 108,3 4,792 5,077' 
10 230,0 10,059 10,926 
15 336,7 '15,67 17,599 
20 439,9 22,11 25,75 
(b) Based on product of 5 125,6 3,988· 3,865 
probabilities 10 249,4 8,851 8,511 
15 374,1 13 '7 50 13,943 
20 492,2 19,890 20,630 
(c)' Based on equation 5 89,2 5,596 5,635 
8.2.6. 10 173,0 11,030 12,367 
15 271,9 17,940 20,174 
20 338,4 23,390 29,050 
(b) Based on Gates' spread· 5 110,8 4,501 3,955 
proposal 10 220,2 10,416 9,671 
15 324,9 15,450 14,589 
20 444,6 20,660 21,250 
These resul~s are.shown graphically in figures 8.5.2 and 8.5.3. 
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In figure 8.5.2 where the results from the use·of 
discrete distributions presented in.table 8.5.1 were plotted, 
it was observed that each set of points,showed a tendency 
to fall along an S-shaped curve. Th~s type of curve was 
therefore used, in.spite of there being relatively few 
points~ The p~esent writer would·not have assumed such 
a curve if this tendency had not been repeated by every 
set of points,to a greater or lesser degree. 
More points would have been plotted had the simulation 
not .taken an average of 15 minutes per run (i.e. 10 cycles. 
of 100 tenders analysed by 4 techniques) on the UNIVAC 1106 
computer in use at.the Universitu. At normal hire rates, 
this would have cost R75 for each point. 
8.5.6 Conclusions. The conclusions reached after 
studying these curves are given below. 
First of all, the highest total profit values were 
always obtained when the probability of·beating three com-
petitors was taken to be 
P (win) = P(A) P(B) P(C) ••••• (8.5.1) 
making use of the notation of Section 8.2. 
As previously pointed out; this is a conservative 
estimate of the probability of winning the contract,and so 
this formula resulted in a lower optimal profit allowance 
than the correct formula given.in equation 8~2.6. it was 
clearly apparent from the curves that this formula yielded 
lower percentage profit allowances than the other three 
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techniques. 
In turn, this meant that more contracts were awarded 
to the imaginary contractor using tbis model than to the 
others •. 
Hence it would be argued that this model should be 
used by.a contractor when he is in need of work to keep his 
organization occupied. 
However, the present writer is of the opinion that 
use·of.this _formula h unjustified:as·it was not-developed 
specifically to optimize the total amount of profit won on 
a large n~mber of co~tracts, but rather to optimize the 
profit won as a percentage of the cost estimate~ of a large 
number of contracts. 
It is possible.that a regression type of analysis com-:-
paring the total profit. made. on each contract· and the c<m-
tractor's cost estimate for that contract could be used to 
develop_a techniqueto optimize the tot(il profit. Such an 
analysis would be similar to the one carried out in Section 
8.4. However, the present writer did·not approach the 
problem from this angle. 
The next.conclusion reached was-that the formula 
1 
P (win) l + l..;.P (A) 1-P (B) . 1-P (C) 
P(A) + P(B) + P(C) 
0 0. (8.5.2) 
for the,probability of bidding lower than 3 competitors (using 
the same notation as .in Section 8.2) yielded the highest cumu-
lative profit as a percentage of the cost of all the work 
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undertaken, as well as the high~st percentage profit allowances 
for the lOOth tender. 
This was apparent both when the probability of beat-
ing the lowest competitor alone was considered to be the. 
probability of winning the. contract· and whe.n th~ probability 
of beating each of the three other competitors separately was 
considered. 
Using the.notation of Section 8.2, the formula reach-:-
ed to 
P (win) = P(A) ooooo(8o5o3) 
when only one (the lowest) compe~itor was considered. 
Furthermore, this conclusion was .. reached when the results. 
of using both continuous and discrete distributions were con-
sidered. 
It should be noted that when discrete probability dis-
tributions were used; formula 8.5.3 yielded curves that were 
generally more predictable, but when continuous distributions 
were used, formula (8o5.2) yielded higher cumulative percent-
age profits. However formula. (8.5.3) yielded higher cumulative 
total profit values in both cases. 
The third conclusion drawn from a study of figures 
8.5.3 and 8.5.4 was that the,use of continuous distributions 
appeared to yield more consistent results than when discrete 
distributions were used. By this it is meant that the points 
obtained conformed better with general trends - ioeo smooth. 
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curves could easily be drawn through them. 
Moreover, when discrete probability distributions 
were used, the slope of.every curve in figure 8,5.2 de-
creased for standard deviation values greater than 10. 
This appears to indicate an upper limit to both the total 
cumulative profit and·t4e percentage.cumulative profit that 
might be won using t4ese techniques when diS!crete distributio.ns 
are employed. Such a tendency was not displayed when co~­
tinuous distributions·were used. 
The final conclus~on does not·concern which technique 
to. use,.but.rather the effect on all the results of different 
standard deviations of the.distribution from which the im-
aginary contractor'. s cost were drawn •. 
One point to note in this.regard is.that every curve 
passed through the origin in figures 8.5,2 and 8.5~3, . This 
means that if all the competitors had identical.cost estimates 
for every contract tendered,·· the use· of these techniques 
would yield zero profit allowances. In conseque~ce,each 
competitor would make zero profit amounts even.though they 
would win contracts by having the lowest.cost.estimate. 
Furthermore, as the standard deviations of the costs 
increased, both the total and the percentage profit amounts. 
won·. by each imaginary contractor increased. 
The reason for this is. that the larger the standard 
deviation, the "flatter" will be the probability distributions 
of the ratio of a competitor's bid.to the contractor's cost 
estimate. This in turn is caused by the wider variation in 
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the contractor's cost.estimates. The reader is referred to 
figure 8.5.5~ 
s ....... .,__!! S+cl . bL>J i.:o. "'"'o\A 
a-, 
\00 X 
Figure.8.5.5 Frequency .Distributions 
Now, the expected profit value ,is the product of the 
probability of winning the contract and tl:le profit that would 
be m~de if the contract was won. Also, when. the higher profit 
allowa~ces are.considered (say for bids greater than x above), 
!;he flatter distribution will yield higher probabilities .of 
winning the contract. (given by the area under. the curve to 
the right of x). Hence it is .reasonable to.suppose that the 
expected profit curves take on the relative forms shown.in 
figure .. 8. 5. q. 
Figure 8.5.6 Expected Profit Curves 
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distribution) 
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(continuous distribution) 
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Figure 8. 5.11 - Technique. proposed by Gates to predict 
the optimal bid from spread probabilities. 
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Since the optimum expected profit occurs at a higher 
allowance for profit in the case of the flatter distribution, 
higher. profits will be made whet:t the market situati.on can be 
described by such a.distribution. 
Note that no significance is attached to the relative 
values of the optimum expected profits. 
This general conclusion implies that con~ractors w<mld 
be will advised to seek markets where there is a wide variation 
in. the prices submitted for each tender •. They should be able 
to make higher profits in such markets. 
This result is intuitively supported when one.considers 
the reasons behind wide differences. in the. tender prices. These 
must be caused by the.contractors lacking the experience or 
ability necessary to be able to estimate accurately the cost, 
of a contract •. Hence a competent contractor should be able 
to fare well in such. a market. 
In conclusion then, th~ general·results of this analysis 
as given in tables 8.5.1 and.8.5.2 and .in figures 8.5.2 and 
8.5.3 were as expected. Therefore it-is deduced that the use 
of the probabilistic mod~l derived. in Section 8~ 2 is justified. 
It remait:ts to test the model against "real world" data. 
Section 8. 6 Parallel Comparison of the Models with Actual 
Resu-lts :: 
In this. section, the profits tha.t would have been yielded· 
by two optim~l bidding techniques presented in Section 8.5 are 
compared with the profits actually ·made by two contract,:ors •. 
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In this conte~t, the profit is considered to be the 
difference between the bid amount and the cost estimate for 
the contract. A profit can only be made if the tender is 
awarded to the contractor. 
i 
Both of the, techniques used predict the bid amount 
that will give the maximum expected profit value. 
In the first one, ,the probability of winning the contract 
is considered to be the probability of bidding lower than the 
competitqr_ submitting the lowest other bid for the contract. 
P (win) = P (lowest) .. oo.(8.6.1) 
where,P (win) is the probability of winning the contract-and 
P (lowest) is the probability of beating the lowest other 
competitor. 
P (lowest) is calculated by setting up a cumulative 
relative frequency distribution of the ratio of the lowest 
other competitor'-s bid to the contr~ctor' s cost estimg:tte for 
a number of past tenders. 
In the second technique, the probability of winning 
the contract is considered to be the following : 
1 
P (win) = 
1 + n 1 - P(Ave) P(Ave) 
0 ••• 0 (8. 6. 2) 
where P(Ave) is the probability of beating an "average" competitor 
and n is _the number of other bidders for, the contract. 
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P(Ave) is determined from a cumulative .relative fre-
quency distribution of.the ratios of the -average of all·the 
competitors' bids to the contractor '.s ·cost estimate for a 
number of past tenders. 
' The ratio for one particular tender is g~ven in 
equation 8~6.3. 
R = 
a + b +- c + •••.• 
n 
CE 
ooooo(8.6.3) 
where a;b,c, ••• ~ are.the bids of every other contractor com-:-
peting for the contract• n is the.number of these competitors, 
and CE is the co:p.tractor's cost estimate for the work. 
The concept of an "average'' competitor is therefore an 
imaginary one. 
Both these techniques have been fully described in 
Section 8.5, so no furthe'J:' description is ne~essary here. 
I:p. setting up the probability distribution, bids greater 
than 1,5 times the contractor's cost estimate were discarded 
as not being seriously submitted. 
A flow-chart of the computer program used is presented, 
in figure 8.6.7, and it is listed in Appendix L. 
The first set of data used.was obtained from a local con-
tractor. 70 past tenders of a civil engineering nature in the 
Western Cape Province were included. The reader is referred 
to a detailed listing in Appendix K to this thesis. 
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The second set of data was.given·by Benjamin in an 
appendix to· his report. (4). It includes 130 tenders for 
building construction contracts in the ·u.s.A. This data 
is also fully listed in Appendix K •. 
The pres~nt writer would have preferred to have used 
local data on building tenders, but this~was unfortunately 
not readily available. , 
In the comparison, the ratios of both the lowest and 
the. "average" competitor's bids to the contractor's cost 
estimate were.considered to.be normally distributed. The 
reasons for this appear in Section 8.3. 
The probabilitj.es associated with these distributions 
were calculated by the method described in Appendix G. 
Initially, only information on tenders that had chrono-
logically preceded the one being bid was used by the techniques. 
This means that the frequency.distributions used to calculate 
the probability of winning the contract wei:e drawn up from an 
ever increasing number of data. 
An interpretation of,this is that the optimumbidding 
technique$ "learned" more and more about the particular con-
struction markets as the,results of more tenders became known. 
This placed the actual contractor at an unfair advantage since 
he always had the results. of a large number of past tenders 
on which to base. his judgment of the best bid for each new 
tender. 
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The results of thi~ comparison are presented graphic- . 
ally in figures 8.6.1 and 8.6.2 for the.local contractor's 
data, and in figures ·8.6.3 and·8.6.4 for Benaj~in's,data. 
The results were not tabulated as it was felt that· 
a graphical presentation would make comparisons easier. 
It should be mentioned at this stage that a point was 
plotted whenever one o~ the techniques; or the actual con-
tractor, submitted the lowest tender; These.points were then 
connected by straigh~ lines.- While .this does not represent 
the t~ue profit at any stage, this_method nevertheless makes 
the graphs much easier to follow. 
Figure 8.6.1 shows the total profit made when the· 
local contractor's data is considered, No units have been 
assigned to the total profit values for reasons of indllstrial 
security. When the d1;1ta was collected, an arbitrary monetary 
unit was used to measure the cost estimate for each tender. 
This wasdone in an.attem~t·to disguise the real identity 
of each project. 
No significant difference is.apparent in the results 
obtained after all 70 tenders had _been bid. The final profits 
made were : 
Actual contractor . 
"Lowest bidder11 
"Average bidder" 
11,35 units 
11~45 units 
10,61 units. 
Figure 8~6.2 shows the profits as .a percentage of the 
work undertaken. Once again, the local contractor's data was-
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used. In this instance, both optimmum bidding techniques 
proved to be decidedly inferior to the contractor's judgment. 
The final percentage.profits were : 
Actual contractor 
"Lowest bidder'' 
technique··. 
"Average bidder" 
technique 
14,56% 
12,05% 
10,40% 
The data supplied by Benjamin included information on 
the lowest other competitor's.bid only. Hence the "Average 
bidder" technique.could not.be compared with the actual con-
tractor's judgment. 
The total profits .and percentage profits made by the 
original contractor and·by the "Lowest bidder" technique 
are presented in figures 8.6.3 and 8.6.4 respectively. Once 
again, only information from tenders preceding the one being 
bid are used by the optimum bidding techniqueo 
The final results obtained were : 
Actual contractor : Total Profit $296 500 
Percentage Profit 4,74% 
"Lowest bidder" technique : Total Profit $242 090 
Percentage Profit 4,41% 
It was noticed that for both.sets of data, the percentage. 
profit yielded by the models always increased, as more tenders 
were bid, though this increase.was hardly noticeable at the end. 
This is attributed to the fact that the techniques 
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~- . 
"learned'' more about the market as more tenders were bid. 
In point of fact; the means.and standard deviations of 
the probability distributions were being estimated more 
accurately. 
The effect of the number of past tenders on the mean 
of the probability distribution is presented in figure,8.6.5. 
This figure, shows within how many standard deviations 
the true mean must lie from the estimated mean for various 
a1Ilounts of data used to const]:'uct,a ~robability distr:ibution. 
This figure applies to any distribution and· is drawn up by 
making use of the statistical concept of "confidence limits". 
Ess.entially, the confidence limits of the mean ar~ the 
upper and lower limits between which the mean is.assumed to 
lie. However; such a statement cannot be made with absolute 
certainty. "J;.'herefore a percentage probability is associated 
with any pair. of confidence, limit,s. This probability is 
termed·the "confidence leve~". 
The reader will appreciate that as the confidence 
level rises, so the difference between the confidence limits 
(the "confidence interval'') must· increase. This is to increase 
the probability that the mean lies ,with~n these limits. Each 
curve on figure 8.6.5 represents-a different.confidence level. 
An example will clarify the use of this curve. If the 
probability distributio.n has been constructed from information 
on only 40 past tenders, then. the true mean lies within 0,266 
standard deviatio.ns of its ,calculated value, at the 90% 
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confidence level. If the estimated mean is .100 and· if the 
standard deviation is-20 (typical results obtained from the 
local contractor~s data) the~ the true mean lies between 
94,68 and 105,32 at the 90% confidence level. 
This is a fairly wide interval and is one which will 
have an effect on th~ optimal bid value predicted by these 
models. It is not surprising then that the percentage profits 
yielded by these models are· inferior to· t;he ·.actual percentage 
profits made. 
In view of- this uncertainty, the techniques were 
compared once again, only this time the probability distributions 
were drawn up using all the local contractor's 70 tenders and 
Benjamin's 130 tenders. The results appear in figures 8.6.6 
and 8o6.3. 
Both techniques-yielded higher total profit values 
than the. local· contra~tor ·: 
Actual contractor 
"Lowest bidder" technique 
"Average bidder'' tecl:miql;le 
11,35 units . 
11,96 units 
13,38 units 
This was.also the case when Benjamin's data. was con-· 
sidered : · 
Actual contractor 
"Lowest bidder" technique 
$296 500 
$321 770 
An improvement was also noted in the percentage profit 
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amounts made by t~e techniques : 
Contractor's data 
Benjamin's data 
Actual-Contractor 
"Lowest bidder" 
technique 
"Average bidder" 
technique 
Actual .. Contractor 
"Lowest bidder" 
technique 
12,33% 
-14,08% 
4,74% 
5,28% 
The present writer concludes from these results that 
the optimum bidding techniques used are not significantly 
superior to the informal methods employed by the two .con-
tractors. 
However, they are.at least as. good as the more con-
ventional method and so should· prove useful in checking the·. 
judgment of a contractor concerning his best altowance for 
profit when submitti~g a tender. 
A way in which the~e techniques might be put to 
practical use,is presented in Chapter 9. 
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Section 8.7 TheCorrelation Betwee,n Suggested Factors 
Influencirtg the Tertder Bid : 
In Chapter 7 it was.remarked that Gates (14) and 
Benja~in (4) had suggested that various factors influenced 
the amount.of profit to be,sought by a contractor tendering 
for a project •. These. fac~ors included. the following : 
a) The contractor's cost estimate for the_work; 
b) The number of competitors to be met; when tendering for 
the contract; 
c) The estimated duration of .. the contract; 
d) The amount of the work. to be sub-contracted.; 
The present writer plotted the relevant data listed in 
Appendix K to try and establish possible relationship between 
the ratio of the lowest competitor's bid to the contractor's 
cost estimate and these four factors. One·.set of data used 
was.obtained from a local contractor and the other set was 
appended to Benjamin's report (4). 
The data was first ranked.· in ascending order with respect 
to the ratio between the 10west competitor's bid to the con-
tractor's cost estimate on each past cont:ract. The data was 
then split into five groups of equal number while maintaining 
the ascending order. 
Thereafter arithmetic means were taken of the following 
values corresponding to each contract falling in the five 
groups 
a) The ratios between the lowest competitor's bid to the 
contractor's cost estimate; 
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b) The cost estimates; 
c) The number of competitors for the tender; 
d) The duration of the.contract (this data was not 
available from the local contractor); 
e) The percentage of the cost estimate which was to be 
sub-contracted out (this data·also was not.available 
from the local contractor). 
The local contractor had·supplied data on 70 past 
contracts, and· so the.above means were taken from 14 values 
each, while Benjamin had given data on 130 past contracts, 
and so the above means were taken·from 26 values each in 
this case. 
The reader is referred to f~gure 8.7ol where scatter 
diagrams are drawn to.show the results of these calculationso 
For each group, the average ratio of.the lowest competitor's 
bid.to the contractor's cost estimate.is plotted onthe 
vertical axis, and the.corresponding average.value of one 
of the relevant factors listed .above is plotted on the 
horizontal axis. 
From these diagrams, it·is .apparent that no firm re-
lat~onships between these factors and'the ratio between the 
lowest competitor'.s bid and .the contractor's cost estimate 
can be deduced. 
The only general trend appearing ~n both the local 
contractor's and in Benjamin's data was.that the above ratio 
tended to decrease as the number of competitors increased. 
It follows from this.that the probability of winning a 
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contract decreases with an increase in the number of com-
peti tors. 
This fact corresponds with the: results of Section 8.2 
where the following equation was given· : 
P(win) = 
1 
1 + n 1-P (ave) · P(ave) 
••••• (8.7.1) 
where P(win) i~ the probability of winning the contract; 
P (ave) is the probability of beating an "average'' competitor, 
and n is_the number of such "average" competitors. -The app-
earance of n in the denominator of this formula indicates 
that the probability will decrease as n increases. 
Generally, the present writer was surprised at the 
poor results _of this analysis and so the same scatter dia-
grams were drawn on a graph plotter linked .to the University 
cqmputer. However on this occasion averages were not_taken 
of the-data values in each group, and e~ch individual item 
of data was plotted. Such a task would have been most 
tedious without the aid of a computer. 
The results obtai~ed were just as disappointing as 
when averages were taken and so the diagrams are notre-
produced here, . 
Therefore it must be conclud~d that though relation-
ships wouldintuitively appear to e~ist between the ratio of 
the lowest competitor's bid and the contractor's cost estimate, 
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and certain factor's listed above, historical data 
both from South Africa and from the U.S.A. does not 
support this. 
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CHAPTER 9 THE PRACTICAL USE OF AN OPTIMUM BIDDING TECHNIQUE 
In this chapter, a way in which .an average contractor might 
make use of an optimum bidding technique is presented. 
T~~ par~icular technique to be considered is.that based 
on equation 8.2.6 for the probability of being the lowest bidder 
for a construction contract. This technique was developed in 
Chapter 8 of this thesis and is described the~ein. No further 
description will be given of the technique in this Chapter. 
The prime requirement for this technique is historical 
bidding data. The particular items of information that have 
to be collected for each past tender in which the cQntractor 
has participated are as follows : 
a) The ratio of the lowest other competitor's bid to the 
contractor's cost estimate. 
b) The average,of the ratios of each competitor's bid to 
the contractor's cost estimate. The contractor's own 
bid should be e~cluded, as should any bid greater than 
1,5 times the .contractor's cost.estimate. 
c) The number of competitors for the tender, apart from the 
contrac,tor. 
d) Whether the contract was for a civil engineering project 
or for a building project. The contractor may use his 
own system of classifying contracts, but he must be 
consistent ~n deciding into which category each new 
tender shoul~ be placed. 
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It is .necessary to maintain up-to-date values of the 
means and standard deviations of the two ratios (a) and (b) 
above for each past tender falling into both categories of 
work. This might be achieved by hand, but is easiest done by 
storing the historical data in a computer file. Only a very 
brief program is needed to calculate the means and standard 
deviations, and the cost of computer time will be negligible. 
The present writer then reconunends the use of charts 
such as those presented in figures 9.1 to 9.3 to obtain the 
optimal bid as a percentage of the contractor's cost estimate 
for the work of each .new contract up for tender. 
These charts have been constructed making use of the 
optimum bidding technique developed in Chapter 8. The charts 
shown are for tenders where 1,5 and 10 other competitors are 
to be met by the contractor. Other charts are easily con-
structed to take into account other numbers of competitorso 
The contractor might use these charts in one of two 
ways. Firstly, he might consider only the lowest of the 
historical bids available to him. In this case, he would 
enter the chartrfor one competitor with the mean and standard 
deviation of the past ratios of the lowest bids to his own 
cost estimate. It is .but a simple matter to read off his 
predicted optimum bid. 
Alternatively, if the contractor knows how many other 
competitors he will meet on the tender, he might enter the 
corresponding chart with the mean and st~ndard deviations of 
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the past ratios of the average other bids to his cost 
estimates. Once again, the predicted optimum bid.is 
easily read off •. 
Which of these two methods to use is left to the 
discretion of the contractor. It was noted, however, that 
in general,.the two bid values that were given did not differ 
by more-than 1%. The local contractor's data referred to in 
section 8.6 was used to arrive at this result •. 
In conclusion, it is important th~t the contractor 
should not regard this optimum bidding technique as a panacea 
to his tendering problems. It is of paramount importance 
that his judgment is integrated with the results obtained. 
The reader is referred to figure 9.4 where the.suggest-
ed bidding system is represented diagramatically. 
JUDGMENT 
Probable Accuracy of 
the Estimate 
Market Conditions 
Need for the Contract 
Other Factors 
PREDICTED OPTIMUM BID 
Figure 9.4 
FINAL 
BID 
The matters upon which the contractor has to exercise 
his judgment were presented in Part 1 of this thesis, and 
the optimum bidding technique was developed in Part 2" 
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APPENDIX A - A DIAGRAMMATIC. REPRESENTATION OF SOME 
FACTORS:AFFECTING THE FINAL TENDER PRICE 
CONDITIONS OF CONTRACT 
Typ~ of tender? · 
How long is there to prepare the.tender? 
Are the contractor's responsibilities 
clearly defined? 
Is compl~tion clearly.defined?. 
Are there penalties for delay? 
Are there performance guarantees? . 
If there are any nominated sub-
contractors, are they acceptable? 
Are alternative designs acceptable? 
Do the conditions of contract place un-
fair risk on the contractor? 
Are sureties or bonds required? 
Is there an arbitration clause? 
SIZE OF COMPANY 
How large are the overhead costs? 
Will it be possible to absorb the 
possible loss on a risky job? 
Is the company large enough to fin-
ance the job itself? 
COMPONENT COSTS 
Material?· 
Labour? 
Job, overheads?· 
Office overheads? · 
How accurate is the·estimate 
likely to . be? 
,f y 
FINANCE 
What .. are the conditions of payment? 
How long is the job? 
How much. money is to be retainedZ 
How large is the required capital 
investment? 
What return on investment is .re-
quired by tbe company? 
Is bank credit available7 , 
What. is the prevailing bank rate?. 
What. are the insurance liabilities? 
PAST EXPERIENCE 
Is it necessary to buy special 
equipment? 
Is it necessary to train or hire 
specialists? 
COMPETI~ION 
What was.the past bidding performance 
of likely competitors.on simila~ 
jobs? 
What interest has ·been shown by lik~ly 
cqmpetitors? 
Will this client invite the company 
to tender in future even if it 
submits .a high price? 
WORK LOAD 
Will the job necessitate an inc~ease 
in the company labour forceZ 
Will it be possible to maintain or 
higher work loading level?· 
Will the job avoid resources ·lying 
idle? . 
'-? 
~' 
/ 
,/ 
FINAL TENDER PRIGE 
RISK INVOLVED 
How accurate is the tender inform-
ation? 
What natural hazards might be·en-:-
countered on the job? 
Are severe_price changes like~y? 
Is there a price variation clause 
in the conditions of contract? 
Is there a possibility of futqre, 
labour diffic~lties? 
Is thi~ client financially stable? 
PLANNING 
Will the experience gained be of 
use in the future? 
Will the job provide a basis for 
future client-contractor 
negotiations? 
Is the job of value as an ad-
vertisement? 
APPENDIX B THE EMPLOYMENT OF BANTU LABOURERS IN THE 
WESTERN CAPE. 
The purpose of this appendix is to relate some of the 
relevant rules and regulations governing the hire and use of 
Bantu labour on civil engineering (heavy construction) con-
tracts ~n the western Cape, 
The western Cape is legally defined as bounded by the 
southern and eastern borders of South West Africa up to and 
l,. 
including the mag~sterial district of Gordonia, and then in 
. 
(; 
a south easterly direction to include the mag~sterial districts 
of Hay, Hopetown, Philipstown, Colesburg, Middleburg, Graff-
Reinet, Pearston, Jansenville, Steytherville, Hankey and 
Humansdorp, Special regulations govern this area because 
of the supposed. abundance of c.oloured labour, though this 
ethnic group appears far inferior to the Bantu in its physical 
capability for and mental attitude towards manual labour of 
the type necessary to carry out a civil engineering contract, 
Perhaps to avoid confusion, it should be noted that actual 
physical labour is under discussion here. These consider-
ations do not apply to skilled labour such as bricklaying 
or carpentry. 
The Bantu labour Act No. 67 of 1964 forms the legal 
basis for this discussion, and the points relevant to our 
discussion are summarized below. 
A special "Employers recruiting licence" is required 
for a contractor wishing to obtain Bantu labour directly from 
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the homelands and not through a labour bureau, However no 
.employers in the western Cape are awarded these licences as 
will be seen from the way in which contractors actually obtain 
Bantu labour, as discussed below. On the,othe~ hand, such a 
licence is relevant. to contractors living outside the western 
Cape, and so it will be describedbriefly. 
The· licence may not be issued in the name of a company, 
partnership or. other association of persons, and so one. in-
dividual Ln such an organisation has it.made out Ln his name. 
However, provisiqn is made. in the Act. for the licence to be 
transferred from one person in a company to another, provided 
permission is granted by the Director of Bantu labour. Also, 
licences are issued in respect of a specific recruiting area 
and cannot be used for any other. 
The holder of sucl:t a licence may employ "runners" with 
the permission of the Director of Bantu labour. These are Bantu 
who ar~ employed to canvass or collect.Bantu or to act as a 
messenger in connection with .the recruiting of labour. Such 
runners may only operate for one licence.holder (and) in one 
area, and furthermore, any runners permits attached to a 
licence expire with it on the 31st of December each yearo 
The Act also states that adequate accommodation has 
to be provided for Bantu labourers near their place of employ-
ment and that a Compound Manager has to.be appointed for 
every compound to house more than 50 Bantu. 
The Government Gazette E~traordinary of the 3rd of 
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December 1965 sets out the Regulations pertaining to the above 
Act (Regulation Gazette No. 581, Government Notice No. R.l892). 
Some of its relevant points are given below, 
A contract of employment be~wwen a Bantu labourer and 
an employer is deemed to be for a period of 30 days and if a 
Bantu voluntarily .continues to work after .this period, he is 
deemed to be employed on a.weekly basis if he is paid. week.ly 
or on a monthly basis if he.is paid monthly. This is not 
quite .the case in the.western Cape, though, as will become 
c!ear later. 
Apart from conditions covering acconunodation, those 
governing licences and permits _are also set out in these Reg-
ulations. Recruiting is forbidden in Rhodesia, Portuguese 
Territory.or anywhere North of latitude 22°8, as well as in 
certain areas of Natal for work outside those areas. Also, 
no recruiting maybe done for employment inside a·"prescribed 
area" (as referred to in. section nine bis of the Urban Areas 
Act); and no holder of a labour agents' licence may recruit 
any· non-Bantu •. 
The practical aspects of obtaining Bantu labour for 
work with a construction company in the western Cape shall 
now be considered. 
First of all, an application has to be made to the 
Conunissioner of .Bantu Affairs for permission to etl).ploy a 
certain quantity of "imported" labourers at any one time, 
This "quota" is granted subject to the requirements of the 
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company, and to sufficient reasons being given.for the import-:-
ing of labourers from other areas. Of course, the main reason 
£.(, 
will .be the ,..:fnavailabili ty of coloured labqurers, in most .._,. "f 
cases. From the approval of .this application onwards, 
this quantity of imported labourers may not be exceeded 
until the quota is altered, as it may be on further application 
by the contractor. 
At any time after the setting of this quota, the con-
tractor may apply to import a certain.amount of labourers. 
However, he has first to prove that there are no coloureds 
available. 
To do this, he has to apply to the Divisional Inspecto+ 
of the Department of Labour for Coloured labour to .fill his 
vacancies. In this application he has to.include the reasons 
for.the vacancies, the numbers of Coloured and.Bantu employed 
by him at the time and the conditions of employment, including 
the minimum wage and the number of hours to be worked each 
day •. 
Assuming that there is no Coloured labour available, 
the Inspector the~ issues a certificate stating this factb 
This certificate is valid for one month. 
Also, before he can import any labour, the contractor 
has to prove.that adequate acconnnodation is available·at.the 
place of employment. The local authority usually provides a 
limited amount of ~cconnnodation, but failing this, the con-:-
tractor has to find adequate accqnnnodation elsewhere or else 
B/4 
build it himself. In the latter case he.must comply with the 
Government Regulations. 
The contractor might build hutments varying ~n size 
from 18 to 56 bunks. These are built on land leased from the 
local authority, and should the contractor fail to keep the 
buildings occupied for some reason, then the local authority 
may assume the use of them. 
Now when the Commissioner for Bantu Affairs is satisfied 
that labour may be imported, the contractor applies to the 
Municipal or District Labour Officer in the area from which 
he wishes to recruit labourers, On the application form, he 
has to state the particulars of the vacancy, the conditions 
of employment (including salary, etc.) and he has to enclose 
a sum of R25, per vacancy to cover the cost of bringing the 
labourers by train from their homelands to the place of employ-
ment, as well as giving them medical examinations etc. The 
portion of this actually covering the rail fare ~s recover-
able from the Bantu in the form of a weekly wage deduction. 
Imported Bantu labourers are obliged to work for one 
year only and then to return home for a period of at least 
three weeks. After this period, the contractor once again has 
to undergo the application process. 
Usually a contractor wishes to re-employ a good labour-
er whom he has spent time training, and this is possibl~ in 
that specific requests for particular Bantu may accompany the 
applications. In practice though, this is not always successful. 
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This procedure for collecting labour is only entered 
into when the relevant contrac~ has been signed, and so due 
allowance has to be made for a time lag of approximately 13 
weeks when the job is scheduled. It is important to note 
that th~re is always a firm labour requirement whe~ such a 
recruiting compaign is begun and seldom, .if ever, .is it 
based on forecasts alone. 
When rough forecasts of any type of labour are made they 
are usually based on an estimate of company growth for the 
prediction period to be considered. This estimate is general-
ly made by top management. 
It is but a simple matter to apply the estimated growth 
factor to past labour requirements to produce a very rough 
prediction of future labour requirements. Presumably the 
method can be improved if one uses different growth estimates 
for the different spheres of interest of the company (e.g. high-
rise buildings, pipelines, roads etc.}. These estimates might 
vary quite considerably. 
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APPENDIX C A TABULATED COMPARISON OF SOME CONDITIONS OF 
CONTRACT IN· USE. IN.·. SOUTH ·AFRICA. 
In this Appendix, a comparison is.made between the clauses 
of the six conditions of contract listed to in Section 3.2 of 
this thesis. 
-The reader is referred to that sectiqn for the.full titles 
of these conditions. , Hereafter in this Appendix the following 
abbreviations will be used : 
a) The South African Institution of Civil Engineers 
conditions - SAlCE; 
b) The Institute,of South African Architects conditions 
c) The Department of Public Works conditions - PW; 
d) The Cape Provincial Administration Department of Roads 
co~ditions - CPA; 
e) The Cape Town City Council conditions ~ CT. 
The International conditions were not included in the 
tabulated comparison as they are almost identical with the 
SAlCE conditions.. However, there were a few differences and 
these are summarised below. 
a) There were several clauses relating to the languages to 
be used on the contract; payment in currencies other than 
that of the country in which ·the contract was being 
executed, and the import and export of plant. In all 
these clauses, the employer was required to assist the 
contractor as far as possible. 
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b) Should there be a major economic dislocation such as 
the devaluation of acurrency.or the imposition of· 
import restrictions.by the Government of the country 
in which the works were being carried out, then the 
employer was to pay any extra costs incurred by the 
contractor. 
c) In the International conditions, ow~ership of the. 
contractors plant and·· equipment did not· automatically 
pass to the employer-for the duratio+l of.t~e contract• 
d) No mention was made·of retention money in-the Internation-
al conditions. 
In.the. following tabulated comparison, the first 
column contains a brief description of the subject of each 
clause. The nex~ five columns contain the numbers of the 
clauses relating to each subject in five conditions of 
contract presently in use in South Africa. Finally, a 
brief description is,given of points on which.the con-
ditions differ. 
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Clauses 
1 •. Assignment & Sub-
contract:i,.ng 
2. Arbitration 
3. Bankruptcy 
4. Certificates & 
payment 
SA ICE 
3,4 
67 
63 
60,61 
62 
Architects 
14 
26 
22 (b) 
25 
Public .Works 
16 
28 
26 
19 
CPA Roads Cape Town 
8(a) 28,29 
S(c) I 52 
1)-'v\. ~,J_.:.,. Ff ... l.v'·-~ 
8 (i) 
9 33,36,44 
Notes · 
PW includes p:i,.ecework 
in the provisions of the 
clause.while SAlCE & CPA 
specifically exclude it. 
A and CT do not mention 
pi~cework. 
PW refers disputes to 
Courts. of Law while others 
agree on arbitration •. A 
suggest agreement~be reach-
ed before signing contract. 
· All ex~ept :PW & CPA refer 
to heads of Institutions 
of Civil Engineers, 
Architects or Quantit;y 
Surveyors. 
CPA require contractor to 
provide proof of owner-
ship of materials. 10% 
retained.at each payment 
except for SAlCE where 
amount specified for each 
job. PW limit retentiqn 
money to 7~% contract 
value while CPA limits 
to RS 000 for roads and 
R20 000 for bridges. A and 
CT retain 5% during main-
tenance period while CPA 
retain lesser of RS 000 or 
() 
-
.p.. 
Clauses 
5. Completion & 
Delay 
6. Contractor's . 
default 
7. Contractor's equip~ 
ment, vesting of 
8. Contractor's re-
presentatives & 
workman 
I 
SAlGE 
43,44, 
47,48 
63,65 
53,54 I 
15,16, 
34,35 
Architects.! Public Works 
18,19, 
20 
21,22 
-
7 
I 
17 
18 
5 
8,12' 
13' 14. 
.I 
CPA Roads 
8 (d)' 
(e), (f) 
8 (i) 
-
5(f) (g) 
(h) (i) (j) 
I 
Cape.Town 
32,33, 
34 
39 
24 
13,14, 
46 
Notes. 
10% of total and PW re-
tain 2! 4. A allow in-
terest to be earned ·on 
retention money when it. 
exceeds R20 000. CT pro-
hibit this. CPA retain 
25% on unus~d materials in 
addition to above %. A 
makes employer liable for 
10% interest on late pay-
ments .while SAlCE adopt 
prevailing bank overqraft 
rate. 
CPA only takes ownership 
of equipment when contract 
determined. A does not 
assume ownership and sells 
the equipment when th~ con-
tract is .determined, credit-
ing the;contractor with 
the proceeds les~ the 
costs. Only the SAlCE 
makes specifi~ mention of 
hired plant. 
Only A makes no requirements 
regarding wages and acc-
ommodation given to workmen. 
Claus~s SAlCE I Architects Public Works CPA Roads C?pe Town Notes · 
9 •. Damage to property .. I 20,22, 16 21,24 I 7 (g) (h) (i)l 30 CPA makes contractor & injury to-persons 23 (3), (k) responsible for obtai~-24 (1) ing permission to use 
private land~ , 
I I 
I 
10. Drawings 7,8 ' 2 2 5 (d) (e) 3,4 
11. Defects Liability 49,50 13· 23 9 (g) (j ). 35 I Maintenance period. stated 
(k) in tender documents ex-
cept for CPA who require 
12 months and A whore-. 
quire 3'months for de~ 
fects other than roof 
(") leakage for which 6 months 
- is required. VI 
12. Delivery of 53,54 6,12 6,20 6 (b) 24 A requires that materials 
materials & only become the property 
passing of of the employer after they 
property have bee~ taken into account. 
PW requires the use of 
government transport when 
delivering materials. 
l(~)(d1 I I 13. Engineer/architect I 1 l(iv) 1 (f), l(b),l6 5(a) 
14. Execution of.the 13,36(i) 1 (a) (b) 2 (i) 4 I 5,10 
work· 11 
15. Faulty work 39 6 11 5(o) I 25 
.:-~-· 
Clauses SA ICE Arch:i,. tee t;s Public' .Works CPA Roads Cape Town Notes 
16. Fluctuations in I 68 I - I 14(ii)(iii) J 3 (b) (c) I 46(7h48 I SAICE,PW and CT specifical-Price ly allow variations in 
labour rates while CPA 
allows variat:i,.ons in cost 
of living allowance. SA ICE 
allows fluctuations in 
ruling market prices of 
materials and fuels quoted. 
in tender, CPA allows 
fluctuations in prices of 
bitumens, fuels and oils, 
cement, steel reinforcing, 
("') I I I I I I 
and CT allows fluctua-
-
tions in cement. PW allows 
Q'\ 
no material price fluctu-
ations while A does not 
mention any fluctuations 
at all. 
I 
17. ,Inspection & 36,37, l(a)(iv) 10,11 5(n) 11,15 
testing 38 8 26 
18. Insurance 21,23, 17(A) or 22 7 (j) 31 I SAlCE, CPA and CT require 24,25 (B) contractor to insure. A 
require contractor to 
insure for new buildings 
' 
I -I I r I under construction and .em-
pl~ye~ td insure for old 
buildings under alterations. 
PW does rtot specifically 
require insurance, and states 
government to insure again-
st fire. 
n 
--...! 
Clauses 
19. Eate~t rights. 
20. Provislonal & 
prime,cost sums. 
21. Security for per-
formance 
22. Site, possession of 
23i Statutory & other 
regulations· 
24. Sufficiency of tender 
25. Suspension & delays 
26. Variations to the. 
work 
SAlCE 
28 
58,59 
10 
42 
26 
11,12 
40 
51,52 
Architects 
24 
18 
4 
20 
10 
Public Works .1 CPA Roads 
18 
17 (i) 
25 
9,17(ii) 
3,4 
1 (d) 
8 (i) 
8 (b) 
7(a) (b) 
(c) (d) (f) 
2 (c) 
8 (c) (f) 
2 (b) '4 (b) 
9 (c) (d) (e) 
Cape Town 
12 
40,41,42 
32 
6 
38 
19,20,21~ 
22 
Notes 
PW makes allowance for 
10% of contract value to 
be deposited with the Dept. 
of Public Works .as surety 
for the work. 
Clauses concerning suff-
iciency-of tender are 
contained in.conditions 
of tender for A,PW & CT. 
A,PW and CT allow 10% on 
materials and 331/3% on 
labour for dayworks while 
CPA allow 15% on materials, 
20% on labour and 331/3% 
on approved plant rates.SAlCE 
have %ages entered in contract 
agreement CT,PW,A allow for 
losses because of omissions, 
but SAlCE and CPA do not. 
APPENDIX D THE ELEMENTS OF GAME THEORY 
The Theory of Games was developed for use in strategic 
situations. These may be defined as situa~ions of conflict 
between several decision makers. Such situations include 
warfare, ne,otiation between a contractor and the promotor 
of a prope~ty development scheme, or merely haggling between 
a housewife and a grocer over tqe price of tomatoes. 
The important point is that one decision maker does not 
know with certainty what the others will do. Hence, every 
decision maker is uncertain of the exact outcome of any course 
of action which he might take. He is only able to assign prob-
abilities to several probable outcomes. 
Certain terminology is peculiar to Game Theory, and·a 
short list of important terms is given below. 
a) A "player" is a decision maker. This could be an in-
dividual, a firm of contractors, or a whole nation. 
b) A "payoff" is the value (not always monetary) of a 
particular outcome of the game. Each outcome is the 
result of a set of decisions by tbe players. 
c) A "strategy" is a pre-determined set of instructions 
stating what decision should be taken by a player in 
a certai~ situation. 
d) A "zero-sum" game is one in which the losses of any one 
of the players are the winnings of the_others. None of 
the players' resources leave the game. 
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e) A "two-person" ganie ~s one where there are only two 
players. This is the simplest type, and our discussion 
will be confined to s4ch games. 
Consider the two-person zero-sum game whose payoff matrix 
~s given in-figure D.l 
Ce>u'f"SC!..S. oS o..ct\oiA 
of!M -~-u rle...~.u- B 
Coo f"SQ..S ds o.c.--+i..o-... 
o~ .Q.IA --k> fl()..~ ~ A 
R S 
-\ 
Q 3 
Figure-D.l 
I--, 
I ") I 
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·--
P()..~O~ \J""lue 
-+eA o~~ 
s~+ ~ o.ch~~ 
The players are A and B, and each has two courses of 
action open to him, A may adopt P or Q and B may ado~t R or 
s. 
Consider the possible outcomes if A chooses P. If B 
chooses R, then the outcome is a loss of 1 unit to A. However, 
if B adopts S, then A will win one unit. 
When choosing his course of action, each player pessimist-
ically assumes that his opponent will select his best c.ounter 
course of action. Each player the~efore chooses his own safest 
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course of action. 
The worst outcome for A if he chooses P is that he 
loses 1 unit. If he chooses Q, the worst that can happen 
is that he WLns 2 units. Therefore his best strategy is to 
adopt Q as his course of action. 
Similarly, if B chooses R, he might lose 3 units, but 
if he chooses S he will only lose 2 units at worst. 
Therefore the two optimal strategies are for A to 
adopt Q and B to adopt S. Furthermore, the value of the game 
is 2 units since this is the amount won by A and lost by B 
when both adopt their optimal strategies. 
The element Q-S of the payoff matrix is termed a 
"saddle point" sLnce it contains the payoff associated with 
each players' optimal strategy. Unfortunately, it is a 
significant f~ct that in practice games with saddle points 
are rare. 
Another point to notice in this game is that A wins 
what B loses, no matter what strategies are used. This is 
therefor-e a zero-sum game • 
Now consider the payoff matrix given Ln figure D.2. 
This differs from the first payoff matrix in only one element, 
namely that_associated with A adopting strategy P and B adopt-
ing strategy s. B now loses 4 units to A instead of 1 as 
before. , 
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Figure D. 2 
From this payoff matrix it is readily seen that B's 
safest strategy.seems to be Rand A's safest strategy seems 
to be Q. 
However, if B knew that A was going to adopt Q, he might 
adopt S instead, and only lose 2 units instead of 3. On the 
other.hand, wily A might anticipate Band choose Po He would 
then win 4 units from B. 
This circ~lar reasoning indicates that the best strategy 
in fact would be for each player to select his course of action 
in such a way that the other would be unable to predict what 
he will do. This is termed a "mixed strategies" as opposed to 
the "pure.strategy" presented above. 
The choice between courses of action might be made by 
tossing a co~n, spinning a roulette wheel or by making use of 
tables of random numbers. 
In the case of mixed strategies, the value of a game is 
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determined from a consideration of expected profits .or 
losses. The size of this appendix does not permit this 
subject to be persued further. 
In the opinion of the present writer, the weakness 
of Game Theory is its severe practical limitations. The two-
person zero-sum game described above are hardly representative 
of everyday situations. When more realistic circumstances 
are,modelled,, Game Theory rapidly becomes unmanageable, and 
the time and money spent on this type of analysis could often 
be put to better purpose Ln another sphere. 
Furthermore, it is highly doubtful whether any con-
tractor would happily toss.a coin to decide on his profit 
allowance before submitting a multi-million Rand tender! 
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APPENDIX E THE ELEMENTS OF UTILITY THEORY. 
Utility Theory consists of a set of axioms. A 
decision maker is said·to be "rational" if he satisfies·these 
axioms.when making a decision. 
In this context, a decision denotes a choice between 
alternative courses of action, each one resulting in a different 
outcome~ The axioms of utility theory concern the decision 
maker's order of preferences for any particular set of outcomes 9 
-If these preferences comply with the axioms (ioe. the 
decision maker may be termed "rational"), then a utility 
function may be used to describe his preferences. 
Two of the most important axioms of Utility Theory con-
cern us and they are given below. 
a) It is po~sible to rank the preferences for different 
outcomes-so that if A is preferred to Band B is pre-
ferred to C, then A is preferred to C., 
b) If outcome A is preferred to B and·outcome B is preferred 
to C, then there is.a probability, p, such that the 
decision maker is indifferent between having outcome B occur 
with certainty and·making a decision whose outcome will 
be A with probability p and C with probability (1-p). 
To illustrate the use of these axioms in constructing 
utility functions, the present writer conducted an experiment 
with the co-operation of three of his friends. 
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They were asked the following questions to establish 
their preferences for various.sums.of money. From their 
answers, functions were constructed to describe their utility 
for money •. 
a) If a man.offered to toss a co~n if you paid him a sum 
of money, and if it landed heads he would pay you RlOOO, 
and, tails nothing, then how much would you give him for 
tossing the .coin? 
b) If he still .said that he would g~ve you RlOOO if it landed 
heads and furthermore.that you wouldn't have to pay.him 
anything to toss the coin, then how much would you be pre-
pared to give him if it should land tails? 
c) Once again he offered to pay you· RlOOO for heads, but the 
amount of money you would have given him in question (a) 
if the coin came up tails •. How much would you pay him 
just to toss the coin this time? 
d)· Now he offers.nothing for tails and·your answer to 
question (a) if it lands heads. How much would you give 
him .to toss the coin? 
e) This time he offers to pay you nothing if the co~n lands 
heads, but you have to pay him the answer to question (b) 
if it is tails. How much would he have to give you before 
you would accept the gamble? 
f) Finally, if you were to pay him RlOOO to toss the coin, 
how much would he have to pay you if it landed heads, 
considering that you will get nothing if it lands tails? 
Or wouldn't your present financial position allow you to 
take such a chance? 
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It will be observed that.these questions each concern 
three sums of money. Two are given in the question and the 
answer is the third. 
The tossing of a co~n is used to introduce the element 
of chance, or probability. The s~cond axiom of utility theory, 
as given above, is then used to determine the utilties of the 
amounts of money given as answer to the questions by the subjects 
of the experiment. 
Each outcome of the tossing of a coin.has a probability 
of occurrence of 0,5. If a person is indifferent between ob-
taining an amqunt B for certain, or else tossing the coin and 
obtaining A if it lands heads or C if it lands tails, then the 
amount B has a utility to him.equal to the average of the utilities 
of.A and,C. 
The answers to each of the three participants in the 
experiment are presented in table E.l. 
Question No 
ALF 
BEN 
CARL 
Table E.l 
(a) 
R50 
R20 
RlOO 
Answers 
(b) 
-RlOO 
-R 20 
-R300 
(c) 
RlOO 
R 25 
R300 
(d) 
RlO 
R 1 
R30 
(e) 
-R80 
-Rl8 
-R250 
(f) 
No 
No 
No 
These points are plotted in figure E,l and approximate 
curves are drawn through them. 
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It should be noted .that no specific utility values were. 
assigned to the points •.. Only their relative utilties were 
plotted. 
Utility amounts are completely arbitrary, and are usually 
chosen to lie between o and 1. However, the present writer 
omitted to do this to emphasize the fact.that only relative 
utilties are necessary when making decisions. 
From figure E.l it is apparent that each of the part-
icipants in the experiment had a different attitude towards 
money.· 
Money is not very important to Carl, and he likes to 
gamble, whereas Ben is a thrifty person. Alf's attitude to-
wards money is somewhere between the two. 
It is also noticeable that each of the curves tended 
to decrease idslope as the monetary amount increased. This 
I 
indicates that an increase from 1 to 2 Rand.has more increase 
in utility than an increase from 101 to 102 Rand. This non-
linear utility of money is a common phenomenon. 
Utility theory is an extensive subject, the surface of 
which has barely been scratched. However, the present writer 
is of the opinion that its practical application to.the com-
petitive bidding proble~ is. severely restricted by the practical 
problem of.setting up utility functions. 
The reader is referred to section 8.1 of thi~ thesis 
for further discussion on this topic. 
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APPENDIX F AN OPTIMIZATION TECHNIQUE. 
In their book (44a), Wilde and Beightler quote the 
following Chinese Maxim : 
"There are many paths to the top of the mountain, 
but the view there is always the same". 
Very broadly speaking, the "paths" of Optimization Theory 
may be classified into the three groups described below. 
a) Differentiation. Maximum and minimum points may be 
found by setting the first differential of any function 
7 "- ··;] 0zero and then evaluating the second derivative at those 
points. A positive value will denote a minimum point and 
a negative value a max~mum. Of course, this method be-. 
comes successively more complicated .as the function has 
more and more variables, and partial derivatives must be 
used. 
b) Elimination, In this method, the function is ev~luated 
at several points, and from the results, the region in 
which the optimium must lie is reduced. The process is 
successively repeated until the position of the optimum 
is known· to lie within acceptably small limits, Figure 
F.l shows the .method diagramatically for a function with 
only one independent variable and only one optimum point 
(a one dimensional unimodal function). After the function 
has been evaluated at the five points, the optimum is 
known to lie between p and q. 
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Figure F.l Elimination 
c) Climbingo This procedure begins with at least two 
evaluations of the objective function and then the 
position of the succeeding points where the function is 
evaluated are automatically chosen so that the function 
values will improve~ The optimum is reached when no 
further improvement is possible. Reference to figure 
F.2 should help to clarify this.method for a one dimen-
sional unimodal function. 
( 
2 
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Figure·F.2 Climbing Technique 
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The. points were chosen in the order shown, Note the closer 
spacing of the points after the "turn". 
The optimization technique used in the computer programs 
of this thesis is actually a mixture of all th~ee of the.above 
methods. The problem of finding the optimum expected profit 
as a function of the bid amount is a particularly simple one 
since there is only one peak value and there is only one Ln-
dependent variable. 
Successive evaluations of the expected profit were made 
at two closely spaced values of the bid amount. From these 
two expected profit values, the slope of the function was 
determined and the next pair of measurements were made in 
the "uphill" direction. The reader is referred to figure 
F.3. 
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Figure F,3 Optimization Technique 
Initially, the peak is assumed to lie between the 
two bid values p and q. The initial "region of uncertainty" 
is therefore i q - p. The first pair of measurements are 
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made symetrically about.the centre of the region of un-
certai~ty, at position 1 in the figure. These.two ex-
pected profit values indicate that.the peak lies to the left 
and so the region of uncertainty is reduced to a, This 
procedure is repeated until after thr~e sets of measure-
ments of the expected profit, the region of uncertainty is 
c. 
If dis taken as the interval between the.two bid 
values at each set of measurements, it is easily verified 
with reference to figure F.3 that the region of uncertainty 
r is given by equation F.l after n sets of evaluations. 
r = 
q-p +d. 
zn d • , , • , (F. 1) 
The bid value$ actually used in the computer programs 
of this thesis were expressed as percentage allowances for 
profit based on the contractor's cost estimate for the contract, 
They were as follows : 
p = 0,0% q = 30,0% d = 0,1% 
If these values are substituted into equation F.l, for 
n = 8 r = 0,016 
n = 9 r = 0,042 
Hence it is seen that eight values are sufficient to 
reduce the range of uncertainty to 0,03% of its original 
value. · 
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Figu~e F.4 shows a flow chart·of the Optimization 
sub-routine. 
8 
Set p and q as left and right hand 
limits to the region of uncertainty 
Evaluate,the expected profit at two 
points ,distance d apart at point x 
in the centre of the region of un-
certainty : 
X 
Increasing Decreasing 
p d X + 2 
<.8 
Figure F.4 
q = 
Set Optimum Bid = 
Optimization Flow Chart 
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APPENDIX G A PSEUDO RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR 
At the time when the present writer was developing the 
simulation program described in Section 8.5, no effective random 
number generator was available for use on the University computer. 
This necessitated a brief investigation into the subject of random 
number generators and the findings of the writer are set out in 
this appendix. 
The random numbers usually produced by computer program are 
uniformly distributed over the interval 0 to 1. The random number 
generator developed by the present writer also followed this pattern. 
An initial number.or "seed" was used to start the generation 
process. Using this number, the sub-routine then produced a new 
random number which was itself used as input for the next one. In 
general, the (i + l)th number was generated from the ith number. 
The generatiqn method adopted is commonly termed the 
"congruence method". The input number was multiplied by a con-
stant (P) and divided by another constant (K), leaving are-
mainder lying between 0 and 1. This remainder was the random 
number generated. 
The value of P used was 109 and the value used for K was 
8. 
The value 8 was chosen.for K as it is a power of 2. Since 
the computer used the binary number system, division by any power 
of 2 is performed very efficiently by shifting the binary point 
to the left. 
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The value 109 was chosen for P since it was a prime 
number and hence could have no relationship to the value 8. 
A lack of correlation between P and K is said to result-in 
very randomly generated numbers. 
The seed was a four figure number (i.e. had a.value 
between 0 and.9999) selected from a table of random numbers. 
This number was then divided by 10 000 to reduce it to 
a value between 0 and 1. After this, a sequence of random 
numbers was generated ~n the .manner described above. 
The flow chart of the sub-routine used to generate 
random numbers is presented in figure G.3. 
______.., 
It is apparent that s~nce a computer can only_handle 
a finite number of significant figures, eventually a random 
number will be generated which will be the same as a previous 
one. This will cause the series of numbers generated up to 
that point to be repeated. 
It is for this.reason that the term "Pseudo Random 
Number Generator" is used to denote the procedure, 
The likelihood of the sequence of numbers being repeat-
ed before any required amount of random numbers has been granted 
is however remote. 
In Section 8.5 of this thesis, random numbers were re-
quired to be drawn from a normal instead of a uniform distribution. 
The present writer accomplished this by using a UNIVAC supplied 
sub-routine •. 
G/2 
The uniformly distributed random numbers were considered 
to be the values of the cumulative normal distribution functiono. 
The inverse of this function was therefore required to yield the 
corresponding normally distributed random value. This process 
is illustrated in figure G.l. 
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Figure G.l 
The inverse of the cumulative normal distribution function 
cannot be expressed in ordinary matematical terms, and so a 
numerical approximation was used in the sub-routine. Further 
details of this method are beyond the scope of this appendixo 
Also in Chapter .8, the value of the cumulative normal 
distribution function had to be evaluated at various pointso 
This was in order to calculate the probability that the value 
of a normally distributed random variable (an opponent's tender 
bid) would be.less.than a certain amount (the contractor's 
bid in this instance). 
Once again a UNIVAC supplied sub-routine was used, and 
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this was also based on a numerical approximation to the 
cumulative normal distribution functiono 
In this case, the process shown in figure Gol was re-
versed! The reader is referred to figure G.2. 
cv..,.o(e'l::h" lL 
~ cll~~~~u-4-toiA 
Figure G.2 
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APPENDIX H UNBALANCED BIDDING 
In this Appendix, the reader ~s assumed to be partially 
familiar with the concept of linear programming. However, 
nearly every computer in use at the present time has software 
able to solve linear programming proble~s. Hence, a contract-
or without a theoretical knowledge of linear programming should 
nevertheless have·little difficulty in making use of the bidding 
technique outlined in.the following pages. 
At the outset, it must· .be explained that this method applies 
only .to tenders for unit price contracts. These form the subject. 
of sub-section !.3.2 of this thesis. Furthermore, it is assumed 
that payment for the work takes place at i~tervals while it is 
bei~g carried out. The reader is referred to Section 4.2 of 
this thesis where typical conditions of payment for construction 
work are described. 
Now when the price submitted by the contractor for each 
item of the work has been calculated without regard for any 
outside factors bearing an influence on that contract, .then the 
bid is said to be "balanced". As soon as the contractor alters 
any of his unit rates because of the circumstances.surrounding 
a contract, he is said to have "unbalanced" his bid. 
This subject has.been introduced in Section 2.11 of 
this thesis. It is the purpose of this Appendix to describe 
a technique whereby a tender bid may be optimally unbalanced. 
It is senseless to discuss an optimal technique unless a 
measure of effectiveness is presented to compare different 
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techniques, In linear programming, this measure is known 
as the. objective function. 
When unbalancing a bid, the usual objective is to 
maximise the,present value of all the future payments to be 
received for the work. The present value concept has been 
considered in Chapter 4. 
There are two possible ways of achieving this objective. 
One is to alter the order in which the items of work are carried 
out, and the other is to alter the unit prices for each item. 
while maintaining a given·schedule for their completion, A 
dynamic programming technique is needed for the first method 
while a linear programming method may be used.for the secondo 
This Appendix is concerned with the second method. 
Obviously, one way to maximise the present value of the 
payments would be to obtain payment for the work in advance. 
Since this is.seldom possible, it is seen that there is a 
constraint to the values that.might be assigned to the unit 
rates, These constraints are listed below. 
a) The total price. If the balanced price for the contract 
is P, it is usual to unbalance the bid while keeping 
this constant• If.N. is the number of units of item i 
~ 
and.X. is the unbala~ce4 unit pri~e of item i, then 
~ 
u 
~ 
i=l 
N.X. 
~ .~ 
= p o o o o o (Ho 1) 
Where P is the total price of the contract.and u is the 
total number of bid items. 
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b) The allowable prices of each item~ The unit price of 
each item always has to lie within a certain range. For 
example, a contractor cannot charge R500 for a cubic metre 
of concrete, nor can he charge nothing. If L. and U. 
~ ~ 
are the respective lower and upper bounds to the unit 
price of item i, then 
L. ~ X. ~ U. 
~ ~ ~ 
• •••• (H.2) 
c) The rate at which payment is made. As mentioned above, 
the contractor can hardly receive payment for the whole 
contract at the end of the first month. Also, the client 
might only be able to pay a certain amount at the end of 
each valuation period. If the amount to be paid at the 
end of valuation period j is Qj, and the quantity of item 
~completed in this period is N .. , then: 
J~ 
u 
Q. 
J 
= N. X. J ~ 
GO 0 0 0 (H. 3) 
i=l 
Finally, if the present value of all future payments for 
work done on the contract is f, we have 
k u 
f = ~ ~ N. RJ X ••••• (H.4) Jm. m 
j=l m=l 
where k is the total number.of intervals j at which payment is. 
made.and R is the discount factor. 
R 1 l+q 
where q is the rate of interest, 
H/3 
••••• (H.5) 
It is seen that both the constraints and the objective 
function ~ are linear, and hence a linear programming algorithm 
may be used to find the optimal prices for each.bid item. 
The present writer is of the opinion that the correct 
use of this technique would be·of.considerable benefit to any 
contractor. 
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APPENDIX I NOTATION 
a 
b 
b 
I 
b 
c 
E 
h(s) 
i 
J 
L 
L. 
1.· 
Ill 
n 
N. 
~ 
N •. p 
P. 
P(A) 
P(Win) 
q 
Q. 
J 
R 
R(A) 
R(Ave) 
most optimistic cost for a bill item (the lowest) 
most pessimistic cost for a bill item (the highest) 
contractor's bid for a contract 
increase.to the contractor's bid for a contract. 
estimated cost of a contract; 
contractor's expected profit for a contract 
probability density function of the ratio of the tru~ 
cost of a contract to it's estimated cost 
bill .item number 
valuation period number 
lowest bid for a contract 
lower bound to the price of bill item i 
most likely cost for a bill item 
number of contractors tendering for a contract 
number of units for bill item i in the contract 
number of units of bill item i to be computed in 
valvuation period j 
total price of a contract 
probability of bidding lower than competitor A 
probability of submitting the lowest bid for a contract 
rate·of interest 
amount of money paid for work done in valuati9n period j 
discount factor used to·calculate present values 
ratio of competitor A's bid for the contractor's cost 
estimate for a contract 
ratio of the-average of the other competitor's bids to 
the .contractor's cost estimate for a contract 
R(Low) 
s 
s 
u. 
~ 
X 
X; 
~. 
ratio of the lowest other competitor's bid to the 
contractor's cost estimate for a contract 
r~tio of the true cost of a contract to it's estimated 
cost 
spread (difference between second lowest and lowest 
bids for a contract) 
upper bound to the price of bill item i 
ratio of the contractor's bid to his cost estimate· 
for a contract 
unbalanced unit pr~ce of bill item i 
present value of future cash flows 
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APPENDIX K - DATA LISTINGS 
Errata: In th.e column headings of the final 
set; of data listed, "BID (%J' should 
read "LOWEST OTHER BID (%)" 
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THIS IS THE DATA USED I~ SECTION 8.4 
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• 3 45.'100u 47.!)\.)iJj 6 3 1316.6000 1134.0UOu 9 3 50.1lCC·U 51 .s .. c·u 7 3 5~o4l:(!U 55o3lJ(:(J 11 
3 59.<>uo.J 59 o~u:).J 7 3 221ol)\l0u 266oR\JJ',.} 3 
• 3 t ll• 0 2(;('l; l2l-.3LC.C. 3 3 ll.~o3lJClJ 1l.'>o5uO(J 3 3 ?u6. 'IODu 2u6o7-.!00 9 3 6R.7vuu 7uo8vOu 7 
• 
3 81.QlC·w 8?. (•L( L 8 3 56 o3L•0u 6(j. 4 iJ(ll: 8 
3 37.40CJ 3'3o3uCI:J El 3 154.AOJJ 157.5:.JJI,} 3 
3 ll•. 9(-('i.J llo700li 2 3 7.7uGiJ 7o9u0u 4 
• 
3 lf>.31)Q.J 2Jo8u.)Li 4 
·-
3 65~.900u 693.7uOU 4 
3 1?. 66 o '> C·C'L 1292.?,l.()l; 8 3 37 .5L:Ol.· 38.11vOt. 1U 
3 .st.fiJO..J 87o5uOCJ 7 3 23.4·JOO 23.,uoJ 4 
3 ]5(:.~[-f·~,: 154o4ul.!l; 8 3 7'> .8ucu 78olu00 6 
II • 3 ?lJ.JO:Ju 212.3u:JCI H 3 115.1uOJ 46oO.JOu 12 -3 27.4(:-l.'L 59.5ur.u 3 3 27.11.:00 27o4uuu 3 
• 
3 611.'1:Ji1u 64.9UOv 13 3 1 o. 3..:)!)u 1u.1uuo 2 
3 111 o r·l r c. 14olLf:u 9 -· 3 56r· oul•Ou 583o3UOu 12 . ~ 
3 6 2. flt).).J 63o5uJ0 8 
-- ·-· 
3 t76ouuJu 17 '1. 3uflu 9 ! 3 2~116.7[0v 2410olGUU 7 3 31 P .• euN: 325 o'fu(•u 8 I • 3 151.Ju:)u 161.tJ~Ju 5 3 3'~.tu;)u 31l.6<JJ(J to 3 12lo'>L'(·(.· 124.P~,.r.u 4 3 8P. o9(:0u 93.Au(;ll tu 
• • 
3 46.7u!J0 4fl.9u)J 7 3 t uO ·OO~Ju l>J 1 • ~uOu 0 
3 92.Q(C"l• 911 .9u u 8 3 29.80Clu 37olluN:: 7 
3 ? 3 ~. 'hJOu 211b.lluJJ 6 3 9~o7uOu lUloiiU:)t) 12 
• 
3 26o 7(•( lJ II 3 .?l.( (; 2 3 229.2()0L> 25?o5uoo 7 
3 115. UC'u 123.5uJJ 2 3 317.8vJu 3119ol0t)l) 2 
3 <;11o'>ur·u 57?.11L[L 2 3 1070.110CU 122flolu0~ 2 
• 
3 4•)o qlJOJ 119.0v'J:J 17 3 liiAoluOv 1 5 ~. 9<J,Ju 11 
3 1811o3(.(qj 1811.7Lru 8 3 4<>.eucv b t 0 l'l.l () (; 2 
3 41.1U01.1 49.•1uuu a 3 39.3uJu ll?oluOu 6 
3 ?9!>.9GC•L· 15P.. 7uCt· 8 4 180.70GU t67o2ut•CI 3 
• II ?12.'1U!)J 217.1Uuu 3 4 98 9 o 50:)U 996.1).J,)U 5 4 t'>.?tru 15 o?l.•((; 8 ·- 4 23o7fJlJU 3?.tu(1(J 3 
II q.rtJO..J 11. 5JJu 3 4 429o5unu 459.Ruou 4 
• 4 13. 5(-f(.o no 7uC'u 8 4 9o90G(J l0.9uCiu 5 
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• 
~ 
() 
• 
• 
• 
• AREA LOWEST SECOND BIDDERS AREA LOWEST SECOND B lODE RS 
------------------------------------ ------------------------------------
• q 12.1u00 13 .OvOO 9 q 1 66o10i)O 185.000J 3 
4 174.700u 187.0ufu 2 4 163 oHll;lJ 169.20(10 3 
• 4 ?32.QJ0t.J 31f>.3(J0i) 2 q 94.tu0u 9 5. qcJOtJ 2 4 18?o">Lf.'U 18'i.~ll'(., 4 4 2~.7COu 32 .t()(:lJ 3 
4 16. "3u\1.J tn. Au.J:) 5 4 tu9 .tJ•Ju 111. 6uou 5 
• 4 ?19.9LC'\., 22">o">LI'·L· 3 4 !8(• ol/li( lJ 18;j.6UC'U 5 q 25 5. ':'.J.).J 3u<;.4,JdU q q t 8 6. 4 utJ u ta7.2uov 2 
4 t85.1'(.(L. 16 7 oQl,(•l 4 4 6.4ucu 7.5ucu 7 
• 4 "U '3 • 'l.J•)u 'Ill. 7u•.'u 4 4 6t.S.:hJu 6 5. AJ;J.:J 4 4 56. ?(;(·i,; 56 .AU(·(; q 4 284 .svou 310 o6u0u ' 2 
• 
4 169.30Qu 176 •. JJJJ 3 q 16'1o200U 239.9uou 5 
4 346.~ur.·c "353.AI:Cl 3 4 317.7UGu 385.AuOu <4 
4 t6.7u0J 2'i. 6v )j 2 4 14.7Ullu 18.,1JOu 4 
4 17. 9 c C•u 19.tU:( 3 4 2t'.tt::nCI 24.9uC'v 4 ... .. 
• 4 t7.tJuw 19 .(hJu~ 2 4 tu4.6udu t.J q olluO.J 3 4 tlt.3C:C·u 11'i.3L(ll 2 4 8tii.7UCiu A83.3UCu 2 
4 31fl.'lJO:J 333.30.JiJ 6 4 tu<;.61))t) h:.A.2uJu 1 
• 4 187.6GCU 1 tl<l .SuC'iJ 6 4 2f.'o7u00 29oCU(1U 4 ·-·-4 419.200u qz?.9u·Ju 6 4 29.•JuJu 29.61..)0\J 4 , 
q 322.9CC·u 32 q .6 LC·u 4 4 323 .9(JtJu 33n.Avou 4 
• 
'I 
4 ?53."<J0v 25R o Rl)~J:l 3 4 lt.5vhJ 12.o;uou 6 !I 
4 389.91,;(1 1.; 399 o9L C(. 4 4 4U.2uCt. 4 58 .9L•Oli 4 i' 
··-· ; 
4 84'3.'5J,)U .'35'1. ,1(JJJ 12 q 22'i.50iJLJ 22 '3. 5000 6 
Ji • 4 ;> 4:?. ?.L oc 244 o4U.;(.; 4 4 9(; o4l:Ql, 93.6unc 2 4 l'i.~.:JC'u l'i.<;tJ~j 5 4 359.9u.'Ju 37'i.4.:JJu 7 [! q 2A.H(l. 29o5U(l! 2 4 13A.5L•Ov 14l.?uOO 5 
• 4 qq.<;uJv 74.(1o.JJu 7 4 103';.]().)0 liJ40.1uOO 4 tl 4 3il.7l-(u 44o7i,:C;(; 2 4 2l;Ao3u('O 222.1uec 2 j• 
4 9.4JJ..J 9.Qi.J(JI) . 14 q b.9uJv 7.6tJOI.I 12 .. ~· • 4 167.nC,[0 lbl.rl\-L 2 4 161 oll:('lJ 167.3uCO 3 ~-! q 1'i17.4,JOJ 161)4ollJJLJ 7 4 27.0001.) 29.5UJ\) 4 
4 7t.•. 4 (.;(,.., Bl· .?~:ll.. 2 4 4'l.7L•C'l' 55.8u0t. 2 
• 4 l'l.:>JQ0 19.7\.)Jj 2 4 7.9utJu 9.tJJOu 11 4 11'l.7L0li 12?.7u(L 6 4 8o5l:Gv A.6uec. 9 
4 "'8't.tuOJ 456oi'cFJiJ 2 q 237.700u 26 5 ·ltJOO 5 
• 4 958."il:f-L 969 oOL•foC; 6 4 24!>.7uOt.. 256.Auou 4 
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' 
• 
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• AREA LOWEST SECOND BIDDERS AREA LOWEST SECOND BIDDERS 
-----------------------------------· 
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• 4 3?62.9UOu 333~o4UO~ 3 4 64.60<)1) 66.6000 6 
4 ?32o7l'C•u 264.PL0u 2 4 222.CIJ0u 269.0(101.1 2 
4 135.1.J0u 139. 'lJ(J~ 3 4 sas.()uOu 589.4001) 9 • 4 1G2.9CC:0 l0Po6l;(<() 1 4 243.4uov 249.4uOu 9 
4 37.tlu0v 9'1. 7u·"!iJ 5 lj 1?.20t)u 1 3. 3uOu 5 
lj l8? ... (:0l: 1 9 (• • o; l. (\ C; 6 4 451.9LCU 463.uuC'L. 17 • lj 9!'1.7u0v 9<>..7uJU liJ 4 15"io40·)0 17 4 •. 2uuu 3 
4 66.9t:[L• 71.2Lll' b 4 13 .se:ou 14.4uOlJ 11 
4 119.?u0u 121.1u•Jtl 4 4 41.7u·1u 42.200.J 13 0 
4 hJ6.f,(•C'I..' ll;9 .Pvl-u 6 4 59!' .(:OCIJ 6t..5 .c.uN; 11 
4 21.4tJO:J 21. 7u0u 5 4 24.4;),)0 24.R<JO.J 7 
4 ?u6.rctu 224.Bul'u 4 4 44.7UCu 45.AuOu 6 • q (>6 3 o IJO,)tJ 274. 91)1:) 8 4 s7.4o.Hu 6l.OoJ0i) 8 
4 41 • q (; C•t: 41.<~\..•CC• 17 4 9'> o2U0U 1(J1.6UOU 8 
4 t3J.JuJv 141.<~u<JLI 3 q 92.9.:).)\J 114. 2U0u 6 • 4 99.i>l·CIG lt:lo~l;('U 8 4 487 olil•[J() 492.7uOO 7 
4 4R7.9u(l.J 48'l. 1..;.)() ~ 4 5(1. 20i)U 52.7(h1U 9 I 
4 295.FC:C'u 31] .<;L·(lJ 1l 4 2b~.3(J01.J 274.uunc. 10 .... -- . -. ·- - . 
-
r 
4 83.7tJ0J BF,.r;u,)J 13 4 8 t. 5u•Ju 8 r;. 5U•)u b 
127.]:,()(.1 127.7liCO 6 4 9o5UOU 9 .suoc• / 4 3 
4 121l.9JOu 131.1u.):J 5 4 A. 50•Ju !1.RuOu 11 
4 15.9Ci('L' 1 "i • 9L (·~ 3 4 157.8(!0(.; t73.5u(ll) 14 - --
• 
• 
4 l5.JJOJ 21 • r; J•) (I 3 4 1lo5tJ)U 1 5. ,J<JO J 4 
4 216. t·L (·L> 21R.5l:-C·u 11 ·4 67 .8£•Gu 7c • .::uou 13 • 4 12"i. q!Jt)u 15'1. :JuJCJ 4 4 1694.7uilO 1Bilt.7os-u b 
4 156.7LCU 36A.9uLL 14 4 7? o(.u(JU 79. 3u[!(; tu 
4 227."u0v 24:). OU·)u 9 4 2lqo61JQU 232.7uJu 4 • 4 12 .c ~C·i..i. 111.5uu: 7 4 11 .2eoo 11.7l)()(J 7 
4 186.'l00v 18'1.\h.J;)J 14 q 52.40')1) 54.JUdJ 6 
q 66.fiLtC: 73 .N .. Lu 8 4 143 olL'OiJ t53.nuotJ 1(1 • 4 t29.1uOJ 134.l,tJCJJ 3 4 4A.3(Ji)l) 54.2uOu 4 
4 1173."iU·L 1177.2l.H; 9 4 3A o2L>OU 45o2u01) b 
4 13.}.::>uou 13Cio70L)0 8 4 57.5lltJu 5R.2u00 7 • 4 46.6UCu 49 • 7U(•(J 9 4 11 o4L•Ou 13. 7uCO 3 
• 
4 133.400\J 137.7t.Jl)tJ 3 4 44 ?o0i)')U '5u 2. 2uoo 9 
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THIS IS THE DATA USED I~ SECTIONS 8.6 AND 8.7 
THE FIRST TWO SETS OF DATA WERE SUPPLIED BY A LOCAL CONTRACTOR 
THE SECOND SET OF DATA WAS GIVEN BY BENJAMIN 114) 
~---- --- -··- ·--
-- --- - - . • I 
-- .. -·:.:· ___ ._. --·::: . 
----
. :·- ::.-. :-- .·. .: .... 
,I 
ij 
. 
~ f 
~ 
r 
, 
• 
• :-· __ -___ ·.::..::: . ..:_ ~ 
• . - .. - -~- --· - -· 
• JOB DESCRIPTION PRICE UNITS BIDDERS 
-------------------------------------------------------------
• t EARTHMOVING & RET~INI~G WALLS 6 !0 
?. IIIAR!Nf WORKS 11 7 
3 Of.MOLIT!ON AND R.C. WORK to 3 • 
" 
PIPELINE 5 4 
• 
o:;· M~RTNF WORKS .6 3 
6 M,,RTNF WORKS 1>1 4 
7 F"XCIIVATT0:-.1 ~ R.C. WORI( 4 3 
·" 
R.C.WOR'< 1 5 
Q [aRTHIJKSt R.C. WORK • DRAINS 8 ROADS 11 4 • tO R.C. BRIDGES 6 3 
1 1 IRRIGATION WORKS 3 4 
12 WATER RETAINING STRUCTURE 6 ·. 7 • 13 ROA!1 8RIDSE 9 4 
til WATER QETAIN!NG STRUCTURE 4 . - 6 
t'; R.C. STRUCTURE 34 4 • 11> P!PE:LTNE 7 - 4 
l7 CONCR~TE WORKS <ROADS I 53 
. . 
5 
~~ T R RIG 1\ T I 0 rJ W 0 R K S 7 - 5 ~:--::_-= .. •· .: . .:·:-:--·---· . . . ~ 
• I • 19 P.OAOS AND SEWERS 14 4 
?.1) RATLWI\Y SIOT'IJGS 1U 3 
21 WATFR RETAINI~G STRUCTURE 9 3 • 
:I 
2?. RO~O RRIDGE 5 4 .- --~-- ---~ .---~-'" 
23 WATE~ RETAINJ~G STRUCTURE 5 7 
24 PIPELINE 6 3 • ;.. ·-=-~·- .· -::: ~o; S!D!Mr. 1 3 ?., PTPfl Tr~E 5 9 
27 PIPELINE 6 2 • 2~ PlPFL TNE 5 8 
29 · WATFR RETAIN!~G STRUCTURE 5 5 
1(' PIPELTNE 4 8 
I 
i 
• 31 WATFR RETA!NI~G STRUCTURE 4 4 
.. 
3? . S IOTNr. 1 3 
33 STO!NE 1 3 • 311 PTPFLTNE 13 8 
35 ROAD ARIDGE; 8 .6 
11> WATFR RETAINING STRUCTURES~ ,IPELN 14 10 • 
• 
0 
0 
• 
• 
• 
• JOB DESCRIPTION PRICE U~JI TS BIDDERS 
-------------------------------------------------------------
• 37 ROAO BRIDGES tv 4 
3A BRIOGFS 7 5 
39 PRIOGFS 6 9 • 40 PTPtL TNE AND PU~PING STATION 3 5 
41 PTPF'"l HIE 23 9 
4:? S I 0 HJ r; 6 4 • 43 RO~nJAY liND Bq IDGES 233 6 
41! PTf>FLTNE 2 7 
4"i R!CP~IRS TO CONCRETE STRUCTURE 2 3 • 4f, SI!1TNr. 1 3 
47 P!PFLTNE AND EARTHWORKS 1 8 
4A AR![1GF 31 5 • 40 RRHHi"" 7 6 
s;o PIPFLTNE 3 8 
'51 PTPFLINE 6 4 • 
'5? STOTNG 1 4 
53 SIO!NG 1 3 
'>4 S I 0 !rJG 1 4 • 55 BRI!"'Gf AL TERAT IO~S 2 6 
"" 
ARII"'GF 5 6 
57 PR!f'G"" 4 9 • "iR AR!fJGF 17 3 
59 PUMP SHTION 28 5 
6r'l STfJPIG 3 4 • 61 PIPFLTNE 11 9 
6? P.RIOG!" 4 2 
6~ PIPFLTNf 11 5 • 64 STDING 5 3 
"" 
MARINI'" WORKS 91 6 
"" 
MARIN~'" WORKS 3:?8 5 • 67 I>IARJNF'" WORKS 8 6 
6R SII)TI\IG 1 3 
69 P !PELT NE 13 9 • 
• 
• 
• I. 
I 
~ 
i1 
I iII 
fi 
I 
i 
t· 
t ~ 
~~· 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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• 
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RID= COMPETITORS 810 AS' OF CONTRACTORS COST ESTIM.ATE 
OB P, IOOER 9I D J:JB BIIJOER BID JOB BIDDER BID JOB BIDDER BID JOB BIDDER BID 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------~-----------
1 
1 
:? 
? 
II 
" 
f, 
q 
9 
tn 
12 
t? 
13 
111 
1') 
17 
1'1 
19 
20 
2? 
2~ 
23 
2'i 
26 
2f> 
28 
2P 
29 
~0 
31 
3? 
34 
34 
3'i 
3f> 
3~ 
1 
" 9Q 
1 
qo 
p 
qo 
"' II 
9Q 
1'.! 
1.3 
11 
qq 
13 
2~ 
17 
17 
4 
A 
99 
1'5 
q 
H 
14 
4 
90 
32 
14 
99 
99 
l'i 
q 
31 
3r 
19 
73.4 
1J'l.8 
H.P.. 3 
4 ~) {,. 1 
124. 0 
t \ '· c; 
11 C) .... 
Q '. 1 
! 2 L·. (• 
t 3 3. 1 
QQ. 2 
14 5. 'i 
132. c 
t 24. t 
147.2 
104. 5 
63.6 
73. 4 
1(:11. 5 
89.5 
112. 9 
1311. 8 
1L'7.1 
61. P. 
1 41. B 
75.2 
117. 13 
190. 2 
170. 1 
117. 3 
115. 2 
1 (J "· 6 
t 1 B. 4 
13 7. 5 
1L 3. (.1 
115. 'i 
1 
? 
? 
I) 
c; 
7 
R 
Q 
1 t 
1:? 
1? 
14 
111 
16 
17 
1P 
19 
2f 
2? 
23 
211 
2" 
2f. 
27 
2P 
20 
3i• 
3P 
31 
:n 
311 
311 
3"i 
31-
36 
2 74.3 
7 109.0 
p 116.3 
12 83'1.1 
7 1 2" .A 
qo 11'i.6 
1... 13~.7 
l't 111.0 
17 133.R 
15 8J.() 
19 1u9.2 
l 214.5 
20 86.3 
4 134. c; 
16 117.3 
10 11~.7 
16 611 ·2 
9CI 1uJ.O 
99 114·3 
4 1.;11. 6 
11 114.5 
4 91.1 
99 116.() 
4 6f.. 4 
99 13C.7 
7 81.2 
8 1u9.P 
12 9!1.11 
3C· 2(.3 .P 
4 13r:. 6 
99 111.7 
2q 1J7.R 
11l 161.Q 
16 155.3 
27 1L7o7 
8 116.R 
1 
1 
2 
3 
4 
6 
7 
R 
9 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
21 
22 
23 
24 
26 
26 
27 
2'1 
29 
3!) 
3() 
31 
33 
34 
35 
35 
36 
36 
3 
8 
4 
4 
II 
II 
qQ 
16 
? 
16 
1b 
4 
16 
99 
9q 
99 
15 
4 
4 
15 
8 
15 
15 
29 
4 
12 
31 
99 
7 
15 
25 
27 
11 
36 
28 
14 
7'i.O 
t,;q.4 
1 2(-. 6 
ld0o1 
1 n .5 
6"1.2 
137.(' 
l3'iol 
157.3 
8 9. 8 
114.2 
9Ao3 
8'1.5 
113.1 
122.6 
120. !l. 
117.(' 
tvc.•.2 
72 .o 
115.1 
12').0 
120.2 
57.3 
68.1 
138 .5 
97.0 
110.7 
109.1 
2L6 o3 
130 o A 
t 20.8 
tuR.9 
I 17 .2 
187.7 
1L•7o9 
1B.5 
1 
1 
2 
3 
4 
6 
7 
!l 
lQ 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
1!1 
19 
21 
22 
23 
24 
26 
26 
28 
28 
29 
30 
30 
32 
33 
311 
35 
36 
3~ 
37 
4 
99 
10 
n 
1'1 
A 
4 
99 
14 
4 
99 
16 
21 
22 
4 
4 
99 
19 
26 
99 
23 
99 
12 
27 
16 
3u 
99 
4 
33 
25 
4 
34 
99 
16 
38 
39 
H•l .6 
110.2 
135.4 
11)4.9 
210.2 
8 "'o 2 
151 .8 
14?.2 
98 .5 
lu '1.8 
115 .2 
lu6.8 
9:r.2 
114 ol 
137.1 
127.9 
117.7 
1u c; .6 
83o8 
120.0 
126.6 
12 5. 4 
6('.9 
72.7 
6?.3 
161.0 
1 J1 o3 
116.8 
2211.7 
li:.l <;. 4 
122 .9 
lu9.2 
llQ o3 
tu0.2 
1 L P ·1 
a 11 .a 
1 
1 
2 
3 
5 
6 
A 
q 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
lR 
20 
21 
23 
23 
25 
26 
26 
28 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
34 
34 
35 
36 
36 
37 
5 1U5.R 
10 115.5 
11 169 .B 
99 ll5o1 
4 94.5 
11 83.2 
15 811.'! 
99 \l4oO 
4 tv6.q 
99 130.0 
4 128.9 
qq. 118.9 
19 11)9.1 
4 122.1 
14 139ol 
24 135.5 
4 12 3 .·6 
25 94.7 
99 115.(1 
27 112·1 
24 135o4 
25 87.5 
28 6 1 .1 
99 111. 8 
5 68 ·2 
15 1U2•1 
12 118.0 
16 164o8 
8 Ju9.o 
4 110·4 
16 99.7 
99 ltlo9 
35 12Qo9 
4 101 .a 
99 11.)9.9 
99 115.0 
[I 
) 
,: ~ 
~ 
b 
;i 
\ 
:· 
i 
I· 
. ' 
' \
~· 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
08 ~IODER AID 
37 
31l 
~9 
39 
liD 
Ill 
II? 
~~~ 
1111 
Ill! 
l!"i 
117 
117 
4!1 
119 
50 
51 
52 
5~ 
r:;<; 
55 
51> 
57 
57 
59 
60 
61 
61 
6"5 
611 
,., 
,,., 
67 
I> A 
69 
f:,O 
11 
99 
R 
110 
1'5 
16 
2"i 
4 
qq 
16 
A. 
111 
16 
26 
19 
3(1 
13 
117 
99 
99 
q 
13 
111 
90 
38 
II 
4R 
13 
13 
25 
I! 
I! 
9Q 
4 
30 
111 
122.2 
114.1 
105. 2 
1 ?0. 5 
14 2. 6 
811. B 
9 5. 3 
11·6. 7 
tu R. 8 
193.0 
147. (I 
ll:ll. 2 
1211. 3 
13?.0 
1 J ?. 3 
134. B 
7 'l. II 
94.7 
11 3. 4 
112. 4 
12 q. 2 
17G.9 
P. 6• II 
117.7 
P.5.9 
79.3 
1 Jo.lo 0 
117. 8 
'15.3 
90. 1 
9 R. 1 
102.4 
11 2. 2 
'f3. 1 
9 g. 3 
126. 1 
RIO = Co~PETITORS BID AS ~ OF CONTRACTORS COST ESTIMATE 
JOB BIDDrR BID 
37 
3P 
30 
4(· 
41. 
41 
4::> 
4'1 
44 
411 
46 
47 
IIA 
49 
IIQ 
5l' 
51 
5? 
'54 
5"' 
51> 
r:;~ 
57 
51> 
'jQ 
6( 
61 
61 
63 
611 
6'> 
66 
67 
6R 
6Q 
n 
4 12~ .II 
19 129.7 
13 1~1>.1 
4 luR.6 
311 43.R 
29 81' .9 
4 lu 1 .1 
99 1l;7.2 
3iJ· 116.A 
44 198.2 
25 1J1.6 
5 1u5.0 
41 1.JJ.R 
2R 81!.7 
90 11,J.O 
15 136.2 
4 95.~ 
4 1u8.4 
25 91.<; 
p; 112.8 
Q9 111!.2 
2R 183.2 
13 9.).1! 
2 3 7( .5 
Fl 9">.7 
42 8:?.3 
49 1w6.4 
16 134.R 
4 lu."J .IJ 
99 112.3 
99 117.'3 
51 1l·llo9 
52 117.7 
9'1 ur:..c 
1"' 90.2 
5 611 .9 
JOB BIDDER BID 
3A. 
39 
.39 
40 
41 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
413 
49 
50 
50 
51 
52 
54 
55 
56 
57 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
65 
65 
66 
67 
69 
69 
70 
A 
27 
II 
99 
21! 
99 
99 
41 
29 
45 
99 
4 
4 
13 
29 
14 
14 
99 
4 
14 
11 
23 
2'l 
4 
4 
99 
'l 
4 
90 
11 
50 
43 
4 
54 
29 
11 
86.6 
77.8 
112.~ 
114 .6 
49.9 
lll .B 
tu 6. 2 
11~.4 
129.9 
1t;2.4 
11 c:;. 4 
1u5.8 
1u7.2 
87.9 
11.;7.3 
141 .o 
1.;6.3 
ll:?. 4 
9'5.1 
120.5 
115.1 
81 .4 
95.0 
77 .8 
t._. <; • A 
11 t• .6 
1u7.2 
70.3 
117.7 
1'2 .9 
12R.9 
1 7(•. 8 
11 ~ .t 
9?..3 
lJO.O 
81 .6 
JOB BIDDER RIO 
38 
39 
39 
40 
41 
41 
42 
43 
44 
46 
47 
47 
48 
49 
51) 
50 
51 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
.57 
58 
59 
61 
61 
62 
63 
65 
66 
67 
67 
69 
69 
7tJ 
27 
23 
99 
16 
41 
4 
42 
10 
4 
4 
15 
99 
99 
38 
99 
4 
99 
25 
42 
28 
4 
34 
8 
99 
99 
'34 
99 
99 
14 
38 
11 
53 
8 
55 
4 
4 
8A.4 
82.8 
112.6 
141 .a 
62.6 
1111 .a 
11°.9 
117.9 
13'>.7 
11('1. (! 
tu 1.'3 
11:: .6 
112.4 
9P .4 
111.2 
157.7 
11 3.9 
11.!1 • 7 
lu rJ. 3 
122 .o 
121).3 
8? .7 
9 "i. 7 
124 .(! 
10°.2 
9( .1 
111.0 
H.o .a 
131.4 
92 .e: 
7 ~. 9 
74 .3 
121\.8 
94 .o 
1J0.7 
91 .3 
JOB BIDDER BID 
38 
39 
39 
40 
41 
41 
43 
43 
44 
45 
47 
47 
48 
49 
50 
50 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
57 
59 
60 
61 
61 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
69 
70 
23 89.5 
28 97.9 
19 119.4 
14 142.2 
14 81).9 
15 117.P 
37 1u5.9 
11 123.1 
14 139.7 
99 124.1 
13 1ut.5 
46 . 116.4 
11 117.6 
4 98.7 
8 t 32.7 
16 176.(l 
25 94.5 
4 uo.o 
99 113.4 
23 125.2 
23 125.5 
4 8 4 .t 
38 96.7 
11 83.:? 
25 67.4 
35 92.8 
4 111.3 
29 87.8 
4 n.o 
8 94.8 
99 100.0 
11 tu3.2 
25 89.'l 
16 97.1 
99 111 • 7 
99 114.9 
·~ 
:t 
'i 
I' 
i 
!I 
!• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
!", 
• JOB BIDDERS COST($) SUBCC$1 MARKUPC\l BJDU l 
• 1 5 P··8 6.1 15.311 81.97 
?. 1 30<1.5 237.6 5.20 101.77 
•• 3 9 2 3'l. 2 155.3 5.88 96.16 II 3 8211.2 7116.8 '5.05 99.50 ·--· .. -···· 
• " 
5 37.9 311.6 <1.33 112.90 
" 
5 11 .c lj. 3 19.35 1C5.90 
1 II 1177.7 81>2.9 7.99 99 .t '5 
p 5 2JP.7 182.5 4.33 103.72 
• 9 13 147.6 113.6 5.56 98.83 10 5 3q1.1 213.3 7.1)6 11)4.43 
1 t 9 1>89.1 5!~u.5 4.25 97.37 
t?. 6 851.2 67u.ll 4.53 97.5] • ~...:: ':.·, _··:..:...:·.~-·~ .. ~ ... ~-=..;:,.·:~:.~ :· .;-:::. ·: ... : .. : .-::·_ .-: ·. ·.-:. 13 5 298.2 246.6 5.05 102.37 
14 4 214.4 1RC.u 5.03 . 96.03 
15 b 556.2 1136.5 11.54 108 • 30 • 1f, 6 231-.9• 1'15.9 6.54 101.3(! 
17 b 27?. 5 1?6.6 3.94 q6. 58 
1R b 3(::0.3 175.5 7.81 98.86 
1<1 t3 36'5.9 3t)t).<.J 3. 7b 94.01 • ..... -~7-:-Z-"';: : -~.:..-. . i 
20 5 1117.9 2<18.6 11.9\J 99.c'i 
21 11 su2.2 1150.11 5.13 'hJ.57 
22 1 118P.2 862.5 11.311 - .. 1("2.75 
2:'1 '7 50"'.8 II 11.4 3.92 lO..J. 37 
211 7 49."~.0 2 Atlo) 12.70 10(}.96 
• 
) 
,: l 
• 
1: 
?<; A 6 37.7 439.3 11.81 q6. 29 
26 3 7<;.3 56·6 5.97 101.2:? 
27 6 22f-.6 196.J 3.43 101.43 • 2P 6 217.4 lq9.4 5.28 107.61 
29 9 150. 7 119.9 4.85 97.81l 
30 6 5".7 47.u 4.36 102.91 • 31 5 311. 5 14.5 9.25 1(!2.81) 
32 8 106". 5 756.9 5.37 97.4 0 
3:'1 2 .:;n.s 4..J.B 6.08 101.97 • 311 3 124A.B 8P.1.2 5.5u 103.46 
3'5 5 7P.3 573.u 4.83 98.13 
3~ 10 571· .e 47L•.l 4.13 lOCI .13 • 
• ~ 
' 
• i t 
~ 
0 
~-. ~· • 
• 
• 
• JOB BIDDERS COST!$) SUBCI$) MARKUP 0.) BIOCll 
----------------------------------------------------------
• 37 4 13(!7.5 997.8 4.97 103.17 
3~ 1 lt>'~.3 157.9 3.61 101.84 
• ~Q 4 2?.9 8.8 12.71 118.18 40 6 1::!5~.0 6 3 3 • t• 7.19 1()2.73 
• 
41 7 5~.9 26.3 9.64 95.73 
4? 7 48~.9 344.8 4.82 96.88 
~~~ 6 52'1.9 372. 1 -.41 1 o:; •. :a 
114 6 ~4'i.3 276 .u 5.79 H•5 .9(, 
~, 
• 4'5 10 89F'olJ 6'i7.6 7.13 98.17 4f. 9 69f•. 2 497.3 4.93 1Ql•o98 .. 
---
• 
47 4 1.)4:".6 713.9 4.99 10u.61 
~~~ 5 11A<;.2 H>5 .6 5.65 96.28 ~- -- -->;~ !19 1 1A".4 127.2 5 .L18 101.3!)-
• 
'50 5 121CI.4 9'>3.3 4.42 A8 .73 
'')! 6 4 37. 2 276.9 3.94 1;)2.07 
52 6 127.1! AB.B f..89 101.21 
• 
5~ 4 E•.6 3. 3 l4.JJ 11)7 .46 
54 6 31CI.3 223.5 4.93 1C:2.63 
5'i A q 5~. 9 771.!1 5.211 103.35 
5f. 1 2(7. 9 136.4 6.90 112.12 
• 57 7 35'1.9 216.7 4.11 1D3.4A r:;p 2 4 (•. 7 25.5 14.72 '12.25 
c;o fl ':>14.3 479.d 10 .15 105.77 
• 60 q QQ.4 43.9 6.36 96.34 61 A 31?. 2 226.8 5 .61 1 JtJ • 59 
• 
6? 1 12'io1 'i3.8 '5.86 92.55 
6~ A 1 3 ~. 7 83.3 7.48 103.34 
64 10 123?.7 8A6.1 7.75 Q 5. 3 (· 
• 
6'5 4 A7 0 4 ~.).6 10.79 '12.61 
"" 
7 12?.2 53.7 5 .a 9 1(,6 .2'1 
67 5 l:?l'io4 751.2 6.41 H.•6.61 
• 
6A 3 3"'2:~. (.\ 182.u 3.2l 93.3P. 
~Q 1 157?.0 962.3 5.32 97.56 
70 7 153U.3 91!5.5 6.38 95.7e 
• 
71 4 1:>.3 l.J. J 29.32 1?2.96 
1? A 6A".1 433.6 '5.9(.. 1(12 .57 
• ~ :<:". • j; ,, 
_:j 
0 
• 
• 
• 
• J08 BI DOERS COST($) SUBCI$) MARKUP C :t) BID U) 
----------------------------------------------------------
• 13 J 271.0 1119.9 8.39 106.58 
74 5 60o9 115.1 6.73 105.77 
• 75 6 31[.'.0 236.6 6.11 1')-.J.9B 76 B 6411 .a 557.7 2.91 101.57 
77 2 33.5 16.9 11'! .61 137.68 
•• 7~ 5 137.3 125.5 4.66 98.98 79 'i 19°.3 na.s 4.l)7 98. Fl2 
AO 6 3P.5 31.5 6.l!l 1('6.11 
• 81 6 480.3 377. J 1.95 Q7.911 A? 4 417.11 21v.4 6.75 93.16 
A~ q 4<)9.7 "279.0 5.25 1 Ou. 38 
• 811 7 1:-.7 1. 3 17.02 93.18 85 5 65olJ II 6. 4 7.12 108.74 
• 
86 9 1 r:;. 4 lu.7 ll).(J2 93.07 
87 8 12" .u 94.4 il.6J 101.21 
llA 8 69?.0 585.5 11.72 101.61 
• 
A9 5 2AP..u 192.9 5.Q9 101.72 
9(1 3 3t r:;. 8 22 7.2 5.15 'l4 .57 
--
··-· 
•91 7 187.1 136.9 3.76 94.54 
9? 9 9.9 7.u 9.55 91).94 
• 91 11 9C1 l • 3 664.<J 5.13 11)5.65 911 12 181r.(; 14 3 .2 4.75 1(12.43 
• 
9'i 5 12:,.9 73.1 11.53 102.43 
96 9 44( .9 296.7 4.05 99.29 
97 10 lAoS 111.8 7.56 97.70 
9!1 2 39°.8 296.9 6.31 10uol:5 
•• 09 Fl 3U)o5 208.7 6.27 102.96 
II ton 7 3fi.C. 15.6 2.86 1('5.15 • 101 9 l(JCoo2 'i3.2 9.56 93.4:? 10? A Bl:~.2 62 7.1 3.65 93.38 tO'! 6 2P.l 219.0 6.31 Fl7. 8Fl 
104 5 4 ( .4 19.8 8.37 9 lobrl 
• PJ'i 7 1 "'i /, • 1 'l6.v 1.1J7 1 nu. 27 '!OA 6 2511.2 159.7 5.57 1(17.54 
ro7 1 2117.4 168.9 4 .55 99.711 
• 'lOR 2 31'.6 3u.5 9.114 H•6.24 
• 
• f 
l 
• ~ 
~· 
• 
• 
.• ' 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
•• I 
• 1 
! 
' 1 I 
• l 
... 
I 
• 
• 
• 
.. 
~ 
JOB BIDDERS COST!$) SUBC($) MARKUP C :t) BID n) 
----------------------------------------------------------
tOO 4 2?. 7 4.4 tll.O!I 95.54 
110 4 9 .·4 3.1 10.82 R7.78 
111 6 739 ·"' 4~9.7 '3.49 1!)2.40 1P 8 123!'.0 1039.6 2 .3l.• 98.5 6 
1"13 10 227.5. 177.7 4.29 93.46 
1111 9 89<?.5 512.7 7.14 99.33 
115 7 Bf-.6 135.6 6.25 104.38 
'tlf- 5 17?.2 134.9 4 .8 3 95.62 
117 5 123".9 1u61.1 3.92 1•) 1. 79 
11A 5 26 o; .1 15 7 .a 3.4 3 92 oL 4 
119 1U 1501.1 1u65.8 5 .lJ 96.39 
1 ?C\ A 2 uu o;. 5 1327.\1 .22 9 3.4 3 
121 4 33°.0 235.0 4.95 1iJ7.18 
1?:' 4 9.9 .4 14.62 89.72 
1?3 8 61".8 488.3 2.15 102.75 
1211 10 460.0 32 7 .o 4.38 99.78 
12'5 9 '57'i.2 322.8 4.00 t•Ju. 14 
121> 3 31'.6 3U.3 6.72 84.73 
127 5 q 2['. 7 21l1.U 4.25 106.72 
121l 7 13C7.3 815.8 5.36 li!Uo20 
129 ll 25[•.7 156.7 4. 38 11o).86 
no 6 35.0 16.3 6.62 1P.8o20 
. ' 
... 
• 
fl 
t 
l 
c 
' ! 
• ! 
t 
J-
• j . 
• 
• • 
• 
• 
• 
APPENDIX L - COMPUTER PROGRAM LISTINGS 
Errata In the listings-of the simulat~on program 
used in Section 8.5, the fotlowing changes 
should be made to the comment statements 
concerning the subroutine used to optimize 
the expected profit making use of discrete 
distributions : 
a) Interchange "PROBABILITY OF WINNING GIVEN BY 
PROBABILITY OF BEATING THE LOWEST COMPETITOR" 
with "PROBABILITY OF WINNING GIVEN BY PRODUCT 
OF PROBABILITIES OF BEATING EACH.COMPETITOR" 
b) Interchange "PROBABILITY OF WINNING GIVEN BY 
FORMULA DEVELOPED IN-SECTION 8o2." with "THIS 
SUBROUTINE EMPLOYS.THE METHOD PROPOSED BY 
GATES TO PREDICT THE .OPTIMAL BID FROM SPREAD 
PROBABILITIES". 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• il 
• 
• 
• 
• 
. . - ... ... 
• 
<I 
5 
1DG 
o\Oio-#t~ 
THIS >ROGRAM UAS USED IN SECTION 8.4 - THE CONCEPT OF SPREAD 
AND RESULTS ACHIEVED . 
OIME~SIO~ IHDG!20loG!20l•BLC600ltSPRE0(60u) 
READ WHICH REGION TO CONSIDER 
RE.~O! 13oltJo.JlNCO DE•! IHOG! 1) • I= lo 19) 
FOR)'I~.T(Ilo19A4). 
IF! NCOOE. EQ.:J) STop· 
XBIIR=G. 
YBAR=O. 
X 2=\.• • 
XY=u. 
IN=l 
WRITEC5o2tJ0) CIHDG!I) .I=lol9) 
20f.t FORMAT!1Hltl9A4 .. //t 0 G.ROUP MEII!IJ LCW BID MEAN SPREAO't/t32c•-•h/ 
101 
2 
102 
11) 
READ GROUP LIMITS 
R E.\. 0 ! 3, D 1 l G (.1) 
DO 1 1=2•9 
RE,'ID!8tluliG!l) 
FORMIIT!Flu.2) 
IF!G!Illllo4t 
!'J=O 'f'lll:' ... 
READ LOW~ST AND SECOND LOWEST BIDS 
READ!lbtlO?liCODEtALOWoSECND 
FORM,T!Ilt14XtF6.lt4XoF6.1) 
DfCIDf WHETHER THEY FALL INTO THE GROUP 
IF! ICOOEl 3•3• 
TFCICODE-NCODEl2oo2 
IF!ALOW-GI!-1))2,, 
IFCALOW-GCI>>•2•2 
IF I."-! s::C"JD-ALOWl /ALOW)·;:>, t 
IFCSfCND·LE·~LOWlGO TO 2· 
N=rJ .. t 
BLCN>=ALOIJ 
SPREOINl=SF.C~D-ALOW 
GO TO 2 
,:-.: 
Cf\LCULATE GEONET~ IC Mi::AN5 OF LOWEST BIDS· ANii SPREADS FOR 
CONTR~CTS IN GROUP . 
. . ":"'" :-=:.-.~-:· .::.::.- ·.· -. 
---~· .. -.. _. -.-.:-. -- ·- ~-
-.·.:.-··~ .. ~·-.·. ~-
~ 
.I 
. ~ 
I 
I 
I 
I 
' 
-~ 
4 
1 • 
•• ·' i 
• 
• 
• 
• 
·• 
• 
• 
• 
• I 
t. 
•• 
l • 
i 
=1 • 
:1· 
l• 
0 
• 
• 
() 
3 CALL G~E~N(BLtNtGMBL) 
CALL GMEAN ISPREDtNtGMSPR·O) 
X= AL OGl'L (GM BL) 
Y:ALOGl.J(GMSPROI 
)(B~R=XBAR+X 
YBAR::Y8AR+Y 
X2:X:>+X•X 
'<Y:XY+X•Y 
J:I-1 
WAitt G~O~ETRTC MEANS. 
~A!Tr!5t?01lJtGMBLtG~SPRD 
., 
20.! I='QRM.HflH tlltbXtF'7 .• ?.t7XoF7.2) 
REI.IHJD 16 
1 CONTINUE 
II I=I-1 
24)2 
7 
6 
20"" 
C~LCULATE REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS 
B~IXY-XB~R•YBAR/Il/(X2-~BAR••2111 
~=VB~R/I-B•XBAR/1 
·.e.=tu••A 
WRITE REGRESSION EQUATION 
WRITE! "it 2u2l AtB 
FORM.TilHOt'SPRtAO : 9 tF1.4o• • LOW BID •• •tF7.4) 
N=O 
c•LCULATE MEAN' AND STANDARD DEVIATION OF SPREADS ON ALL JOBS 
RE!Dil6t 1u21 ICoDEtALOIJ,SECNO 
IFIICOOEI6t6.• 
IFilCOOE-NCODEI7tt7 
IFI,?-ISECND-ALOWl/ALOWI7tt 
N=N+1 
«;PREDPJI:ISECND;_ALOWJ/ALOW •· 
GO TO 7 
CALL AMEA~(SPREDtNtXAAR) 
CALL STDEVISPRED•N~t.,SIGMAI 
WRITE M~AN AND STANDARD DEVIATION 
WRTTfl5t2u3lXBARtSIGMA . 
FORM~TilHOt'ON ALL JOBS THE MEAN SPREAU IS !tF10~5t' WITH STD DEV 
1 'tFlu.5l 
REWIND lh 
GO TO 'i 
END 
·.,:..t 
.·_ .. , .. 
.. -;., .. 
''::.· .. 
: ~ 
: t 
'I 
I II 
r 
t 
t 
j 
1 • 
•• I 
' I ,. 
! 1;. 
I. 
• 
• 
1 
.• 
=• 
•• r. 
J• 
I 
•• j 
~ . 
iiil:. 
I: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
0 
!\ 
200 
10() 
12 
6 
10 
... 
THIS ~ROGRAM WAS USED I~ SECTION Be5 
TO CO"'PARE TH.REE MODELS . 
THE USE OF SIMULATION 
THIS IS THE MAIN SIMULATION PROGRAM 
INTEGER CtCW Clt..•l tOIJ CHil tCWCI10t500lt OWCUOtSOOl 
COMMON BL l'hJJl t COS TC l..J • 5<:)Jl t B2150Ul t BIOI t.Jt SOil) • K 
0 HI ENS ION PI OF' t l 01 t IW 1 N C '5 l.ol) l t S PRE 0 C 5 00 h PC I U h XC '5 00 h CPROF 1500) 
IJR I T E I '1·, 2 J 0) I I t I = 1 t II l t I I • 1 = 1 t 4 l , I I, I= 1 t 4 ) 
FOR '1 II T C 1 Hlt ' JO R', 16 X t 'COSTS' t 27X • 'BIOS • t 21X, • CU MULA riVE PROFITS t , I 
1/t 2Xtl:?l!lt/lt 1<11.11 '-' l/) 
REAO THF INITIAL RANDOM r..UI'IB(R 
RE.\018tU\JIXIll 
I"OR'Ib.T IF'll/.31 
IFCXC1l.LE.u.ISTOP 
00 1? I=lt4 
OWIIl=D 
CIJCll=O 
CPROFIIl=tJ. 
DO 1:? J=lolt·O 
OWCCitJI=J 
CW.C I It J I= U 
GENER~TE THE RAN~OH COST ESTIMATES FOR EACH COMPETITOR 
CALL CRAND~ IXt4liOolCO.t20.1 . . 
DO 1 J = 1 • 1 Ou 
DO 6 1=1•4 
N::J.•II+l-1 
COSTI I •J I =X (N) 
~IDCitJl=COSTIItJI 
t=l 
DECIDE WHO HAD THE LO~EST COST 
DO 1 (> C = 2 t II 
IF I CoST I C t J l. LT. CO Sf C I, J I l I= C 
OWCil=OLJCil+l 
OLJCihJl=OWCil 
K=J-1 
IF.CKl2t2t 
CftLL THE SUBROUTINES USING THE DIFFERENT OPTI"AL BIDDING 
TECH'IIOUES 
CALL OPBIOl 
;· 
I ) 
:) 
,:t:,' 
f 
j 
i • 
• 
•• 
• f ~.. ,. 
I j:. 
0 
• 
• 
• 
•• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
.. 
• 
• 
0 
0 
2 
3 
4 
q 
201 
1 
1 
20? 
ll 
20'1 
5 
CALL OPBI02 
CALL OPBIOl 
CALL OPBIOII 
I:t 
Ar 
DECIDE WHO WAS THE LOWEST BIDDER AND CALCULATE HIS PROFIT 
1'10 3 C:2,q 
IFCBlDCCtJl.LT.BIOlltJlii:c· 
HJINCJ):I 
CI.!Cll:C\Jill+t 
r:wccr,JI=CtHll 
'1L CJ I :f•IO I I, Jl 
CPROFIII:CPROFtli+610CitJl-COSTIIoJ) 
12=1-1 
IFI l?oLEotJI I2:4 
DEC!DE WHO WAS THE SECOND LOWEST BIDDER 
no " c=2•" 
JFIC-lltllt 
!FCBIDCCoJI.LT.BIOll2oJlll2:C 
CONTI :VUE 
C~LtU_ATE THE SPREAD ON THE CONTRACT 
5 PRE D I J l : C Fl I 0 I I 2, J l -B Lf Jl l /B Ll J) •1 00 • 0 
B21JI=AIDC I2tJl 
W~ITE THE RESULTS 
WRITfC5t2~11Jo1COSTiloJl •l=lo4) oiBIOCloJlti=te4)olCPROFti~ 0 I:io4) 
FOR~~Tt1Huti~t1Xt12F~o2l 
CONTINUE 
W R IT E C 5' 202 l I I' I:: 1, 4 I , C I o I: 1t 4 l t ( I , I= 1 t 4 I 
FORMATC1Hlt'J0B'ol~Xo 0 0RIGINAL IJINS'o20Xo•FINAL WINS't21Xt'OPTI"U" 
1 B!0S'o//t2Xo1218t//t1DL('-'1/I . 
oo 5 J=l•l()() 
DO 1l C=ltll 
OWCCI::O~.;CCCtJ) 
cwccl=cwccc,Jl 
. A I OF C C l : I B I 0 C C • J I I C 0 S T ( C o J I- 1 • 0 l •1 0 U • u 
1J R IT E C 5 , 2 u 3 i J, I 0 IJ I II , I:: 1', 4 I , I CW c I l , I= 1 , 4 )o I B I 0 P CI ; , I= 1t 4 ) 
FORM~Til~Otilt17o71Bo2Xo4FA.2) 
CONTIIJUE 
GO T.o R 
THIS SUPROUTINE CAlCULATES THE MEAN AND STANDARD DEVIATION OF 
'I 
~ ~ -~ _·.· ~ 
·.:.:.~~ -~- --::. ... =~-.; 
.. :.: .. .:.....- ... ·-· 
'I 
:·. ·--· .-::-.:. ::· ..... ~-: 
I ~ 
I· 
~ .. 
r 
,, 
j 
1 • 
• i 
i 
t·. 
, .• 
I' 
~. 
• 
1 
• 2 
r• ,I. 
I· 
1. I. 
!.· ; ll. l ' 
.,,. 
~· 
... 
• ' 
, •. 
• 
G 
0 
·.' .. ·.· L 
A SET OF NUMBERS 
SUBROUTI~E PARA~INtBRtXBARtSIGMAI 
DI~ENSION BRI50L) 
c:o. 
DO 1 l=l•N 
C:C+fiRIII 
XB~R=C/N 
c=n. 
D02I=l•N 
C:C+IB~III-XBARI••2 
SIGM~=SQRTIC/N) 
RETURN 
END 
"'_"" -~;~ :;~~- -~;;. 
THIS SUBROUTINE CONVERTS ~AiN PROGRAM INFORMATION FOR USE IN 
THE BIDDING SUBROUTINES 
SUB~OUTINE ALTER11CI 
INTEGER C . 
CO~MON BLI~0ll tCOSTI1Uo5~0itB215001tBIOI10t500itK 
DO 1 IJ:loK . . . 
BLIIJI:(qL IIJI/COST(ColJI-t.OI•lOO.U 
R2CIJI=!~2!IJ)/COSTICtiJI-J.Oi•lOO.O 
DO 1 1=1•4 
IF!I-Ciolo 
RIOIIoiJI:(BIDIIoiJI/COSTICt!JI-t.OI•lOD.O 
CO~TINUE 
RETuqN 
END 
THIS SUBRoUTINE CONVERTS BIDDING SUBROUTINE INFORMATION FOR 
·USE IN THj MAIN PROGR~M . 
SUAROUTINE ALTER?!Cl 
INTEGER c· 
CO~MON BLIS~31tCOSTil~o5DOioBZI500itBIDit0,50~1tK 
D~ l lJ=loK . 
RL!IJi:tALIIJI•O.Dt•t.ni•COSTICt!J) 
R211JI=te2!IJI•u.01+1.01•COSTICtiJI 
oo 2 raz=t•4 
IFIIOZ-Cit2o 
RIDIIOZtiJI:{B!DIIDZtiJI•o.ut•t.OI•COSTICtiJI 
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CONTINUE 
CONTI1JUE· 
RETURN 
END 
. .. 
-·~ .. -
THIS ;ET OF SUBROUTINES GENERATES RANDOM NU~BER USING THE 
TECHNIQUE OF APPENDIX G 
SUBROUTINE CRANDN(X,NtXBARtSOEV) 
DIMENSION X(tue0l 
CI\LL CRANDUIXtNl 
00 1 I=loN 
V= X (I l 
XIIl=TINORMIVo$ll*SDEV+XBAR 
CO~J T Iii!UE 
RETURN 
SU~ROUTI~E CRANDUCX,Nl 
OI~ENSION XC1u00) 
CALL CRANDIXoN) 
DO 1 I=l•N 
X (I l =X ( ll •0.,1001 
RETURN 
SURROUTI~E CRANOCX,N) 
DIMENSION Xl1~~~~ 
v= x c u 
DO 1 I=l•N 
XIIl=Y*lJ9.u 
IX=XI ll/A. 
XIIl=XCil-IX•B. 
v=x 1 I> • 1tuN. 
RETURN 
,_ 
THE FOLLOWING SUBROUTINES OPTI~IZE THE EXPECTED PROFIT "AKING 
USE OF CO~TINUOUS DISTRIBUTIONS 
THE METHOD IS 0ESCRI8ED IN APPENDIX F 
PROBABILITY OF ~INNING GIVEN BY PROBABILITY OF.BEATING THE 
LOWEST COMPETITOR 
SURROUTI~E OPBIDt 
DIMENSION AX150~) 
CALL ALTERllll 
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DO 1 L = lt K . 
IFCIWINCLl.E0.1lAX(L):B21L) 
IFCIWINCL>.NE.l>AXIL):ALIL) 
COII!T TNUE 
CALL PARAM(KoAXtXBARtSIGMA) 
XL=~.:.u 
XR= 3.). 
DO 3 L=lo9 
W:CXL+XRl•.5 
Xt=W-.05 
X2=w•.::>5 
V:IXl-XBAMl/SIGM~ 
IFIY-4.)5t5t 
XR=Xt 
GO TO 3 
EP1=Xl•Ct.-RNORM(Y)) 
Y=CX?-XBARl/SIGMA 
EP2=X2•11~-RNORMIY)) 
IFIEP2.LE.~PllXR=Xl 
1FCEP2.GE.EP1lXL=X2 
IFCXR-XU2t2t3 
CONT TIJUE 
AMAX= CXL•XRho5 
~IOClrJl=BIDlloJl•Ct.+.ut•BMAX) 
CALL ALTER2Cll 
RETURN 
PROBABILITY OF WINNING GIVEN BY 
BEATING EACH COMPETITOR 
SUBROUTINE OPBI02 
0 I" E 'IS I 0 N A X C 5 C• U t X BR ( 5 ) , S 6 M ( 5) 
CALL ALTER1(2l 
[lO 1 IC=loll 
TFIIC-2ltlt 
DO 4 L = 1 t K 
Axcu=arncrc.u 
CALL PARAMCKtAXoXBARoSIGMA> 
XBRCIC>=XBAR 
SG'!t.CIC>=SIGMA 
CO"JTINUE 
- -- - -·-·-
····- -· 
PRODUCT OF PROBABILITIES OF 
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XL=O. 
XR=30. 
DO 3 L=lo9 
W::(XL+XRI•·5 
Xl=W-.05 
X2::1.J+.Q5 
Ol=IX1-X3Rilll/SGMAC1) 
03::1Xl-XBRC3)1/SGMAC3) 
04=1Xl-XARI4ll/SGMAC4l 
EP 1 =X 1 * I 1 • - R NOR M I 0 1 I ) * 11 •.,.: R NO R"H 03 ) ) * C l • - RN ORM I 04 ) ) 
01:: I X2-X'IR I 1 )-) /SGHI\( tl 
03::tX2-XARI3ll/SGMACJl 
04=CX2-XBRI4ll/SGMAC4l 
EP?. =X 2 • C 1 .-RN OR M C 0 l I)* C 1. -R NORM I 03) I • U • -RNORM t 04 ) ) -- . 
IF(EP2.LE.EPllXR=Xt 
IFCEP2.GE.EP11XL=X2 
IFCXR-XU2o2o3 
COIIJTI\IUE 
9MAX::CXL•XRI•.5 
BIDC?oJ)::BIDC2oJI•ll.+.ol•B~AXI­
CALL ALTER2 12 l 
RETURN 
-·-
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PROBABILITY OF WINNING-GIVEN BY FORMULA DEVE~OPED IN ~~~~ ~ 
SECTION 8.2 
SUBROUTINE 0~8103 
DII'lENSION AX C5NII oXBRI5hSGMAt51 
CALL ALTER1(3) 
DO 1 IC=1o4 
IFIIC-Jlolo 
DO 4 L=loK 
AX(L)::BIOCICoU 
CALL PARAMIKoAXoXBARoSIG~AI 
XBRCIC>=XBAR . 
SGMA!IC>=SIGMA 
CONTINUE 
XL=u. 
XR=3'1• 
003L=lo9 
tJ::(XL•XR>••5 
-~-----· 
--
~---·:___ ::-: ....... ": ----· . 
__ : . .. - - .... 
.. -.::.- -_ ... ___ ~----- --- --.:· i.. . 
:-:.=..:: -."":_.-:..· :-::::·.-
..! . •; 
I t'j 
; I 
i I 
• I 
,; t 
r 
~ 
~ 
' 
r 
,-
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
e 
• 3 2 
• 
• 
• 
•• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Xl:l.l-.05 
X2:1.1+.05 
Ol=IX1-X3Ril>)/SGM~(1) 
a2:(Xl-XBRI211/SGMAI2) 
Q4:(Xl-XBRI411/SGMA141 
EP1=Xl/(l.+RNORMIOll/(t.-RNCRMCQ1))+RNORMlQ2)/I1o-RNORMI~2))+RNORH 
lfQ41/Il.-~NOR~IQ4111 
Q1:(X2-XPR(l))/SGMA(l) 
Q 2: (X 2- X R R ( 2 l I I SG M A ( :? I 
Q4:1X2-XPR(4ll/SGMA(Ii) 
~P?=X2/(l.+RNORMIQ11/(1.-RNORMI0111+RNORMIQ2J/(1.-RNORMI0211+RNORM 
1( 041/( 1.-RNORM (Qli) l I 
IFIEP2.LE.~Pt1XR=Xl 
IFIEP2.GE.EPllXL:X2 
IFIXR-XLl2t2t3 
CONT HIUE 
BM ,\X: I XL • X R I*. 5 
RID!~tJJ:BJOI3oJl•Ct.+.Ot•BMAX) 
CALL ALTER:?(l) 
RETURN 
THE FOLLOWING SUBROUTINES OPTIMIZE THE EXPECTED PROFIT MAKING 
USE OF DISCRETE DISTRIBUTIONS 
PRORABILITY OF I.IINNING GIVEN BY PROBABILITY OF BEATING THE 
LOWEST COMPETITOR 
SUB~OUTINE OPBIDl 
OLL ALTERl(ll 
A~~ X:J o..J 
EMAX:v.u 
DO 4 C:lt4 
T F ( C -2 l t II t 
f10 1 L: 1 t K 
IF!BiuiCtLilltlt 
IFIBIO!CtLl-3u.ulttl 
P.O:BIOICtLl-0.01 
DO 2 I C: 1 , 4 
IF I IC-:? I t2t 
w:o.o 
DO 3 IL=ltl< 
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IF I B D .L E .BID I I C .Ill l W=W +1 • 0 
PCICl:W/K . 
EP:PC1l•PC3l•PI4l•BD 
IFIEP-EMAXlltlt 
F:rU.X=EP 
'H1~X=BD 
CONTI'IIUE 
CONTINUE 
~IDilrJl =BIDilo.Jl•ll•O+O.Ol•BMAXl . 
C~LL ALTER? C 1) 
RETURN 
PROBAAILifY OF WINNING GIVEN BY. PRODUCT OF PROBABILITIES OF 
BEATING EACH COMPETITOR 
SURROUTINE OPBID2 
OLL ALTERll?l 
-AMAX-::o.J • ..J 
EMAX=u•u 
DO 1 L=l•K 
IF(1WINCll-2lt3t 
IF18Lill) ltlt 
IF!30.~-BLILllltt 
"lD-::BL I U -u.Ol 
GO TO 4 
IFIB21Ulltlt 
IFC30.0-82CLllltt 
"lD=B2 cu-o .ut 
W:fi.f: 
DO '2 IDO=l•K 
IFCIWINCIDOl-2lt5t 
IF C BL C I Qj l • GE. B 0 l W= W +1 • 0 
GO TO 2 
5 IFCB2CIUJl.GE.BDlW=W+l.O 
2 CONT I.IJUE 
EP=WtK•BJ 
IFIEP-EMAXlltlt 
.EMI\X=EP 
EHUX=BD 
1 CO!IIT INUE 
RIDI2rJl=BIDI2oJl•ll.O+O.OI•BMAX) 
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CALL ALTER212) 
RETUqN 
PROBAfliL lTV OF WINNING GIVEN BY FORMULA DEVELOPED IN 
SECTION 8.2 
SUBROUTINE ~PBJ03 
CALL ALTER113) 
BM~X=u.u 
EMAX=u.J 
DO 1 I=l•K 
JFISPRED1Il-3Ciou) ttl 
RD=SPRE"OIIl-Lt.ul 
I.J=·1• (' 
DO 2 L = 1 •K 
IF!BO.LE.SPRED!LllW=W+l.~ 
EP=WIK•BO . 
IF!EP-EMAXlltlt 
EMAX=EP 
!'lMI\X=BD 
CONT I~JUE 
RIDI1tJl:BIDI3tJl•Ct.u•U.Ol•6MAXl 
CALL ALTER?!3) . 
RETURN 
.-- ·. :=.-·.·: -·-
THIS SUBROUTINE 
THE OPTIMAL BID 
SUBROUTINE OPBID4 
CALL ALTER 1!4) 
CJM~X=u.o 
EMPLOYS THE METHOD PROPOSED BY GATES TO PREDICT 
FROM SPREAD PROBABILITIES 
F:MAX=iJ.u 
DO 5 C=1•4 
IFIC-4),~, 
DO 1 L=l•K 
IF ! I IJ IrH Ll -4 l , 7 , 
IFC6Lilllltl• 
IFIBL!Ll-30.0lttl 
BD=BLILl-u.ul 
GO TO A 
9D=B?!Ll-u.C..l 
P!ll=t.o 
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PC21=1.1J 
PC4l=1.() 
0:> 2 IC=l r4 
. IF C I C -4 I t 2, 
w=o ol) 
00 3 IL=l•K 
IFIBO.LE.BIOCICtiLIIY:W+t. 
CONTINUE 
PIICl=Wt< 
CONT hUE 
' ~~ .. · 
"-7!- • ~ --•. • .• ;.:: 
EP = B fJ/ ! 1 • J • C 1 • Cl- P C 1) I I P ( l) + C 1 • 0- P ( 2 I I I P ( 2 ) + C t • :>-PI 4 I I /PC 4 ) ) 
DO 'I IC=lrll 
IFIIC-3lr4t 
TFCPIICl .LE.O.OIEP:O.U 
CONTINUE 
IF CEP-EM AXI lrlt 
EMAX=EP 
EIMAX=BO 
CO~ITINUE 
CONTINUE 
RI0(4,J):BIDiflrJ)*(l,Q+~.Ol+BMAXt 
CALL ALTER214l . -
RETURN 
THIS PROGRAM WAS USED IN SECTION 8.6 -PARALLEL COMPARISON OF 
THE MODELS WITH ACTUAL RESULTS 
THIS WAS THE MAIN PROGRAM 
OIMENSIO"' CEC20JI tNCOMPC2iJOltCBIOC2UOltABIDC2U~ltBLC2CJOI 
WR ITF: I 5, 2LCJI 
201) FORMAT!lH1r8Xr'CONB~CT0R'•12Xo'LOWBI0't13Xr'FORMULA'tlt' JOB 
13C'BID PROF ''t6X)t//l 
R E A D C 1 o; , 1 u 0 l C J t C E· I J I , N C 0 M P C J I , I = t , 7 0 I 
RfAO DATA ~N PAST BIDS 
liJO FORMAT!l?r42XrF5.2t5Xti2l 
DO 1 J=lo70 
N=JIJCOMP CJl 
NC=u 
DO 2 I=1rN 
REJIDC lhr lul I" rBR 
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FORMATI4Xtl2t3XtF6.1) 
IFIM-9 1H3u3 
C3IDIJI=BR 
GO TO 2 
IFIBL!J) .LE.O.)Bl(Jl=BR 
IF I 8 R- 2uJ • ) t, 2 
: __ -.. -.. ':'" .. :::.:.·-·--
~- .... 
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SET UP DISTRIBUTIONS OF THE LOWEST BID RATIOS AND THE AVERAGE 
BID RATIOS 
ABIDIJI=ABIDIJ)•BR 
NC=NC:+l 
CONT I~JUE 
~AIDIJ)=&BIDIJ)/NC 
CONTINUE 
DO 4 J=2t7n 
K=J-1 
CALCULATE THE OPTIMUM. BIDS PREDICTED BY THE "ODELS 
CALL PAkAMIKtBLoXBARtSIGMA) 
CALL OPBID193.ol9.oOPTt1) 
BL9 ID=OPT 
CALL PARAM!KtA~IDoXSARoSIGMA)~ 
N=NCOMP!Jl-1 
CALL OPBID11D8 •• 19.,0PTrN) 
FBID=OPT 
X= PL I J) ~. 
CALCULATE THE. PROFITS WOIII BY THE ACTUAL CONTRACTOR AND BY 
THE ~ODELS . 
IFICP.IDIJ)-Xltt5 
CP=CP+ICAIDIJ)-100.)•CEIJ)•.Ot 
CW=CW+CEIJ) 
CPP=CP/CI.J•lu) • 
IFIELBID-X) ,.6 
~LP=RLP+IBLOID-laO.l•CEIJ)•.Ot 
BLW=BUJ+CEIJ) 
BLPP=BLP/BLI.J*lOO. 
IFCFBID-Xl ,.7 
FP=FP+IFAIO-luO.l*CEIJ)•.Ot 
FW=n!+CE I Jl 
FPP=FP/FW•1UJ. 
WRITE RESULTS 
I.JRITEI5o20llJrCBIDIJ)rCPrCPPtBLBIDtBL~tBLPPtFBIDtFPoFPP 
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FORMATCli ti3t1Xt3CF6~2tF6.2tF6.2tlXl) 
CONTINUE 
~RITEC5t202lXBARtSIGMA 
FORM~TC1HOt2F10.4) 
<;TOP 
END 
.• -~-: ·~.:.:""::~ .:-.::-~·~-~'7".:" -:.; -~. 
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-- ... ·. ----=- :.-~~:-~ ... ·.-
----- .. -
'::.. -· .-·.:::...-. ... :-·-- .;·----~--- .. ··- ___ ..:,,-... - · .. .:. .. 
THIS SUBROUTINE CALCULATES THE MEAN ANO ST~ND~RO'DEVIATION.OF A· 
SFT OF· NUMBERS 
. _:_:~:-~~=~~-- ~ :.:. 
SURROUTI~E P~RAMCN•X•X~AR,SlGMAl 
0 I t-1 E ~.JS I 0 II! Y C 2 L U 
c=o • 
DO 1 I=l•N 
C=C+X(l) 
XBAR=C/N 
C=J. , 
DO 2 I=l•N 
C=C•CXCil-XBARl••2 
SIGMII=SORTCC/N) 
RETURN 
END 
THIS SUBROUTINE CALCULATES THE OPTIMAL BID MAXIMIZING THE 
EXPECTED PROFIT BY THE METHOD OF APPENDIX F 
SURROUTINE OPBIDIXBAR,SIGMAtOPT,N) 
XL=H·u. 
·XR=l5u • 
DO 1 K=ltlO 
X=IXL+XRl•.S 
xt=x-.os 
X2=X•.05 
Y=CXl-XBtRl/SIGMA 
IFCY-11.)2•2• 
XR=Xt 
GO TO 1 
EPl=CXl-lGD.)/Cl.•N•RNORMCY)/tt.-RNORMCV))) 
Y=IX?-XB~R)/SIGMA 
EP 2 = C X 2 -.li_,('. l I C 1. + N•R NORM C Y )./ ( t.- RNO RM I Y) ) l 
IFCEP2.LE.EPllXR=Xt 
TF!EP2.GE.EPI)XL=X2 
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IF!XR-XLI3r3r1 
CONTINUE 
OPT=<XL.+XR1•.5 
RETURN 
END 
THESE P~OG~AMS WERE USED IN SECTION 8.7 - THE CORRELATION 
BETWEEN SUGGESTED FACTORS INFLUENCING A TENDER BID 
THIS PROGRAM PLACES ITEMS OF DATA ON PAST TENDERS IN GROUPS AND 
TAKES THEIR MEANS 
OIME.'\1 SIO~ RL I 20oJI rC( 2u•)) •N ( 20<.il, ID< 21)0) tS 12001, FR( 200 I, Fq 200 I, Nf( 
l2GDitiFD12ti~lrFS!2GUltFN!5UitFOI5Ul .. 
R!:AD THE DATA 
R E II D ( 1 <;, 1 vfl I ( F C I .JI , NF ( .J) , .J= lf 701 
FORMAT144XrF5.2r5Xrl2l 
DO 5 I=lo7(1 
IDO="JFIIJ 
no 6 J=I.rDo 
RE110116rlJ1l~tBR 
FOR~ATI4Xri2r3XrF6.1J 
IF IM-9'11 r6t 
IF!FPI II ·Lf.C.IFB<Il=BR 
CONTINUE 
CONT!'IIUE 
RANK rHE DATA IN ASCENDING ORDER ACCORDING TO THE LOWEST BID 
ON EACH TENDER 
no 1 I=l• 10 
M.HJ=1 
00 4 J=2t70 
IF!F~IMlNl•GT.Fb(JIIMIN:J 
CO'JT TNUE 
J=~"HJ 
'3LIII=FBIJI 
F81Jl=FBI.Jl+2u0 • 
CIII=FC<Jl 
NIII=NFIJI 
CONTINUE 
WRITE15t2001 
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20C FORMAT11Hlo7Xo'LOW BID COST .NUMBER DURATION SUB_ 9 o/t7X•39P-
3 
201 
2 
20? 
lOll 
1')//) 
PLACE IN 5 GROUPS 
DO 2 100=1•5 
DO 3 I=lo14 
J= I •1 4 * I I u 0-1 I 
FB!Il=P.L!JJ 
FC!Il=CIJJ 
IFICIJJ.LE.u.lFCCil=•u01 
FN!Il=N!Jl 
CO~!T T:IIUE 
C~LCU_ATE THE MEANS 
CALL. AMEfNIFPol4oAFBJ 
CALL A~1E~NIFCo14oAFCl 
CALL A~E~NIFNo14oAFNl 
CALL G~E~NIFRo14oGFBl 
CALL GMEt~(FCo14tGFCJ 
CALL GMEANIF~ol4oGFNl 
WRITE THE RESULTS 
WRITEI5o2u114FBoAFCoAFN 
FORMo"ITilH o'AMEAN 'o1FR.?l 
WRITEI5o~J21GFBoGFCoGFN 
FORM~TilH t'GMEAN •,~F~.2l 
STOP 
~1\jQ 
.··-· -- --- .. : . -. - ~::..... . -:.;: 
THIS ~ROGRA~ WAS USED TO PLOT SCATTER OIAGRA~S ~F VARIOUS 
F~CTORS THOUGHT TO AFFECT THE LOWEST BID 
OIMEIIJSION X12utll oY(20uJ tXNAMf20l•YNAM(201 
DIMENSION NCI20ul 
READ THE nATA 
REIIOI8tHLIN 
FORMHII3l 
M AXX = 1 
~lAXY=l 
MINX=l 
~HNY=l 
DO 1 I=loN 
REAOI8ol01INCIII oYtlltZ 
. .::· -=-·--=· ·:~. ::. ·-·-:--~·:.·;- .. 
.. ···--- .. "' 
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1 
200 
9 
FORMAT14~tl3t2XtF6.2t4XtF6.2) 
SET THE SCALES ON BOTH AXES-
VI I >=ZIYI I l•ll.jQ • 
X!Il=NCIIl 
IFIXIMAXXl-XIIll2t3t3 
"'AXX:I 
IFIXIMINXl-XIIll5t5t4 
MINX= I 
IFIYIMAXYl-Yilll6t7t7 
MAXY=I 
IFIYIMI~Yl-YIIll1•1•8 
MINY=I 
corJTirJUE 
RA~GX=XI~AXXl-XIMINXl 
~A~GY:YIMAXYl-YIMINY) 
XS=tr./RANGX 
YS:8./RA.\IGY 
X0=-4./XS+XI~INXl 
Y0:-4./YS+Y(~INYl 
CALL SCALFIXStYStXOtYOl 
PLOT THE ,iXES 
U:l.IXS 
~JI:RaNGX/U+u.5 
!:~ .•. --~:-:-:-·;· ;::.-
OLL FGRIDII:tXIMJNX)tYIMINYI~UtNl) 
CALL FGRID llltXIMINXI tY01AXYI tUtNI I 
Z=XIMAXXl 
NI=NI•l 
DO 9 1=1 tNI 
W:Z+0.1/XS 
V:YII'.lNYl-1.7/YS 
LIIBEL THE AXES 
CALL FCHARIWtVt.ltoltl.57u8) 
t.IRITE17r2uOlZ 
FOR"l·\TIF,.l) 
z=z-u 
ll=l./VS 
Nl=R~NGYIU+u.5 
CALL FGRIDiltXIMINXItYIMINY)tUtNII 
CALL FGRIDfltX!MAXXl tY!MINYI tUoNII 
Z=Yif"AXYl 
• ~.:;,._.::... __ ;;; ~ ~:-• ..=.·~:...;.___. .•· • 
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